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227The concept of identityOxford University Press. 1982.In this book, Eli Hirsch focuses on identity through time, first with respect to ordinary bodies, then underlying matter, and eventually persons.
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Talmudic destinyIn Samuel Lebens, Dani Rabinowitz & Aaron Segal (eds.), Jewish Philosophy in an Analytic Age, Oxford University Press, Usa. 2019.
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620Quantifier VarianceIn Martin Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, Routledge. pp. 349-357. 2019.Quantifier variance is a well-known view in contemporary metaontology, but it remains very widely misunderstood by critics. Here we briefly and clearly explain the metasemantics of quantifier variance and distinguish between modest and strong forms of variance (Section I), explain some key applications (Section II), clear up some misunderstandings and address objections (Section III), and point the way toward future directions of quantifier-variance-related research (Section IV).
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48A Note on Safety and Iterated KnowledgeGrazer Philosophische Studien 96 (2): 244-254. 2019.Timothy Williamson has argued that the safety condition on knowledge places certain limits on iterations of knowledge. But at the same time, Williamson claims that interpersonal iterations of knowledge aren’t so restricted as to rule out ordinary cases. The present authors show that Williamson’s discussion misconstrues the challenge to iterated interpersonal knowledge. The proper argument against interpersonal iterations is rather what the authors call a third-person argument that does not share…Read more
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Rashi's View of the Open Future: Determinateness and BivalienceIn Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 2, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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87Precis of Dividing RealityDividing Reality (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1): 199. 1996.What I call the Similarity Principle says that a word ought to denote a class of things that are more similar to each other than to other things. A closely related formulation, which I’ll here take to be equivalent, is that a word ought to denote a class of things having something in common with each other that they don’t have in common with other things. The Similarity Principle is an example of an intuitively rational constraint on the lexicon of a language. If we imagine such strange words as…Read more
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35Practically StrangeDividing RealityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1): 203. 1996.In Eli Hirsch’s clever and careful Dividing Reality he asks us to consider several strange languages. For example, in the Gricular language there is no word that applies to all and only green things and none that applies to all and only circular things, but there are the three words “gricular,” which applies to anything that is either green or circular, “grincular,” which applies to anything that is either green or not circular, and “ngricular,” which applies to anything that is either circular …Read more
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462Quantifier Variance and the Demand for a SemanticsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3): 592-605. 2017.In the work of both Matti Eklund and John Hawthorne there is an influential semantic argument for a maximally expansive ontology that is thought to undermine even modest forms of quantifier variance. The crucial premise of the argument holds that it is impossible for an ontologically "smaller" language to give a Tarskian semantics for an ontologically "bigger" language. After explaining the Eklund-Hawthorne argument (in section I), we show this crucial premise to be mistaken (in section II) by d…Read more
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4The Rational PhysicianPhilosophic Exchange 30 (1). 2000.In recent years, some professors of medicine have applied the results of decision theory to the practice of medicine. This paper argues that this agenda is deeply flawed and potentially unethical.
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46The Concept of Identity.The Identity of the SelfPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (3): 467-473. 1985.
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41Physical‐Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common SensePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1): 67-97. 2007.Two main claims are defended in this paper: first, that typical disputes in the literature about the ontology of physical objects are merely verbal; second, that the proper way to resolve these disputes is by appealing to common sense or ordinary language. A verbal dispute is characterized not in terms of private idiolects, but in terms of different linguistic communities representing different positions. If we imagine a community that makes Chisholm's mereological essentialist assertions, and a…Read more
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13Peter van Inwagen’s Material BeingsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3): 687-691. 1993.
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3Kripke's argument against materialismIn Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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328
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15Ontology and alternative languagesIn David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford University Press. pp. 231--58. 2009.
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149Comments on Theodore Sider’s Four Dimensionalism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3). 2004.Theodore Sider has given us a terrific book, bursting at the seams with new arguments and new takes on old arguments. Whether or not one is convinced by his conclusions, the thoroughness, lucidity, fair-mindedness—and the sheer exuberance—of his discussions make Four Dimensionalism a major contribution to contemporary metaphysics.
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875. Rashi's View of the Open Future: Indeterminateness and Bivalence1Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2 111. 2006.
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244Metaphysical Necessity and Conceptual TruthMidwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1): 243-256. 1986.
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929Physical-object ontology, verbal disputes, and common sensePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1). 2005.Two main claims are defended in this paper: first, that typical disputes in the literature about the ontology of physical objects are merely verbal; second, that the proper way to resolve these disputes is by appealing to common sense or ordinary language. A verbal dispute is characterized not in terms of private idiolects, but in terms of different linguistic communities representing different positions. If we imagine a community that makes Chisholm's mereological essentialist assertions, and a…Read more
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15Diabolical Mysticism, Death, and SkepticismPhilosophic Exchange 39 (1). 2009.According to one view, death is bad for the one who dies. The challenge for this view is to explain exactly why and when death is bad for the one who dies. According to an alternative view, death is not actually bad for the one who dies. There is a third alternative, according to which the thought of one’s own death elicits an experience that reveals the horror of one’s own death in a way that is ineffable. This paper explores this third alternative.
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