Alan Carter

Genuine altruism would appear to be incompatible with evolutionary theory. And yet altruistic behavior would seem to occur, at least on occasion. This article first considers a game-theoretical attempt at solving this seeming paradox, before considering agroup selectionist approach. Neither approach, as they stand, would seem to render genuine, as opposed to reciprocal, altruism compatible with the theory of evolution. The article concludes by offering an alternative game-theoretical solution to the problem of altruism.

Whereas many environmentalists have traditionally argued in favour of small‐scale, decentralised communities as a solution to the environmental crises which we appear to face, some environmental political theorists have recently argued against decentralisation. In this article I first show that game theory seems, at first glance, to support the insistence by statists that decentralisation is highly impracticable. But, second, I then attempt to demonstrate that, on closer inspection, game theory actually provides considerable support for the decentralist case.

On the basis of our apparent obligations to future generations, it would seem that we are morally obliged to reduce the risk our environmentally destructive behaviour poses for their well-being. But if, rather than choosing to destroy the environment, we are in fact driven to do so, then any obligation to reduce our environmental impact requires an understanding of the mechanism driving our behaviour. This article argues that the State-Primacy Theory provides a plausible explanation for the nature of that mechanism, and concludes that the most common strategies offered as a response to our environmental impact are most likely to be insufficiently radical to meet our seeming obligations effectively.