•  594
    Fast-Collapsing Theories
    Studia Logica (1): 1-21. 2013.
    Reinhardt’s conjecture, a formalization of the statement that a truthful knowing machine can know its own truthfulness and mechanicalness, was proved by Carlson using sophisticated structural results about the ordinals and transfinite induction just beyond the first epsilon number. We prove a weaker version of the conjecture, by elementary methods and transfinite induction up to a smaller ordinal
  •  272
  •  502
    Guessing, Mind-Changing, and the Second Ambiguous Class
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 57 (2): 209-220. 2016.
    In his dissertation, Wadge defined a notion of guessability on subsets of the Baire space and gave two characterizations of guessable sets. A set is guessable if and only if it is in the second ambiguous class, if and only if it is eventually annihilated by a certain remainder. We simplify this remainder and give a new proof of the latter equivalence. We then introduce a notion of guessing with an ordinal limit on how often one can change one’s mind. We show that for every ordinal $\alpha$, a gu…Read more
  •  434
    This sentence does not contain the symbol X
    The Reasoner 7 (9): 108. 2013.
    A suprise may occur if we use a similar strategy to the Liar's paradox to mathematically formalize "This sentence does not contain the symbol X".
  •  699
    An axiomatic version of Fitch’s paradox
    Synthese 190 (12): 2015-2020. 2013.
    A variation of Fitch’s paradox is given, where no special rules of inference are assumed, only axioms. These axioms follow from the familiar assumptions which involve rules of inference. We show (by constructing a model) that by allowing that possibly the knower doesn’t know his own soundness (while still requiring he be sound), Fitch’s paradox is avoided. Provided one is willing to admit that sound knowers may be ignorant of their own soundness, this might offer a way out of the paradox