Thom Brooks

Hegel'sPhilosophy of Rightis more than a major work of political and legal philosophy; it is a battleground for two different interpretive approaches. MyHegel's Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Rightargues that these approaches are mistaken about their differences and that one approach offers a more compelling interpretation ofHegel's Philosophy of Rightthan the other. I will briefly outline my defence of the systematic reading of thePhilosophy of Rightbefore replying to the constructive criticisms raised by Redding, Rosen and Wood.There are two different interpretative approaches to understanding Hegel'sPhilosophy of Right. These are the metaphysical and the non-metaphysical readings. The former often highlight Hegel's insistence that some political states may be considered more ‘true’ or ‘actual’ than others. This reading also often emphasises the special place of religion in Hegel's philosophical system, for example. In contrast, the non-metaphysical reading argues that such an interpretation is not only unattractive, but perhaps even unnecessary because Hegel's views on ‘actuality’ and ‘actualization’ are less controversial than traditional metaphysical readings of Hegel's philosophy have claimed. Commentators must choose between these competing camps and interpretations of Hegel's work are conceived within these approaches. Importantly, each reading claims that its approach best captures Hegel's philosophical importance. But would Hegel endorse either the metaphysical or non-metaphysical reading?The problem is that this debate rests on a central misconception about Hegel's philosophy. The debate is characterized as a disagreement about the role and perhaps the very existence of metaphysics in Hegel's philosophy. But this is a false impression. It is virtually nowhere in doubt that metaphysics is present in Hegel's philosophy, including hisPhilosophy of Right. Therefore, the debate between a ‘metaphysical’ and ‘non-metaphysical’ reading of Hegel's works is not a debate about whether these works contain metaphysics. The characterization of the debate invites a false impression about what is at stake.

Moral enhancement techniques modifying brain processes to produce improved moral conduct present us with new challenges for how we grapple with the ethical questions raised. John Shook (2012) argues that we should greet these developments with some measure of skepticism and cynicism regarding their success and desirability. This commentary considers further Shook’s scepticism. It is argued that the issue of “moral enhancement” raises questions about which view(s) may benefit and the problems this poses for societies characterized by the fact of reasonable pluralism. More importantly, it is further argued that moral enhancement runs into greater difficulties where enhancement is thought to contribute to alleviating illegal behavior. This is because law and morality are related imperfectly and, therefore, improved moral sensitivity may not translate into less illegality. Thus, moral enhancement techniques may create moral Frankensteins that (a) may undermine the existence of reasonable pluralism in modern liberal societies and (b) may fail to better achieve lawful behavior.

Many efforts are directed towards philosophical accounts of life from life’s meaning to how it should be led. Often overlooked are no less important issues concerning the end of life. Questions like what is death?, is immortality desirable?, is death ‘bad’ for the person who dies?, can the dead be harmed or punished? and what, if any, obligations do we have towards the dead? – these are but a few key concerns deserving greater attention. This special issue brings together three contributions that chart promising new perspectives on this timeless philosophical pastime. The first piece by Ben Curtis asks ‘when do persons die?’ Curtis focuses on the general thesis that death is constituted by the death of the human organism. Not all agree: some critics defend a ‘two-deaths thesis’ maintaining that the death of an organism is not the same as the death of a person. So which view is most compelling?

Both vote buying and tax-cut promises are attempts to manipulate voters through cash incentives in order to win elections, but only vote buying is illegal. Should we extend the ban on vote buying to tax-cut promises? This article will argue for three conclusions. The first is that tax-cut promises should be understood as a form of vote buying. The second is that campaign promises are a form of vote buying. The third conclusion is that campaign promises, including tax-cut promises, should not be banned. An important distinction is drawn between enforceable wrongful incentives and unenforceable wrongful incentives. The difference between vote buying and tax-cut promises is not wrongfulness but enforceability.

This review article critically examines R. A. Duff and Stuart P. Green’s wide-ranging Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law. The book captures well a crucial debate at the heart of its topic: is morality a key for understanding criminal law? I first consider legal moralism arguments answering this question in the affirmative and argue they should be rejected. I next consider alternatives to argue that philosophers of criminal law should look beyond legal moralism for more compelling theories about criminal law.

Green agrees with Kant on the abstract character of moral law as categorical imperatives and that intentional dispositions are central to a moral justification of punishment. The central problem with Kant's account is that we are unable to know these dispositions beyond a reasonable estimate. Green offers a practical alternative, positing moral law as an ideal to be achieved, but not immediately enforceable through positive law. Moral and positive law are bridged by Green's theory of the common good through the dialectic of morality. Thus, Green appears to offer an alternative that remains committed to Kantian morality whilst taking proper stock of our cognitive limitations. Unfortunately, Green fails to unravel fully Kant's dichotomy of moral and positive law that mirrors Green's solution, although Green offers a number of improvements, such as the importance of the community in establishing rights and linking the severity of punishment to the extent that a criminal act threatens the continued maintenance of a system of rights.

Climate change presents us with perhaps the most pressing challenge today. But is it a problem we can solve? This article argues that existing conservationist and adaptation approaches fail to satisfy their objectives. A second issue that these approaches disagree about how best to end climate change, but accept that it is a problem that can be solved. I believe this view is mistaken: a future environmental catastrophe is an event we might at best postpone, but not avoid. This raises new ethical questions for climate change: what are the moral implications of a future climatic catastrophe that might be delayed at best? What practical consequences might these implications yield? This article argues most political philosophers have misunderstood the kind of problem that climate change presents and the daunting challenges we face.

