Alejandro G. Vigo

Resumen En el �mbito de la acci�n moral, el principio socr�tico de que nadie yerra voluntariamente implica que toda vez que un agente elige algo lo hace por considerarlo, al mismo tiempo, como bueno o, al menos, preferible a otra cosa: su elecci�n es internamente racional. La tesis socr�tica sobre la conexi�n estructural entre error y autoenga�o constituye, sin duda, uno de los aportes m�s decisivos al pensamiento filos�fico occidental. De esta concepci�n en torno a la naturaleza y estructura del error, en general, y de su aplicaci�n espec�fica al caso del error moral, se siguen importantes consecuencias para el modo en que S�crates considera el fen�meno del conflicto motivacional. Asimismo, se muestra la importancia decisiva que tuvo la concepci�n socr�tica para la discusi�n de la estructura de la conciencia moral tanto en Plat�n y Arist�teles como en Tom�s de Aquino.: In the realm of moral action, the socratic principle nobody errs willingly implies that the rational agent always chooses to do what he/she takes to be good or better for himself/herself: his/her choice is internally rational. Socrates"� view of the connection between error and self-deception is a major contribution to western philosophy. The application of this view to the particular case of moral error has important consequences concerning the possibility of motivational conflict. Not only Plato and Aristotle but also Aquinas are strongly influenced by Socrates in their views concerning the structure of moral conscience

This paper discusses Kant’s account of the connection between ethics and right. Firstly, the way Kant includes rigth in the sphere of morals is considered. Secondly, the difference between moral and juridical legislation is examined in connection with the distinction between internal and external freedom. On this basis, an account of both the function of the principle of coexistence of freedoms and the connection between right and coaction is given.As a result, Kant’s complex position is characterized in terms of the so called “motivational model” for the distinction between ethics and right.

This book brings together a number of contributions dealing with certain fundamental structures of practical rationality, as they are presented in the areas of the philosophy of action and normative ethics, namely: intentionality, normativity, and reflexivity. With the term “intentionality,” is meant a set of problems that are linked not only with the teleological structure of praxis-oriented rationality, but also with its temporal structure. “Normativity”, in turn, refers to a distinct set of problems, which cannot simply be reduced to those entailed in the intentional nature of human action, even if this notion incorporates a reference to the good or value in its very structure. Finally, with the term “reflexivity” we point at the linkage between the normative dimension of reason with both the contingent circumstances of action and the moral receptivity of the agent, as it is experienced in moral judgment.

Partiendo de la actual discusión en torno al concepto de identidad práctica , se ofrece una reconstrucción del modo en el cual Aristóteles con ci be la identidad y la individualidad del sujeto de praxis. En primer lugar, se considera el ca rác ter esencialmente au to rre ferencial de la praxis. A continuación, se aborda el pa pel que cum ple la orien ta ción a partir de una representación global de la pro pia vida y la aper tu ra al ho rizonte de futuro. Por úl ti mo, se discute la función cons titutiva de la ha bi tua li dad y del êthos