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Eli Hirsch

Brandeis University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    68
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Events
    2
  •  News and Updates
    8

 More details
  • Brandeis University
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
Waltham, Massachusetts, United States of America
  • All publications (68)
  •  319
    Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology
    Oxford University Press. 2010.
    A sense of unity -- Basic objects : a reply to Xu -- Objectivity without objects -- The vagueness of identity -- Quantifier variance and realism -- Against revisionary ontology -- Comments on Theodore Sider's four dimensionalism -- Sosa's existential relativism -- Physical-object ontology, verbal disputes, and common sense -- Ontological arguments : interpretive charity and quantifier variance -- Language, ontology, and structure -- Ontology and alternative languages.
    QuantifiersOntological DisagreementMaterial ConstitutionCoincident ObjectsMereological NihilismElimi…Read more
    QuantifiersOntological DisagreementMaterial ConstitutionCoincident ObjectsMereological NihilismEliminative Conceptions of Material ObjectsPermissive Conceptions of Material ObjectsThree- and Four-DimensionalismQuantification and Ontology
  •  13
    Ontological arguments : interpretive charity and quantifier variance
    In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary debates in metaphysics, Blackwell. pp. 367--81. 2008.
    QuantifiersOntological DisagreementQuantification and Ontology
  •  68
    Dividing Reality
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1): 217-221. 1996.
  •  335
    A sense of unity
    Journal of Philosophy 75 (9): 470-494. 1978.
    Aspects of Consciousness
  •  738
    Ant and Uncles
    Philosophy Phridays. 2017.
    It is difficult to understand questions about the evolution of ants. It seems often to be assumed that there are specific features that ants possess because of the "survival value" of such features. This makes very little sense, because it is very hard to believe that there are any features at all that can be viewed as having survival value for ants.
    Philosophy of Gender, MiscOrganismic Selection
  •  118
    Rashi's View of the Open Future: Determinateness and Bivalience
    In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 2, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 111. 2006.
    The Open Future
  •  228
    Physical identity
    Philosophical Review 85 (3): 357-389. 1976.
    Persistence, MiscMetaphysics of Mind
  •  4
    Kripke's argument against materialism
    In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The waning of materialism, Oxford University Press. 2010.
    Consciousness and MaterialismKripke's Modal Argument Against Materialism
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