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490Real Knowledge Undermining LuckLogos and Episteme 7 (3): 325-344. 2016.Based on the discussion of a novel version of the Barn County scenario, the paper argues for a new explication of knowledge undermining luck. In passing, an as yet undetected form of benign luck is identified.
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191Identity-Based Reduction and Reductive ExplanationPhilosophia Naturalis 47 (1-2): 183-219. 2010.In this paper, the relation between identity-based reduction and one specific sort of reductive explanation is considered. The notion of identity-based reduction is spelled out and its role in the reduction debate is sketched. An argument offered by Jaegwon Kim, which is supposed to show that identity-based reduction and reductive explanation are incompatible, is critically examined. From the discussion of this argument, some important consequences about the notion of reduction are pointed out.
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14Editorial - Second European Graduate School: Philosophy of Language, Mind and ScienceAbstracta 5 (2): 113-115. 2009.
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26David Woodruff Smith et Amy L. Thomasson (dir.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, 322 pagesDavid Woodruff Smith et Amy L. Thomasson (dir.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, 322 pages (review)Philosophiques 36 (1): 257-259. 2009.
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62Prophets against Ockhamism. Or: why the hard fact/soft fact distinction is irrelevant to the problem of foreknowledgeInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (2): 119-135. 2014.In this paper, a cognate of the problem of divine foreknowledge is introduced: the problem of the prophet’s foreknowledge. The latter cannot be solved referring to Ockhamism—the doctrine that divine foreknowledge could, at least in principle, be compatible with human freedom because God’s beliefs about future actions are merely soft facts, rather than hard facts about the past. Under the assumption that if Ockhamism can solve the problem of divine foreknowledge then it should also yield a soluti…Read more
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28Enhancing Beyond What Ought to be the Case - A Conceptual ClarificationBioethics 30 (6): 384-388. 2016.In order to do justice to the intuition that medical treatments as such do not form proper instances of bio-enhancement, as the notion is employed in the ethical debate, we should construe bio-enhancements as interventions, which do not aim at states that, other things being equal, ought to obtain. In the light of this clarification, we come to see that cases of moral enhancement are not covered by the notion of bio-enhancement, properly construed.
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29Identity, Language, and Mind. An Introduction to the Philosophy of John Perry (edited book)CSLI. 2012.As one of the world's most eminent living philosophers, John Perry has covered a remarkable breadth of subjects in his published work, including semantics, indexicality, self-knowledge, personal identity, and consciousness. Looking particularly at the way in which he deals with issues of self, communication, and reality, this volume is organized in seven chapters that highlight a different aspect of Perry's work on the intersection of these subjects. A fundamental work for students and scholars,…Read more
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109The Concept of ReductionSpringer. 2014.This volume investigates the notion of reduction. Building on the idea that philosophers employ the term ‘reduction’ to reconcile diversity and directionality with unity, without relying on elimination, the book offers a powerful explication of an “ontological” notion of reduction the extension of which is (primarily) formed by properties, kinds, individuals, or processes. It argues that related notions of reduction, such as theory-reduction and functional reduction, should be defined in terms …Read more