Stephen Turner

Charles Ellwood is usually described as a junior member of the founding generation of American Sociology. Ellwood fulfils many of the standard stereotypes of the American sociology student of the era. He was born on a farm and, after winning a state scholarship, went to Cornell, as he himself noted, ‘because it was virtually the state university of New York’.1 He then went directly on to the University of Chicago, where he was converted only partially from his concerns with social problems to a theorist. He was one of the first PhDs in sociology from the University, and the first Chicago Sociology PhD to hold a position in sociology at a major university other than Chicago itself: a large land grant university in the Midwest, Missouri. He stayed there for most of his career until leaving for Duke, an institution with a strong religious orientation that prized him for his religious writings.

Universal Logic is the study of the formal properties of logical systems in terms of the ways in which these formal features are found across systems of various kinds. A crucial example of this problematic is found at the heart of cognitive science. Brains are computers or computer-like things. But the digital logic of computers and the logic of computer programs do not correspond in any direct way with the processes of brains, either at the neural level, or at the level of psychological descriptions of reasoning and inference processes. There have been many approaches to this problem, typically involving the idea of some sort of brain-based universal semantics or syntactics that is realized in different forms in different languages. These accounts do not extend very successfully to other supposed forms of common tacit mental life, such as culture, climates of opinion, habitus, practices, norms, scripts, schemas, worldviews, and so forth. Nor do any of these concepts fit very well with known neural processes. The alternative approaches appeal to versions of the notion of individual habit, most recently summarized in a major book recently published by Cambridge University Press (Caruana in Habits: Pragmatist Approaches from Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020). My approach is to see the language capabilities of each person as an assemblage of language patterns that have patterned relations to one another, and that are unique to each person. The evidence that this is how the brain actually works comes from bilinguals, who do not have two parallel downloaded language systems, but who have a mixed system with no neural separation between linguistic capacities. This is a better model for the heterogeneous tacit capacities that make up the logic of practices: an assemblage of patterns that allow for mutual interaction. What makes up the “system” are patterned forms of behavior that are recognized by others as “signals.” Language and linguistic expressions serve, among other things, as props to inferences: as substitutes for elements of inferences, and as surrogates for inferences, which enable extensions of inferences beyond experience. It is a “system” not in the sense that it corresponds to some neural structure, but in the sense that the patterns which are learned in the course of language learning have causal relations with one another in the brain, and in the behavioral responses of others, form the “signal system.”

One of Ian C. Jarvie’s most interesting contributions is his discussion of the thinking of Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi on the nature and workings of the scientific community and their relation to politics : 545–564, 2001). The self-image these thinkers contributed to still lingers, but their accounts capture a historical moment that has passed and was idealized even when they were written. In this chapter, I examine this tradition and identify the central themes which dominated this literature and ask the question of how this history is relevant today. The answer will perhaps be surprising: despite the fact that the Left of the past held positions that are the opposites of the positions of the present participatory Left, the considerations that motivated the older Left remain.

Understanding the role of religion in early British sociology, as well as its fate in later sociology, requires a variety of perspectives: one is intellectual and concerns the various forms that the topic of religion took for British sociology. Another is organisational and ecological. British sociology as embodied in the Sociological Society was a part of a vast array of organisations that were part of a massive movement of social reform, international in scope, and motivated largely by the newly ‘social’ Christianity of the late Victorian era. As a kind of public discourse, sociology was part of what Maurice Cowling called the ‘Public Doctrine’ replacing religion. As Cowling demonstrates for British intellectual life as a whole, the withdrawing roar of the sea of faith, as Matthew Arnold put it, was in the ears of generations of British academics and thinkers, and especially in those who used the term ‘sociology’ or referred to sociological thinkers, such as Comte, or their precursors.

Martin Bulmer made distinguished and groundbreaking contributions to the history of sociology, particularly in his classic study of the Chicago School, which spanned the era of personal memory and archival history. His work particularly emphasized empirical research, which led him to problems relating to the Laura Spelman Rockefeller fund and its leader, Beardsley Ruml, as well as to the problematic of the relation of sociology to the social survey movement. His work on funding led to the “Fisher-Bulmer” debate, over the aims of the fund, which Bulmer regarded as primarily scientific and concerned with the improvement of research, rather than political. In later years the idea of history of sociology as reparations for the neglect or exclusion of women and minority scholars was a source of controversy, which Bulmer responded to with a defence of traditional historiographic values.

This book addressees a timely and fundamental problematic: the gap between the aims that people attempt to realize democratically and the law and administrative practices that actually result. The chapters explain the realities that administration poses for democratic theory. Topics include the political value of accountability, the antinomic character of political values, the relation between ultimate ends and the intermediate ends that are sought by constitutions, and a reconsideration of the meaning of the rule of law itself. The essays are inspired by the demystifying realism of Max Weber and Hans Kelsen, including explications of their views on law, constitutions, and the rule of law. The book will be of interest to social and political theorists, philosophers of law, and legal theorists, and for discussions of democratic theory, the administrative state, constitutionalism, and justice, as well as to readers of Weber and Kelsen.

Social science has for the most part lost its ambition to be ‘science’, as shown in the recent change in the American Anthropological Association statement of purpose. The new term is expertise. The change points to something fundamental: social science methods are now largely stable; they have well-developed uses for public and policy audiences; because they are user-friendly they are unlikely to radically change, and new problems arise for them to be applied to. New concepts are developed, but they do not develop into ‘theories’ in a scientific sense. So what is expertise? It is something other than fact generation: it is the result of aggregating and assessing research in an area. Experts engage with one another, so there is a community of expertise. Yet there is also another sense of ‘scientific’: using the tools of natural science and extending them to the social. The current means of doing this for social science is through neuroscience. These methods could serve to filter and validate social science concepts.