Manuel Bremer

A theory of the beliefs of non-human animals is not closed to us, only because we do not have beliefs of their kind. Starting from a theory of human beliefs and working on a building block model of propositional attitudes a theory of animal beliefs is viable. Such a theory is an example of the broader conception of a heterophenomenological approach to animal cognition. The theory aims at outlining the crucial differences between human and animal beliefs as well as the relations between these attitudes and theories of them. By this it contributes both to a theory of human cognition and to a theory of the evolutionary origin of human cognition. The capacities of animals can thus be appreciated without making animals minor humans. Human cognition can be seen in its uniqueness without cutting the ties to its evolutionary origin.

Is transcendental pragmatics a matter of ultimate foundation or a matter of holism? Transcendental pragmatics as developed by Karl-Otto Apel has been the object of various criticisms. Against the fallibilists' claim (Albert) that argumentation is at last either dogmatic, axiomatic or circular, the transcendental pragmatists have given an argument that ultimate foundation ('Letztbegründung') cannot be proved to be impossible. But this clarification of their claims leaves open the questions whether their method can establish universal statements, and whether they prove statements which are synthetic a priori. Against the claim of the reconstructive scientist (Habermas) they have to restate their view, and take into account an element of fallibilism. Here we encounter a first element of holism. With regard to the question whether there can be ultimate foundation without ultimate foundation of the method of ultimate foundation holism breaks in. The distinction between a vicious and a transcendental circle, used against Albert, is of no use in the establishment of the transcendental circle

A theory of the beliefs of non-human animals is not closed to us, only because we do not have beliefs of their kind. Starting from a theory of human beliefs and working on a building block model of propositional attitudes a theory of animal beliefs is viable. Such a theory is an example of the broader conception of a heterophenomenological approach to animal cognition. The theory aims at outlining the crucial differences between human and animal beliefs as well as the relations between these attitudes and theories of them. By this it contributes both to a theory of human cognition and to a theory of the evolutionary origin of human cognition. The capacities of animals can thus be appreciated without making animals minor humans. Human cognition can be seen in its uniqueness without cutting the ties to its evolutionary origin.

Kant spricht bezüglich der Widerlegung des Idealismus von einem „Beweis”. Das ist sicher der höchste Status, den er bereit ist, einem Argument zuzuschreiben. Diese Notiz hier soll zeigen, daß Kant diesen Anspruch zu Recht erhebt. Dazu reicht eine an der sprachlichen Oberflächenstruktur orientierte Formalisierung. Nun hat Kant natürlich die moderne Prädikatenlogik nicht gekannt, aber für den Gebrauch dieser Logik und ein dem gemäßes Räsonieren bedarf es bekanntlich ja auch nicht der ausdrücklichen Kenntnis eines entsprechenden Kalküls. Es reicht aus, daß es mindestens eine Formalisierung gibt, in die sich Kants Argument bringen läßt, um zu zeigen, daß es formal schlüssig ist

In his recent paper in History and Philosophy of Logic, John Kearns argues for a solution of the Liar paradox using an illocutionary logic (Kearns 2007 ). Paraconsistent approaches, especially dialetheism, which accepts the Liar as being both true and false, are rejected by Kearns as making no ?clear sense? (p. 51). In this critical note, I want to highlight some shortcomings of Kearns' approach that concern a general difficulty for supposed solutions to (semantic) antinomies like the Liar. It is not controversial that there are languages which avoid the Liar. For example, the language which consists of the single sentence ?Benedict XVI was born in Germany? lacks the resources to talk about semantics at all and thus avoids the Liar. Similarly, more interesting languages such as the propositional calculus avoid the Liar by lacking the power to express semantic concepts or to quantify over propositions. Kearns also agrees with the dialetheist claim that natural languages are semantically closed (i.e. are able to talk about their sentences and the semantic concepts and distinctions they employ). Without semantic closure, the Liar would be no real problem for us (speakers of natural languages). But given the claim, the expressive power of natural languages may lead to the semantic antinomies. The dialetheist argues for his position by proposing a general hypothesis (cf. Bremer 2005 , pp. 27?28): ?(Dilemma) A linguistic framework that solves some antinomies and is able to express its linguistic resources is confronted with strengthened versions of the antinomies?. Thus, the dialetheist claims that either some semantic concepts used in a supposed solution to a semantic antinomy are inexpressible in the framework used (and so, in view of the claim, violate the aim of being a model of natural language), or else old antinomies are exchanged for new ones. One horn of the dilemma is having inexpressible semantic properties. The other is having strengthened versions of the antinomies, once all semantic properties used are expressible. This dilemma applies, I claim, to Kearns' approach as well

This book gives an overview of paraconsistent logics - that is logics which allow for inconsistency. Although allowing for inconsistency, paraconsistent logics are worth considering: Logical systems are worth considering in their own right since we can learn about very abstract structural properties of logics and the concepts employed within them such as negation, necessity and consistency. Some non-classical logics are especially of interest from a philosophical perspective since they alone offer the possibility of solving or even stating some philosophical problems. These introductory lectures argue from a philosophical perspective that some paraconsistent logics are of interest or even the best candidates for dealing with specific philosophical problems. Although logic is seen from the point of view of its philosophical use, various formal systems are described, compared and employed.

Die in Wittgensteins Anfangsthesen des Tractatus formulierte Ansicht, daß Tatsachen die Bausteine der Welt ausmachen, kann auch so interpretiert werden, daß Tatsachen physische Entitäten sind. Die These von der physischen Existenz von Tatsachen wird in der analytischen Philosophie jedoch weitgehend abgelehnt. Hier wird hingegen versucht, diese Position als Tatsachen-Ontologie kohärent zu entwickeln. Vorzüge diese Position wären u.a. eine elegante Deutung der Vielheit verschiedener wahrer Aussagen, eine gute Basis fur eine Korrespondenztheorie der Wahrheit, Referenz auf strukturierte Raum-Zeit-Bereiche, sie wäre Baustein einer realistischen Situationslogik und könnte eine Lösung für David Lewis' Problem der Einermengen liefern.

A theory of the beliefs of non-human animals is not closed to us, only because we do not have beliefs of their kind. Starting from a theory of human beliefs and working on a building block model of propositional attitudes a theory of animal beliefs is viable. Such a theory is an example of the broader conception of a heterophenomenological approach to animal cognition. The theory aims at outlining the crucial differences between human and animal beliefs as well as the relations between these attitudes and theories of them. By this it contributes both to a theory of human cognition and to a theory of the evolutionary origin of human cognition. The capacities of animals can thus be appreciated without making animals minor humans. Human cognition can be seen in its uniqueness without cutting the ties to its evolutionary origin.