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Samuel Allen Alexander

Ohio State University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    41
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    28

 More details
Ohio State University
Department of Mathematics
PhD, 2013
New York, NY, United States of America
0000-0002-7930-110X
Areas of Specialization
Artificial Intelligence Methodology
Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence
Epistemology
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Mathematics
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence Methodology
Epistemology
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Mathematics
  • All publications (41)
  •  910
    Arithmetical algorithms for elementary patterns
    Archive for Mathematical Logic 54 (1-2): 113-132. 2015.
    Elementary patterns of resemblance notate ordinals up to the ordinal of Pi^1_1-CA_0. We provide ordinal multiplication and exponentiation algorithms using these notations.
    Set Theory
  •  196
    The First-Order Syntax of Variadic Functions
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 54 (1): 47-59. 2013.
    We extend first-order logic to include variadic function symbols, and prove a substitution lemma. Two applications are given: one to bounded quantifier elimination and one to the definability of certain Borel sets.
    Predicate LogicMathematical Logic
  •  1390
    Formulas for Computable and Non-Computable Functions
    Rose-Hulman Undergraduate Mathematics Journal 7 (2). 2006.
    Computability
  •  742
    A purely epistemological version of Fitch's Paradox
    The Reasoner 6 (4): 59-60. 2012.
    Knowability
  •  987
    Guessing, Mind-Changing, and the Second Ambiguous Class
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 57 (2): 209-220. 2016.
    In his dissertation, Wadge defined a notion of guessability on subsets of the Baire space and gave two characterizations of guessable sets. A set is guessable if and only if it is in the second ambiguous class, if and only if it is eventually annihilated by a certain remainder. We simplify this remainder and give a new proof of the latter equivalence. We then introduce a notion of guessing with an ordinal limit on how often one can change one’s mind. We show that for every ordinal $\alpha$, a gu…Read more
    In his dissertation, Wadge defined a notion of guessability on subsets of the Baire space and gave two characterizations of guessable sets. A set is guessable if and only if it is in the second ambiguous class, if and only if it is eventually annihilated by a certain remainder. We simplify this remainder and give a new proof of the latter equivalence. We then introduce a notion of guessing with an ordinal limit on how often one can change one’s mind. We show that for every ordinal $\alpha$, a guessable set is annihilated by $\alpha$ applications of the simplified remainder if and only if it is guessable with fewer than $\alpha$ mind changes. We use guessability with fewer than $\alpha$ mind changes to give a semi-characterization of the Hausdorff difference hierarchy, and indicate how Wadge’s notion of guessability can be generalized to higher-order guessability, providing characterizations of ${\mathbf{\Delta}}^{0}_{\alpha}$ for all successor ordinals $\alpha\gt 1$
    Mathematical Logic
  •  790
    A paradox related to the Turing Test
    The Reasoner 5 (6): 90-90. 2011.
    Philosophy of Computation, MiscComputabilityThe Turing Test
  •  931
    This sentence does not contain the symbol X
    The Reasoner 7 (9): 108. 2013.
    A suprise may occur if we use a similar strategy to the Liar's paradox to mathematically formalize "This sentence does not contain the symbol X".
    Gödelian Arguments Against AI
  •  1373
    An axiomatic version of Fitch’s paradox
    Synthese 190 (12): 2015-2020. 2013.
    A variation of Fitch’s paradox is given, where no special rules of inference are assumed, only axioms. These axioms follow from the familiar assumptions which involve rules of inference. We show (by constructing a model) that by allowing that possibly the knower doesn’t know his own soundness (while still requiring he be sound), Fitch’s paradox is avoided. Provided one is willing to admit that sound knowers may be ignorant of their own soundness, this might offer a way out of the paradox.
    InfallibilityKnowabilityEpistemic Paradoxes, Misc
  •  955
    Biologically Unavoidable Sequences
    Electronic Journal of Combinatorics 20 (1): 1-13. 2013.
    A biologically unavoidable sequence is an infinite gender sequence which occurs in every gendered, infinite genealogical network satisfying certain tame conditions. We show that every eventually periodic sequence is biologically unavoidable (this generalizes König's Lemma), and we exhibit some biologically avoidable sequences. Finally we give an application of unavoidable sequences to cellular automata.
    Philosophy of Biology, Misc
  •  1618
    A Machine That Knows Its Own Code
    Studia Logica 102 (3): 567-576. 2014.
    We construct a machine that knows its own code, at the price of not knowing its own factivity.
    Formal Epistemology, MiscGödelian Arguments Against AITheories of Knowledge, MiscLogic and Philosoph…Read more
    Formal Epistemology, MiscGödelian Arguments Against AITheories of Knowledge, MiscLogic and Philosophy of LogicQuantified Modal Logic
  •  1193
    Fast-Collapsing Theories
    Studia Logica 1 1-21. 2013.
    Reinhardt’s conjecture, a formalization of the statement that a truthful knowing machine can know its own truthfulness and mechanicalness, was proved by Carlson using sophisticated structural results about the ordinals and transfinite induction just beyond the first epsilon number. We prove a weaker version of the conjecture, by elementary methods and transfinite induction up to a smaller ordinal.
    Formal Epistemology, MiscPhilosophy of AI, MiscLogic and Philosophy of LogicQuantified Modal Logic
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