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Eric T. Olson

University of Sheffield
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Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
  •  380
    What are we?
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6): 37-55. 2007.
    This paper is about the neglected question of what sort of things we are metaphysically speaking. It is different from the mind-body problem and from familiar questions of personal identity. After explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, the paper tries to show how difficult it is to give a satisfying answer
    Personal Identity, Misc
  •  137
    Immanent Causation and Life After Death
    In G. Gasser (ed.), Personal Identity and Resurrection, Ashgate. pp. 51-66. 2010.
    The paper concerns the metaphysical possibility of life after death. It argues that the existence of a psychological duplicate is insufficient for resurrection, even if psychological continuity suffices for personal identity. That is because our persistence requires immanent causation. There are at most three ways of having life after death: if we are immaterial souls; if we are snatched bodily from our deathbeds; or if there is immanent causation ‘at a distance’ as Zimmerman proposes--but this …Read more
    Death and DyingAfterlife, Misc
  •  191
    The Person and the Corpse
    In Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman & Jens Johansson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death, Oup Usa. pp. 80. 2013.
    Physical and Animalist Theories Of Personal Identity
  • The Human Animal. Personal identity without psychology
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 192 (1): 112-113. 1997.
    Continental Philosophy
  •  187
    Book Review. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View Lynne Rudder Baker (review)
    Mind 110 (438): 427-430. 2001.
    Persons, MiscThe Body, MiscTheories of Personal Identity
  •  317
    Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 161-166. 1999.
    In “Was I Ever a Fetus?” I argued that, since each of us was once an unthinking fetus, psychological continuity cannot be necessary for us to persist through time. Baker claims that the argument is invalid, and that both the premise and the conclusion are false. I attempt to defend argument, premise, and conclusion against her objections.
    Psychological Theories of Personal Identity
  •  1196
    An argument for animalism
    The view that we are human animals, " animalism ", is deeply unpopular. This paper explains what that claim says and why it is so contentious. It then argues that those who deny it face an awkward choice. They must either deny that there are any human animals, deny that human animals can think, or deny that we are the thinking things located where we are
    Theories of Personal Identity
  •  100
    Critical notice of T. Merricks, Objects and Persons (review)
    Philosophical Books 43 (4): 292-99. 2002.
    Book reviewed in this article T. Merricks, Objects and Persons.
    Mereological NihilismEliminative Conceptions of Material ObjectsMaterial Objects, Misc
  •  404
    Was Jekyll Hyde?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2): 328-348. 2003.
    Many philosophers say that two or more people or thinking beings could share a single human being in a split‐personality case, if only the personalities were sufficiently independent and individually well integrated. I argue that this view is incompatible with our being material things, and conclude that there could never be two or more people in a split‐personality case. This refutes the view, almost universally held, that facts about mental unity and disunity determine how many people there ar…Read more
    Dissociative Identity Disorder