•  42
    The Dualist Project and the Remote-Control Objection
    Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1): 89-101. 2021.
    Substance dualism says that all thinking beings are immaterial. This sits awkwardly with the fact that thinking requires an intact brain. Many dualists say that bodily activity is causally necessary for thinking. But if a material thing can cause thinking, why can’t it think? No argument for dualism, however convincing, answers this question, leaving dualists with more to explain than their opponents.
  •  667
    Against Person Essentialism
    Mind 129 (515): 715-735. 2020.
    It is widely held that every person is a person essentially, where being a person is having special mental properties such as intelligence and self-consciousness. It follows that nothing can acquire or lose these properties. The paper argues that this rules out all familiar psychological-continuity views of personal identity over time. It also faces grave difficulties in accounting for the mental powers of human beings who are not intelligent and self-conscious, such as foetuses and those with d…Read more
  •  11
    Warum wir Tiere sind
    In Alfred North Whitehead (ed.), La Science Et le Monde Moderne, De Gruyter. pp. 11-22. 2006.
  •  177
    Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity, MICHAEL TYE. Cambridge, MA, and London, UK
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2): 500-503. 2006.
    There is much to admire in this book. It is written in a pleasingly straightforward style, and offers insight on a wide range of important issues.
  •  36
    Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (review)
    Mind 110 (438): 427-430. 2001.
  •  101
    What Does it Mean to Say That We Are Animals?
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12): 84-107. 2015.
    The view that we are animals -- animalism -- is often misunderstood. It is typically stated in unhelpful or misleading ways. Debates over animalism are often unclear about what question it purports to answer, and what the alternative answers are. The paper tries to state clearly what animalism says and does not say. This enables us to distinguish different versions of animalism.
  •  18
    X*-imperfect identity
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2): 247-264. 2006.
  •  78
    Swinburne’s Brain Transplants
    Philosophia Christi 20 (1): 21-29. 2018.
    Richard Swinburne argues that if my cerebral hemispheres were each transplanted into a different head, what would happen to me is not determined by my material parts, and I must therefore have an immaterial part. The paper argues that this argument relies on modal claims that Swinburne has not established. And the means he proposes for establishing such claims cannot succeed.
  •  48
    Interview by Simon Cushing
    Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics (Philosophical Profiles). 2016.
    Simon Cushing conducted the following interview with Eric Olson on 1 July 2016.
  •  173
    Narrative and persistence
    with Karsten Witt
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3): 419-434. 2019.
    ABSTRACTMany philosophers say that the nature of personal identity has to do with narratives: the stories we tell about ourselves. While different narrativists address different questions of personal identity, some propose narrativist accounts of personal identity over time. The paper argues that such accounts have troubling consequences about the beginning and end of our lives, lead to inconsistencies, and involve backwards causation. The problems can be solved, but only by modifying the accoun…Read more
  •  12
    Lowe's Defence of Constitutionalism
    Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210): 92-95. 2003.
    Constitutionalism says that qualitatively different objects can be made of the same matter at once. Critics claim that we should expect such objects to be qualitatively indistinguishable. E.J. Lowe thinks this complaint is based on the false assumption that differences in the way things are at a time must always be grounded in how things are at that time, and that we can answer it by pointing out that different kinds of coinciding objects are subject to different composition principles. I argue …Read more
  •  36
    Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem
    Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204): 337-355. 2001.
    It is often said that the same particles can simultaneously make up two or more material objects that differ in kind and in their mental, biological and other qualitative properties. Others wonder how objects made of the same parts in the same arrangement and surroundings could differ in these ways. I clarify this worry and show that attempts to dismiss or solve it miss its point. At most one can argue that it is a problem we can live with.
  •  301
    Was I Ever a Fetus?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1): 95-110. 1997.
    The Standard View of personal identity says that someone who exists now can exist at another time only if there is continuity of her mental contents or capacities. But no person is psychologically continuous with a fetus, for a fetus, at least early in its career. has no mental features at all. So the Standard View entails that no person was ever a fetus---contrary to the popular assumption that an unthinking fetus is a potential person. It is also mysterious what does ordinarily happen to a hum…Read more
  •  14
    Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self, by John Perry (review)
    European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3): 434-437. 2006.
  •  1
    Beginning with Locke, most philosophers writing on personal identity have claimed that some sort of psychological continuity is necessary for a person to persist from one time to another. I argue that this "psychological approach" to personal identity faces ontological difficulties that many of its proponents have not appreciated. In its place I advocate a "biological approach" to personal identity: you and I are human organisms, and our persistence, like that of other organisms, consists in nar…Read more
  •  167
    Cartesian or substance dualism is the view that concrete substances come in two basic kinds. There are material things, such as biological organisms. These may be either simple or composed of parts. And there are immaterial things--minds or souls--which are always simple. No material thing depends for its existence on any soul, or vice versa. And only souls can think
  •  459
    The Extended Self
    Minds and Machines 21 (4): 481-495. 2011.
