Mike McNamee

The purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of Schadenfreude - the pleasure felt at another’s misfortune - and to argue that feeling it in the course of health care work, as elsewhere, is evidence of a deficient character. In order to show that Schadenfreude is an objectionable emotion in health care work, I first offer some conceptual remarks about emotions generally and their differential treatment in Kantian and Aristotelian thought. Second, I argue that an appreciation of the rationality of the emotions is crucial to our self-understanding as persons in general and nurses in particular. Third, I present a critique of Portmann’s (2000, When Bad Things Happen to Other People. London: Routledge) defence of Schadenfreude with examples from both nursing and medical scenarios. Specifically, I show how his exculpation of the emotion in terms of low self-esteem and a commitment to justice are not compelling. I argue that we are active in the construction of our emotional experiences of Schadenfreude, how we may indeed ‘nurse’ the emotion, and thus become culpable for them in ethical terms

There are few, if any, aspects of contemporary sport that do not raise ethical questions. From on-field relationships between athletes, coaches and officials, to the corporate responsibility of international sports organizations and businesses, ethical considerations permeate sport at every level. This important new collection of articles showcases the very best international scholarship in the field of sports ethics, and offers a comprehensive, one-stop resource for any student, scholar or sportsperson with an interest in this important area. It addresses cutting-edge contemporary themes within sports ethics, such as gene doping, as well as introducing classic ethical debates that define our understanding of sport, sporting conduct and sport in practice. _The Ethics of Sports_ is arranged into seven thematic sections, each of which includes an introduction by the editor that highlights the key themes and places each article in context, and offers suggestions for further reading. _The Ethics of Sports _sheds new light on a wide range of issues within contemporary sports studies including doping, disability, gender and ethnicity; the practice of physical education and sports coaching; sports media; sports business and sports medicine. It is essential reading for all students with an interest in sport or applied ethics

In this article, transhumanism is considered to be a quasi-medical ideology that seeks to promote a variety of therapeutic and human-enhancing aims. Moderate conceptions are distinguished from strong conceptions of transhumanism and the strong conceptions were found to be more problematic than the moderate ones. A particular critique of Boström’s defence of transhumanism is presented. Various forms of slippery slope arguments that may be used for and against transhumanism are discussed and one particular criticism, moral arbitrariness, that undermines both weak and strong transhumanism is highlighted

The issues surrounding ethical controversies in sport have filled the media recently. This book of invited original essays by mainstream philosophers as well as philosophers of sport will provide the reader with a discussion in ethics and sport based on a sound philosophical footing. It will be accessible to a wide range of teachers and students in the field of sport and leisure studies. Contributions from international, highly regarded experts in the fIeld provide the reader with systematic treatment of the ethics of sport from a diverse perspective.

When Richard Peters wrote Ethics and Education (1966) he could scarcely have imagined the revolutions in ethics that have since occurred. Nor could he have imagined the way philosophers have created curricula and codes of ethics that have been incorporated in the various professional spheres within and beyond education. Whether this signals a decline in the trust that professionals might once have claimed, the diminishing of a strongly internalised sense of responsibility, or merely an extension of the natural developments of professionalisation is not yet clear.

Brent Kious has objected to our previous criticism of his views on doping, maintaining that we, by and large, misrepresented his position. In this response, we strengthen our original misgivings, arguing that (1) his views on risk of harm in sport are either uncontroversially true (not inconsistent with the views of many doping opponents) or demonstrably false (attribute to doping opponents an overly simplistic view), (2) his use of analogies (still) indicates an oversimplification of many issues surrounding the question of doping in sports, and (3) his doping analogies are insufficiently precise to support his conclusions.

Sports Medicine as an apparent sub-class of medicine has developed apace over the past 30 years. Its recent trajectory has been evidenced by the emergence of specialist international research journals, standard texts, annual conferences, academic appointments and postgraduate courses. Although this field of enquiry and practice lays claim to the title ‘sports medicine’ this paper queries the legitimacy of that claim. Depending upon how ‘sports medicine’ and ‘medicine’ are defined, a plausible-sounding case can be made to show that sports medicine is not in fact a branch of medicine. Rather, it is sometimes closer to practices such as non-therapeutic cosmetic surgery. The argument of the paper is as follows. It begins with a brief statement concerning methodology. We then identify and subscribe to a plausible defining goal of medicine taken from a recognised authority in the field. Then two representative, authoritative, definitions of sports medicine are discussed. It is then shown that acceptance of these definitions of sports medicine generates a problem in that if they are accepted, no necessary commitment to the defining goal of medicine is present within sports medicine. It seems to follow that sports medicine is not medicine. In the final part of the paper a critical response to that conclusion is presented and rebutted. The response is one which rejects the identification of the defining goal of medicine upon which our argument rests

Brent Kious has recently attacked several arguments generally adduced to support anti-doping in sports, which are widely supported by the sports medicine fraternity, international sports federations, and international governments. We show that his attack does not succeed for a variety of reasons. First, it uses an overly inclusive definition of doping at odds with the WADA definition, which has global, if somewhat contentious, currency. Second, it seriously misconstrues the position it attacks, rendering the attack without force against a more balanced construal of an anti-doping position. Third, it makes unwarranted appeals to matters Kious considers morally ‘clear’, while simultaneously attacking a position many others take to be equally morally ‘clear’, namely that of anti-doping. Such an inconsistency, attacking and appealing to the moral status quo as befits one’s argument, is not acceptable without further qualification. Fourth, his position suffers from a general methodological flaw of over-reliance upon argumentation by analogy. Moreover, it is argued that the analogies, being poorly selected and developed, fail to justify his conclusion that the anti-doping lobby lacks philosophical and moral authority for its stance. These issues are symptomatic of a more fundamental problem: any attempt at providing a blanket solution to the question of whether doping is morally acceptable or not is bound to run up against problems when applied to highly specific contexts. Thus, rather than reaching any particular conclusion for or against doping products or processes in this article, we conclude that an increased context-sensitivity will result in a more evenhanded appraisal of arguments on the matter

Mike McNamee, professor of applied ethics at Swansea University, offers a critique on paralympism in the context of the International Paralympic Charter's four stated values: courage, determination, inspiration, and equality. He discusses two specific cases arising from paralympic sports involving amputation of limbs either to enhance sporting performance or to enable disability sport membership of an otherwise able-bodied person by the use of elective surgery. McNamee argues that disability sports organizations should ban such practices and better articulate their value base in order to preserve the integrity of disability sports.