Manuel Bremer

Notes on Vagueness. A 3-valued approach to vagueness is defended. In contrast to other 3-valued approaches the logic is an extension of classical logic, due to the use of both a Boolean negation and a predicate negation. The view is justified by semantic considerations. Crucial issues (Sorites reasoning, higher order vagueness, existence of cut off points, 'penumbral truth') are discussed from the perspective developed, and some contrasts (mostly to supervaluationism) outlined. An extended version appeared as book in 2026 (Berlin: Logos).

The paper argues against a commitment to metaphysical necessity, semantic modalities are enough. The best approaches to elucidate the semantic modalities are (still) versions of lingustic ersatzism and fictionalism, even if only developed in parts. Within these necessary properties and the difference between natural and semantic laws can be accounted for. The proper background theory for this is an updated version of Logical Empiricism, which is congenial to recent trends in Structural Realism. The anti-metaphysical attitude of Logical Empiricism deserves revitalization. Another target besides metaphysical necessity are substantial forms of iterated modalities, as used, for instance, in the philosophy of religion. An extended version appeared as book in 2025 (Berlin: Logos)

Was ist Philosophische Semantik? Bedarf es neben der Linguistik uberhaupt noch einer "philosophischen" Semantik? Welche Rolle spielt diese Semantik fur die Philosophie im Allgemeinen? Welche methodische Rolle spielt die Klarung von "Bedeutung" fur die Sprachanalytische Philosophie? Tritt die philosophische Semantik an die Stelle der Erkenntnistheorie? In welchem Verhaltnis steht sie zur Ontologie und zur Philosophie des Geistes? Diesen Fragen geht das vorliegende Buch nach. In einem zentralen Verstandnis von Philosophischer Semantik ist das Wesentliche die Beziehung zwischen Bedeutungstheorie und Erkenntnistheorie (vermittels der Rechtfertigung von Satzverwendungen). Eine so verstandene Semantik hat z.T. einen eigenen Ansatz, der einen zentralen Stellenwert fur eine Philosophie in der Analytischen Tradition besitzt. Man kann diese Philosophische Semantik als eine "Erste Philosophie" ansehen."

This book gives an overview of paraconsistent logics - that is logics which allow for inconsistency. Although allowing for inconsistency, paraconsistent logics are worth considering: Logical systems are worth considering in their own right since we can learn about very abstract structural properties of logics and the concepts employed within them such as negation, necessity and consistency. Some non-classical logics are especially of interest from a philosophical perspective since they alone offer the possibility of solving or even stating some philosophical problems. These introductory lectures argue from a philosophical perspective that some paraconsistent logics are of interest or even the best candidates for dealing with specific philosophical problems. Although logic is seen from the point of view of its philosophical use, various formal systems are described, compared and employed.

There are positive and negative lessons from Sartre: - Taking up some of his ideas one may arrive at a better model of consciousness in the analytic philosophy of mind; representing some of his ideas within the language and the models of a functionalist theory of mind makes them more accessible and inte¬grates them into the wider picture. - Sartre, as any philosopher, errs at some points, I believe; but these errors may be instruc¬tive, especially in as much as they mirror some errors in some current theories of consciousness. This paper, therefore, is not a piece of Sartre scholarship, but an attempt of a “friendly take¬over” of some ideas I ascribe to Sartre into current models in the philosophy of mind.

I consider here several versions of finitism or conceptions that try to work around postulating sets of infinite size. Restricting oneself to the so-called potential infinite seems to rest either on temporal readings of infinity (or infinite series) or on anti-realistic background assumptions. Both these motivations may be considered problematic. Quine’s virtual set theory points out where strong assumptions of infinity enter into number theory, but is implicitly committed to infinity anyway. The approaches centring on the indefinitely large and the use of schemata would provide a work-around to circumvent usage of actual infinities if we had a clear understanding of how schemata work and where to draw the conceptual line between the indefinitely large and the infinite. Neither of this seems to be clear enough. Versions of strict finitism in contrast provide a clear picture of a (realistic) finite number theory. One can recapture standard arithmetic without being committed to actual infinities. The major problem of them is their usage of a paraconsistent logic with an accompanying theory of inconsistent objects. If we are, however, already using a paraconsistent approach for other reasons (in semantics, epistemology or set theory), we get finitism for free. This strengthens the case for paraconsistency.

The book aims to set out in which respects concepts are properly studied in philosophy, what methodological role the study of concepts has in philoso-phy's study of the world. Many of the considerations in this book nowadays are placed under the headline ‘metaphilosophy’. In contrast to paradigmatic ordinary language philosophy the book endorses a representationalist theory of meaning and concepts, thus agreeing with many of its critics in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. In contrast to many of these critics and supposedly the majority of cognitive scientists it endorses the viability of conceptual analysis as one method of philosophy. The book reflects on Frege's theory of concepts, because Frege's theory of sentential unity has barely been super-seded, and the problems arising from Frege's understanding of concepts are still alive. The central part of the book starts by reconsidering the approach and the idea of ordinary language philosophy. Although ordinary language philosophy cannot be the whole of analytic philosophy a proper understanding of conceptual analysis turns out to be one part of analytic philosophy.