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45Iris Murdoch and the borders of analytic philosophyRatio 25 (2): 164-176. 2012.Iris Murdoch's philosophical texts depart significantly from familiar analytic discursive norms. (Such as the norms concerning argument structure and the minimization of rhetoric.) This may lead us to adopt one of two strategies. On the one hand an assimilation strategy that involves translation of Murdoch's claims into the more familiar terms of property-realism (the terminology of ethical naturalism and non-naturalism). On the other hand, there is the option of adopting a crossover strategy an…Read more
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6A Philosophy to Live By: Engaging Iris Murdoch by Maria Antonaccio (review)Philosophy Now 101 38-39. 2014.
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5The Next Democracy?: The Possibility of Popular ControlRowman & Littlefield International. 2015.Responding to widespread disenchantment with electoral politics, this book gives a practical examination of the possibilities offered by a generalized system of direct democracy.
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35Lockean puzzlesJournal of Philosophy of Education 41 (3). 2007.In analytic moral philosophy it is standard to use unrealistic puzzles to set up moral dilemmas of a sort that I will call Lockean Puzzles. This paper will try to pinpoint just what is and what is not problematic about their use as a teaching tool or component part of philosophical arguments. I will try to flesh out the claim that what may be lost sight of in such Lockean puzzling is the personal dimension of moral deliberation—for example, moral problems differ from technical problems in the se…Read more
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55Stuart P. Green, Lying, cheating, and stealing: a moral theory of white-collar crime: Oxford University Press, 2006, 284 pp, Hardback, £40, ISBN 0-19-926858-4Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (3): 333-336. 2007.
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56Iris Murdoch's mortal asymmetryPhilosophical Investigations 30 (2). 2007.Iris Murdoch holds that the best sort of life is a figurative death of the self. This figurative death is informed by an acceptance of real mortality. A recognition of mortality is supposed to help redirect our attention away from self and towards others. Yet these others are also mortal but (unlike the self) remain worthy of love, care and consideration. That is to say, the significance of mortality for Murdoch depends on whose mortality is at issue, whether it is the mortality of the self or o…Read more
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459The WroNGNeSS oF SeX WiTh ANiMALSPublic Affairs Quarterly 25 (3): 241-256. 2011.For sexual purposes, animals are off limits. But if we regard attributions of species membership as unimportant in familiar ethical contexts, then it may be difficult to explain why this is the case. Someone who is unimpressed by appeals to species membership as a basis for favoring humans over non-humans may remain similarly unimpressed by such appeals when sex becomes an issue. Species barriers may seem to be beside the point. Peter Singer’s attitude toward human sexual relations with non-huma…Read more
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43Murdochian humilityReligious Studies 43 (2): 217-228. 2007.The following paper sets out a view of humility that is derived from Iris Murdoch but which differs from a strict Murdochian approach in two important respects. Firstly, any association with self-abnegation is removed; and secondly, the value of a limited form of pride (recognition pride) is affirmed. The paper is nevertheless strongly continuous with her work, in the sense that it builds upon her rejection of universalizability on the specific grounds that we have varying moral competences. A l…Read more
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94False emotionsPhilosophy 83 (2): 213-230. 2008.This article sets out an account of false emotions and focuses upon the example of false grief. Widespread but short-lived mourning for well known public figures involves false grief on the part of at least some mourners. What is false about such grief is not any straightforward pretence but rather the inappropriate antecendents of the state in question and/or the desires that the relevant state involves. False grief, for example, often involves a desire for the experience itself, and this can b…Read more
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97The duplication of love's reasonsPhilosophical Explorations 16 (3). 2013.If X loves Y does it follow that X has reasons to love a physiologically exact replacement for Y? Can love's reasons be duplicated? One response to the problem is to suggest that X lacks reasons for loving such a duplicate because the reason-conferring properties of Y cannot be fully duplicated. But a concern, played upon by Derek Parfit, is that this response may result from a failure to take account of the psychological pressures of an actual duplication scenario. In the face of the actual los…Read more
Areas of Specialization
Applied Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Applied Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |