•  98
    Practical grounds for belief: Kant and James on religion
    European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4): 1269-1282. 2018.
    Both Kant and James claim to limit the role of knowledge in order to make room for faith. In this paper, we argue that despite some similarities, their attempts to do this come apart. Our main claim is that, although both Kant and James justify our adopting religious beliefs on practical grounds, James believes that we can—and should—subsequently assess such beliefs on the basis of evidence. We offer our own account of this evidence and discuss what this difference means for their accounts of re…Read more
  •  77
    Kant, Rational Psychology and Practical Reason
    Kant Yearbook 6 (1). 2014.
    In his pre-critical lectures on rational psychology, Kant employs an argument from the I to the transcendental freedom of the soul. In the (A-edition of the) first Critique, he distances himself from rational psychology, and instead offers four paralogisms of this doctrine, insisting that ‘I think’ no longer licenses any inferences about a soul. Kant also comes alive to the possibility that we could be thinking mechanisms – rational beings, but not agents. These developments rob him of his pre-c…Read more
  •  168
    Kant and the Problem of Recognition: Freedom, Transcendental Idealism, and the Third-Person
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (2): 164-182. 2016.
    Kant wants to show that freedom is possible in the face of natural necessity. Transcendental idealism is his solution, which locates freedom outside of nature. I accept that this makes freedom possible, but object that it precludes the recognition of other rational agents. In making this case, I trace some of the history of Kant’s thoughts on freedom. In several of his earlier works, he argues that we are aware of our own activity. He later abandons this approach, as he worries that any awarenes…Read more
  •  91
    Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary (review)
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (3): 616-619. 2013.
    No abstract