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2Extreme self-denialIn M. Marraffa, D. De Caro & F. Ferretti (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 2006.
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84Sensations and grain processesIn Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.), Evolving Consciousness, John Benjamins. 1998.
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26Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem. By Michael E. Levin (review)Modern Schoolman 59 (4): 301-302. 1982.
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21Explanation and Power: The Control of Human Behavior. By Morse Peckham (review)Modern Schoolman 57 (2): 168-171. 1980.
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36Ultimate differencesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4): 698-699. 1995.Gray unwisely melds together two distinguishable contributions of consciousness: one to epistemology, the other to evolution. He also renders consciousness needlessly invisible behaviorally.
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24Oxford Textbook of Philosophy and PsychiatryOxford University Press. 2006.Psychiatry is unique in medicine in being on the border between science and the humanities. Science provides insight into the 'causes' of a problem, enabling us to formulate an 'explanation', while the humanities provide insight into its 'meanings' and helps with our 'understanding'. The new interdisciplinary field of 'philosophy of psychiatry' has developed to explore the range of issues relevant to this border country. The Oxford Textbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry is a unique textbook which…Read more
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30More on the Goodness of SkinnerBehavior and Philosophy 11 (1): 45. 1983.Discusses B. F. Skinner's proposal in Beyond Freedom and Dignity that reinforcing stimuli are important in the production and modification of value talk. The argument that the view that values are reinforcing leads to moral nihilism is discussed. It is concluded that moral standards can be objective without being universally deployable, and that Skinnerian morality is objective. It shows that certain actions are morally appropriate, others morally wrong. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, a…Read more
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25Philosophical psychopathology and self-consciousnessIn Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Blackwell. pp. 194--208. 2007.
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44Guilty consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 255-256. 1995.Should we distinguish between access and phenomenal consciousness? Block says yes and that various pathologies of consciousness support and clarify the distinction. The commentary charge that the distinction is neither supported nor clarified by the clinical data. It recommends an alternative reading of the data and urges Block to clarify the distinction.
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Self-ascription: Thought insertionIn Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion, Oxford University Press. pp. 89. 2004.
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32Dissociation, self-attribution, and redescriptionBehavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4): 719-719. 1994.
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18Review of grant Gillett, Subjectivity and Being Somebody: Human Identity and Neuroethics (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (5). 2009.
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68Are qualia a pain in the neck for functionalists?American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1): 73-80. 1985.
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14Psychopathology, Freedom, and the Experience of ExternalityPhilosophical Topics 24 (2): 159-182. 1996.
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33Reconcevoir le délirePhilosophiques 33 (1): 183-195. 2006.Les délires sont des composantes cruciales de nombreux troubles psychiques, surtout la schizophrénie. Que sont les délires? Selon l’opinion courante, il s’agit d’un type de croyance, plus précisément, une croyance pathologique. Malheureusement, l’opinion courante ne correspond pas rigoureusement, dans tous les cas, à la pratique clinique, où l’expression « délire » est souvent appliquée à des états qui ne sont pas des croyances. Nous examinons les raisons pour lesquelles des états qui ne sont pa…Read more
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387Phenomenal intentionality and the brain in a vatIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. 2004.
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119Consciousness and intentionalityIn Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Blackwell. pp. 468--484. 2007.
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74When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted ThoughtsMIT Press. 2000.An examination of verbal hallucinations and thought insertion as examples of "alienated self-consciousness."
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46In and Out of MePhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (4): 323-326. 2004.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In and Out of MeGeorge Graham (bio)An important role in many recent philosophical analyses of personal well-being and psychological health has been played by a principle I call the "the principle of responsible innerness." This principle states that a person is psychologically healthy and well only if she or he acts in critical situations on preferences and desires that are responsibly in her or him rather than being merely in her or…Read more
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1On what is good: A study of BF Skinner's operant behaviorist viewBehaviorism 5 (2): 97-112. 1977.
Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |