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7Minimal RationalismMind 102 (408): 587-610. 1993.Enquiries into the possible nature and scope of innate knowledge never proceed in an empirical vaccuum. Instead, such conjectures are informed by a theory concerning probable representational form. Classical approaches to the nativism debate often assume a quasi-linguistic form of knowledge representation and deliniate a space of options accordingly. Recent connectionist theorizing posits a different kind of represenational form, and thus determines a different picture of the space of possible n…Read more
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96Beyond the flesh: Some lessons from a Mole cricketArtificial Life 11 (1-2): 233-44. 2005.What do linguistic symbols do for minds like ours, and how (if at all) can basic embodied, dynamical and situated approaches do justice to high-level human thought and reason? These two questions are best addressed together, since our answers to the first may inform the second. The key move in ‘scaling-up’ simple embodied cognitive science is, I argue, to take very seriously the potent role of human-built structures in transforming the spaces of human learning and reason. In particular, in this …Read more
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196Embodiment and the philosophy of mindIn Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press. pp. 35-51. 1998.Cambridge University Press:1998) P. 35-52. To be reprinted in Alberto Peruzzi (ed) MIND
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237Where brain, body, and world collideCognitive Systems Research 1 (1): 5--17. 1999.--œWhere Brain, Body, and World Collide--� reprinted by permission of Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, from the issue entitled, --œThe Brain,--� Spring 1998, Vol. 127, No. 2
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The roots of 'norm-hungriness'In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Philosophy of Mental Representation, Oxford University Press Uk. 2002.
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59Extended epistemology: an introductionIn J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Extended Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 1-14. 2018.First, a theoretical background to the volume’s topic, extended epistemology, is provided by a brief outline of its cross-disciplinary theoretical lineage and some key themes. In particular, it is shown how and why the emergence of recent and more egalitarian thinking in the cognitive sciences about the nature of human cognizing and its bounds—viz., the so-called ‘extended cognition’ program, and the related idea of an ‘extended mind’—has important and interesting ramifications in epistemology. …Read more
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2Perception, action, and experience: unraveling the golden braidIn Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary & Finn Spicer (eds.), Perception, action, and consciousness: sensorimotor dynamics and two visual systems, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.
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100Markets, companies and various forms of business organizations may all (we have argued) be usefully viewed through the lens of CAS -- the theory of complex adaptive systems. In this chapter, I address one fundamental issue that confronts both the theoretician and the business manager: the nature and opportunities for control and intervention in complex adaptive regimes. The problem is obvious enough. A complex adaptive system, as we have defined it, is soft assembled and largely self-organizing.…Read more
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229Memento's revenge: The extended mind, extendedIn Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind, Mit Press. 2010.In the movie, Memento, the hero, Leonard, suffers from a form of anterograde amnesia that results in an inability to lay down new memories. Nonetheless, he sets out on a quest to find his wife
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1Artificial intelligenceIn Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2002.
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304Is seeing all it seems? Action, reason and the grand illusionJournal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6): 181-202. 2002.We seem, or so it seems to some theorists, to experience a rich stream of highly detailed information concerning an extensive part of our current visual surroundings. But this appearance, it has been suggested, is in some way illusory. Our brains do not command richly detailed internal models of the current scene. Our seeings, it seems, are not all that they seem. This, then, is the Grand Illusion. We think we see much more than we actually do. In this paper I shall (briefly) rehearse the empiri…Read more
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117Substituting the sensesIn Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.Sensory substitution devices are a type of sensory prosthesis that (typically) convert visual stimuli transduced by a camera into tactile or auditory stimulation. They are designed to be used by people with impaired vision so that they can recover some of the functions normally subserved by vision. In this chapter we will consider what philosophers might learn about the nature of the senses from the neuroscience of sensory substitution. We will show how sensory substitution devices work by ex…Read more
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Introduction: The extended mind in focus / Richard Menary The extended mindIn Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind, Mit Press. 2010.
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1271This unpublished article was written around 2009 for a journal special issue of a journal which never materialized. In 2018, the article was rewritten and published in the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. It can be found on PhilPapers as Drayson and Clark (2018), 'Cognitive Disability and the Embodied, Extended Mind'.