This article examines the relation of risks and public policy through the lens of alcohol and crime. Alcohol thus lives a double-life as a fountain of celebration while also a wellspring of potentially serious harms. The issue of how risks might be managed much better is approached through considering three different arenas within the criminal law concluding that it is a crude mechanism for grappling with complex issues of criminal responsibility for any higher risks associated with becoming under the influence. The article defends the use of nudges as an under explored area for public policy decision-making and proposes new policies based on them.

Perhaps one of the most controversial aspects of Hegel's Philosophy of Right for contemporary interpreters is its discussion of the constitutional monarch. This is true despite the general agreement amongst virtually all interpreters that Hegel's monarch is no more powerful than modern constitutional monarchs and is an institution worthy of little attention or concern. In this article, I will examine whether or not it matters who is the monarch and what domestic and foreign powers he has. I argue against the virtual consensus of recent interpreters that Hegel's monarch is far more powerful than has been understood previously. In part, Hegel's monarch is perhaps even more powerful than Hegel himself may have realized and I will demonstrate certain inconsistencies with some of his claims. My reading represents a distinctive break from the virtual consensus, without endorsing the view that Hegel was a totalitarian.

Many Christians are split on whether they believe we should endorse or oppose capital punishment. Each side claims Biblical support for their professed position. This essay cannot hope to bring this debate to a conclusion. However, it will try to offer a different perspective. The essay recognizes that the Bible itself offers statements in support of each position. The proposed way forward is not to claim there is a contradiction, but to place greater emphasis on understanding these statements in their particular contexts, specifically with reference to their relation to Jesus’ New Covenant. Such a perspective should lead us to oppose capital punishment.

This Comment demonstrates that policy judgements are not masked by philosophical references, nor do philosophers play any crucial role in contentious judicial decisions. Neomi Rao’s study is flawed for many reasons: incomplete content analysis, poor assessment of data, and an inadequate definition of philosophy. She should be criticised for hypocritically praising Court philosopher references in some instances and not others, especially with regard to the Court’s early development. This Comment searched unsuccessfully for an instance where philosophers were cited just once in controversial cases regarding racial integration, capital punishment’s abolition and re-legality, and the 2000 Presidential election. Philosophers are peculiarly absent from major controversial cases. Rao claims the Court’s majority decisions avoided the “Philosophers’ Brief” because the philosophers’ argument was grounded in theory, not substantive legal argument surrounding issues of judicial precedent. This Comment challenges Rao’s use of “philosophy” as something entirely abstract and steeped in metaphysics. Philosophy is presented as a large umbrella covering diverse sub-fields, two of which are philosophy of law and political philosophy. These sub-fields are of great use to law. Thus, the Court has not illegitimately used philosophers to support personal policy preferences. Nor is the use of philosophy incommensurable with judicial decision-making.

This article argues that James Seth provides illuminating contributions to our understanding of law and, more specifically, the natural law tradition. Seth defends a unique perspective through his emphasis on personalism that helps identify a distinctive and compelling account of natural law and legal moralism. The next section surveys standard positions in the natural law tradition. This is followed with an examination of Seth's approach and the article concludes with analysis of its wider importance for scholars of Seth's work as well as legal philosophers more generally.

How should we determine which nations have a responsibility to remedy suffering elsewhere? The problem is pressing because, following David Miller, ‘[it] is morally intolerable if (remediable) suffering and deprivation are allowed to continue... where they exist we are morally bound to hold somebody (some person or collective agent) responsible for relieving them’. Miller offers a connection theory of remedial responsibilities in response to this problem, a theory he has been developing over the last decade. This theory is meant to serve as a guide on how we can best determine which nations are remedially responsible for alleviating suffering and deprivation elsewhere. Miller’s theory entails our following a procedure in order to determine remedial responsibility for nations. The problem is that there is an important flaw in this procedure, a flaw that previous critiques have overlooked. This essay will explain this flaw and how Miller’s theory might be reformulated into a two-tiered procedure that would take better account of this problem. Keywords: Global justice; nationalism; Miller; identity; distributive justice; severe poverty (Published: 16 September 2011) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2011, pp. 195-202. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v4i3.7140.

It is widely accepted by the scientific community and beyond that human beings are primarily responsible for climate change and that climate change has brought with it a number of real problems. These problems include, but are not limited to, greater threats to coastal communities, greater risk of famine, and greater risk that tropical diseases may spread to new territory. In keeping with J. S. Mill's 'Harm Principle', green political theorists often respond that if we are contributing a harm to others in contributing to climate change and its negative effects, we then have a negative duty to assist those we have harmed and to reduce our carbon emissions. In this paper, I will take seriously negative duties stemming from a contribution to climate change and demonstrate that our negative duties do not demand that we necessarily end our contribution to climate change if we were able to compensate those who may be affected by climate change. Thus, the conclusion of many green political theorists - that we must reduce our carbon emissions - does not necessarily follow from the view that humans are primarily responsible for climate change and its attended ill effects.

Hegel's legacy is particularly controversial, not least in legal theory. He has been classified as a proponent of either natural law, legal positivism, the historical school, pre-Marxism, postmodern critical theory, and even transcendental legal theory. To what degree has Hegel actually influenced contemporary legal theorists? This review article looks at Michael Salter's collection Hegel and Law. I look at articles on civil disobedience, contract law, feminism, and punishment. I conclude noting similarities between Hegel's legal theory and that of Ronald Dworkin. I also criticize the volume's emphasis on Hegel's postmodern credentials, all of which I doubt.