Arnon Levy

I offer a defense, albeit a qualified one, of machine analogies in biology, focusing on molecular contexts. The defense is rooted in my prior work (Levy in Philosopher’s Imprint 14(6), 2014), which construes the machine machine-likeness of a system as a matter of the extent to which it exhibits an internal division of labor. A concrete aim is to shore up the notion of molecular biological machines, paying special attention to processive molecular motors, such as Kinesin. But I will also try to show how the division of labor account gives us guidance more broadly, both about where and why machine analogies can be expected to prove helpful and about their limitations.

I offer a defense, albeit a qualified one, of machine analogies in biology, focusing on molecular contexts. The defense is rooted in prior work (Levy 2014), which construes the machine machine-likeness of a system as a matter of the extent to which it exhibits an internal division of labor. A concrete aim is to shore up the notion of molecular biological machines, and I’ll pay special attention to processive molecular motors, such as Kinesin. But I will also try to show how the division of labor account gives us guidance more broadly, both about where and why machine analogies can be expected to prove helpful and about their limitations.