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Memento's revenge: The extended mind, extendedIn Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind, Mit Press. 2010.
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784How to situate cognition: Letting nature take its courseIn Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, Cambridge University Press. pp. 55--77. 2008.1. The Situation in Cognition 2. Situated Cognition: A Potted Recent History 3. Extensions in Biology, Computation, and Cognition 4. Articulating the Idea of Cognitive Extension 5. Are Some Resources Intrinsically Non-Cognitive? 6. Is Cognition Extended or Only Embedded? 7. Letting Nature Take Its Course
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Embodied cognition and the sciences of the mindIn Michela Massimi (ed.), Philosophy and the Sciences for Everyone, Routledge. 2014.
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51New humans? Ethics, trust, and the extended mindIn J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Extended Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 331-352. 2018.Strange inversions occur when things work in ways that turn received wisdom upside down. Hume offered a strangely inverted story about causation, and Darwin, about apparent design. Dennett suggests that a strange inversion also occurs when we project our own reactive complexes outward, painting our world with elusive properties like cuteness, sweetness, blueness, sexiness, funniness, and more. Such properties strike us as experiential causes, but they are really effects—a kind of shorthand for w…Read more
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274Beyond the 'Bayesian blur': predictive processing and the nature of subjective experienceJournal of Consciousness Studies 25 (3-4): 71-87. 2018.Recent work in cognitive and computational neuroscience depicts the brain as in some sense implementing probabilistic inference. This suggests a puzzle. If the processing that enables perceptual experience involves representing or approximating probability distributions, why does experience itself appear univocal and determinate, apparently bearing no traces of those probabilistic roots? In this paper, I canvass a range of responses, including the denial of univocality and determinacy itself. I …Read more
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30Intelligent problem-solvers externalize cognitive operationsNature Human Behaviour 3 (2): 136-142. 2019.The use of forward models is well established in cognitive and computational neuroscience. We compare and contrast two recent, but interestingly divergent, accounts of the place of forward models in the human cognitive architecture. On the Auxiliary Forward Model account, forward models are special-purpose prediction mechanisms implemented by additional circuitry distinct from core mechanisms of perception and action. On the Integral Forward Model account, forward models lie at the heart of all …Read more
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1045Cognitive disability and embodied, extended mindsIn Adam Cureton & David Wasserman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability, Oxford University Press. 2020.Many models of cognitive ability and disability rely on the idea of cognition as abstract reasoning processes implemented in the brain. Research in cognitive science, however, emphasizes the way that our cognitive skills are embodied in our more basic capacities for sensing and moving, and the way that tools in the external environment can extend the cognitive abilities of our brains. This chapter addresses the implications of research in embodied cognition and extended cognition for how we thin…Read more
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115New humans? Ethics, trust, and the extended mindIn J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Extended Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 331-351. 2018.The possibility of extended cognition invites the possibility of extended knowledge. We examine what is minimally required for such forms of technologically extended knowledge to arise and whether existing and future technologies can allow for such forms of epistemic extension. Answering in the positive, we explore some of the ensuing transformations in the ethical obligations and personal rights of the resulting ‘new humans.’
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25Word, Niche and Super-Niche: How Language Makes Minds Matter MoreTheoria 20 (3): 255-268. 2010.How does language impact thought? One useful way to approach this important but elusive question may be to consider language itself as a cognition-enhancing animal-built structure. To take this perspective is to view language as a kind of self-constructed cognitive niche.
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2049How to Knit Your Own Markov BlanketPhilosophy and Predictive Processing. 2017.Hohwy (Hohwy 2016, Hohwy 2017) argues there is a tension between the free energy principle and leading depictions of mind as embodied, enactive, and extended (so-called ‘EEE1 cognition’). The tension is traced to the importance, in free energy formulations, of a conception of mind and agency that depends upon the presence of a ‘Markov blanket’ demarcating the agent from the surrounding world. In what follows I show that the Markov blanket considerations do not, in fact, lead to the kinds of tens…Read more
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Associative Engines: Connectionism, Concepts and Representational ChangeBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (4): 1047-1058. 1994.