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8Jason Stanley, How Propaganda Works: Princeton University Press, 2015. Hardcover ISBN 9780691164427 (review)Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3): 817-819. 2016.
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11On how we perceive the social world. Criticizing Gallagher’s view on direct perception and outlining an alternativeConsciousness and Cognition 17 (2): 544-552. 2008.Criticizing Gallagher’s view on direct perception, I develop a basic model of social perception. According to the Cartesians another person’s intentions are not directly accessible to an observer. According to the cognitivist Cartesians conscious processes are necessary for social understanding. According to the Anti-Cartesians social perception is direct. Since both of these latter approaches face serious problems, I will argue in favor of an alternative: anti-cognitivist Cartesianism. Distingu…Read more
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12Pains, Pills and Properties - Functionalism and the First-Order/Second-Order DistinctionDialectica 66 (4): 543-562. 2012.Among philosophers of mind, it is common to assume that at least some mental properties are functional in nature, and that functional properties are second-order properties. In the functionalist literature, the notion of being a second-order property is cashed out in three different ways: (i) in terms of semantic features of characterizations or definitions of properties, (ii) in terms of syntactic features of second-order quantification, and (iii) in terms of a metaphysical criterion, according…Read more
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32Identity, Asymmetry, and the Relevance of Meanings for Models of ReductionBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4): 747-761. 2013.Assume that water reduces to H2O. If so water is identical to H2O. At the same time, if water reduces to H2O then H2O does not reduce to water–the reduction relation is asymmetric. This generates a puzzle–if water just is H2O it is hard to see how we can account for the asymmetry of the reduction relation. The paper proposes a solution to this puzzle. It is argued that the reduction predicate generates intensional contexts and that in order to account for the asymmetry, we should develop conditi…Read more
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Personal Identity. An Introduction to the Philosophy of John PerryIn Albert Newen & Raphael van Riel (eds.), Identity, Language, and Mind. An Introduction to the Philosophy of John Perry, Csli. 2012.
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10The content of model-based informationSynthese 192 (12): 3839-3858. 2015.The paper offers an account of the structure of information provided by models that relevantly deviate from reality. It is argued that accounts of scientific modeling according to which a model’s epistemic and pragmatic relevance stems from the alleged fact that models give access to possibilities fail. First, it seems that there are models that do not give access to possibilities, for what they describe is impossible. Secondly, it appears that having access to a possibility is epistemically and…Read more
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27Nagelian Reduction Beyond the Nagel ModelPhilosophy of Science 78 (3): 353-375. 2011.Nagel’s official model of theory-reduction and the way it is represented in the literature are shown to be incompatible with the careful remarks on the notion of reduction Nagel gave while developing his model. Based on these remarks, an alternative model is outlined which does not face some of the problems the official model faces. Taking the context in which Nagel developed his model into account, it is shown that the way Nagel shaped his model and, thus, its well-known deficiencies, are best …Read more
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72Real Knowledge Undermining LuckLogos and Episteme 7 (3): 325-344. 2016.Based on the discussion of a novel version of the Barn County scenario, the paper argues for a new explication of knowledge undermining luck. In passing, an as yet undetected form of benign luck is identified.
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13Identity-Based Reduction and Reductive ExplanationPhilosophia Naturalis 47 (1-2): 183-219. 2010.In this paper, the relation between identity-based reduction and one specific sort of reductive explanation is considered. The notion of identity-based reduction is spelled out and its role in the reduction debate is sketched. An argument offered by Jaegwon Kim, which is supposed to show that identity-based reduction and reductive explanation are incompatible, is critically examined. From the discussion of this argument, some important consequences about the notion of reduction are pointed out.
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14Editorial - Second European Graduate School: Philosophy of Language, Mind and ScienceAbstracta 5 (2): 113-115. 2009.
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15David Woodruff Smith et Amy L. Thomasson (dir.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, 322 pagesDavid Woodruff Smith et Amy L. Thomasson (dir.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, 322 pages (review)Philosophiques 36 (1): 257-259. 2009.