    The extended-mind thesis says that mental states can extend beyond one’s skin. Clark and Chalmers infer from this that the subjects of such states also extend beyond their skin: the extended-self thesis. The paper asks what exactly the extended-self thesis says, whether it really does follow from the extended-mind thesis, and what it would mean if it were true. It concludes that the extended-self thesis is unattractive, and does not follow from the extended mind unless thinking beings are litera…Read more
  •  16
    Replies
    Abstracta 4 (S1): 32-42. 2008.
  •  292
    What are we?: a study in personal ontology
    Oxford University Press. 2007.
    From the time of Locke, discussions of personal identity have often ignored the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we human people are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you. The result of this neglect has been centuries of wild proposals and clashing intuitions. What Are We? is the first general study of this important question. It beings by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as …Read more
  •  221
    Material coincidence and the indiscernibility problem
    Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204): 337-355. 2001.
    It is often said that the same particles can simultaneously make up two or more material objects that differ in kind and in their mental, biological, and other qualitative properties. Others wonder how objects made of the same parts in the same arrangement and surroundings could differ in these ways. I clarify this worry and show that attempts to dismiss or solve it miss its point. At most one can argue that it is a problem we can live with
  •  128
    The passage of time
    In Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. 2009.
    The prosaic content of these sayings is that events change from future to present and from present to past. Your next birthday is in the future, but with the passage of time it draws nearer and nearer until it is present. 24 hours later it will be in the past, and then lapse forever deeper into history. And things get older: even if they don’t wear out or lose their hair or change in any other way, their chronological age is always increasing. These changes are universal and inescapable: no even…Read more
  •  141
    Imperfect identity
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2). 2006.
    That grass is green, that pigs don’t fly, and that you are now awake are all hard facts. But there is often said to be something soft about matters of identity over time. Is today’s village church the very church that was first built here, despite centuries of repairs and alterations? How many parts of my bicycle do I need to replace before I get a numerically different bike? If a club disbands and years later some of the original members start a similar club with the same name, have we got two …Read more
  •  217
    Composition and coincidence
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4): 374-403. 1996.
    Many philosophers say that the same atoms may compose at once a statue and a lump of matter that could outlive the statue. I reject this because no difference between the statue and the lump could explain why they have different persistence conditions. But if we say that the lump is the statue, it is difficult to see how there could be any human beings. I argue that this and analogous problems about material objects admit only of solutions that at least appear to be radically at odds with our or…Read more
  •  414
    There is no problem of the self
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6): 645-657. 1998.
    Because there is no agreed use of the term 'self', or characteristic features or even paradigm cases of selves, there is no idea of "the self" to figure in philosophical problems. The term leads to troubles otherwise avoidable; and because legitimate discussions under the heading of 'self' are really about other things, it is gratuitous. I propose that we stop speaking of selves
  •  453
    Animalism and the corpse problem
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2): 265-74. 2004.
    The apparent fact that each of us coincides with a thinking animal looks like a strong argument for our being animals (animalism). Some critics, however, claim that this sort of reasoning actually undermines animalism. According to them, the apparent fact that each human animal coincides with a thinking body that is not an animal is an equally strong argument for our not being animals. I argue that the critics' case fails for reasons that do not affect the case for animalism.
  •  284
    Thinking Animals and the Reference of ‘I’
    Philosophical Topics 30 (1): 189-207. 2002.
    In this essay I explore the idea that the solution to some important problems of personal identity lies in the philosophy of language: more precisely in the nature of first-person reference. I will argue that the “linguistic solution” is at best partly successful.
  •  52
    Imperfect Identity
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2): 81-98. 2006.
    Questions of identity over time are often hard to answer. A long tradition has it that such questions are somehow soft: they have no unique, determinate answer, and disagreements about them are merely verbal. I argue that this claim is not the truism it is taken to be. Depending on how it is understood, it turns out either to be false or to presuppose a highly contentious metaphysical claim.
  •  177
    On Parfit's View That We Are Not Human Beings
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76 39-56. 2015.
    Derek Parfit claims that we are not human beings. Rather, each of us is the part of a human being that thinks in the strictest sense. This is said to solve a number of difficult metaphysical problems. I argue that the view has metaphysical problems of its own, and is inconsistent with any psychological-continuity account of personal identity over time, including Parfit's own