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3Christine Sistare, Larry May, and Leslie Francis, eds., Groups and Group Rights Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 21 (4): 297-299. 2001.
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40Justin Garson, The Biological Mind: A Philosophical Introduction. Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 35 (5): 259-260. 2015.
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44Be a Skeptic, Not a MetaskepticIn Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Lexington Books. pp. 87. 2013.
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Stephen Cohen The Nature of Moral Reasoning (review)Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 6 (1). 2004.
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132History as struggle: Foucault's genealogy of genealogyHistory of the Human Sciences 11 (4): 159-170. 1998.
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71Peter Ulric Tse , The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 33 (4): 331-333. 2013.
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85Zimmerman’s The Immorality of Punishment: A Critical Essay (review)Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (1): 103-112. 2015.In “The Immorality of Punishment”, Michael Zimmerman attempts to show that punishment is morally unjustified and therefore wrong. In this response, I focus on two main questions. First, I examine whether Zimmerman’s empirical claims—concerning our inability to identify wrongdoers who satisfy conditions on blameworthiness and who might be reformed through punishment, and the comparative efficacy of punitive and non-punitive responses to crime—stand up to scrutiny. Second, I argue that his crucial…Read more
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12Ethics and Rules: A Political Reading of Foucault's Aesthetics of ExistencePhilosophy Today 42 (1): 79-84. 1998.
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Nomy Arpaly, Merit, Meaning and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free WillPhilosophy in Review 27 (2): 89. 2007.
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311Virtual child pornography: The eroticization of inequalityEthics and Information Technology 4 (4): 319-323. 2002.The United States Supreme Court hasrecently ruled that virtual child pornographyis protected free speech, partly on the groundsthat virtual pornography does not harm actualchildren. I review the evidence for thecontention that virtual pornography might harmchildren, and find that it is, at best,inconclusive. Saying that virtual childpornography does not harm actual children isnot to say that it is completely harmless,however. Child pornography, actual or virtual,necessarily eroticizes inequality…Read more
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47Katrina Hutchison and Fiona Jenkins (eds.) , Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change? Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 34 (3-4): 132-135. 2014.
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34There May Be Costs to Failing to Enhance, as Well as to EnhancingAmerican Journal of Bioethics 13 (7): 38-39. 2013.No abstract
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19Cognitive Enhancement and Intuitive Dualism Testing a Possible LinkIn Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning, Psychology Press. pp. 171. 2012.
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155The apology paradox and the non-identity problemPhilosophical Quarterly 52 (208): 358-368. 2002.Janna Thompson has outlined ‘the apology paradox’, which arises whenever people apologize for an action or event upon which their existence is causally dependent. She argues that a sincere apology seems to entail a wish that the action or event had not occurred, but that we cannot sincerely wish that events upon which our existence depends had not occurred. I argue that Thompson’s paradox is a backward-looking version of Parfit’s (forward-looking) ‘non-identity problem’, where backward- and forwa…Read more
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490The case for physician assisted suicide: how can it possibly be proven?Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (6): 335-338. 2006.In her paper, The case for physician assisted suicide: not proven, Bonnie Steinbock argues that the experience with Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act fails to demonstrate that the benefits of legalising physician assisted suicide outweigh its risks. Given that her verdict is based on a small number of highly controversial cases that will most likely occur under any regime of legally implemented safeguards, she renders it virtually impossible to prove the case for physician assisted suicide. In thi…Read more
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28Respecting rights … to deathJournal of Medical Ethics 32 (10): 608-611. 2006.Ravelingien et al1 argue that, given the restrictions that must be imposed on recipients of xenotransplanted organs, we should conduct clinical trials of xenotransplantation only on patients in a persistent vegetative state. I argue that there is no ethical barrier to using terminally ill patients instead. Such patients can choose to waive their rights to the liberties that xenotransplantation would probably restrict; it is surely rational to prefer to waive your rights rather than to die, and p…Read more
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164Embodied savoir-faire: knowledge-how requires motor representationsSynthese 194 (2). 2017.I argue that the intellectualist account of knowledge-how, according to which agents have the knowledge-how to \ in virtue of standing in an appropriate relation to a proposition, is only half right. On the composition view defended here, knowledge-how at least typically requires both propositional knowledge and motor representations. Motor representations are not mere dispositions to behavior because they have representational content, and they play a central role in realizing the intelligence …Read more
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111Open-Mindedness and the Duty to Gather EvidencePublic Affairs Quarterly 20 (1): 55-66. 2006.Most people believe that we have a duty to gather evidence on both sides of central moral and political controversies, in order to fulfil our epistemic responsibilities and come to hold justified cognitive attitudes on these matters. I argue, on the contrary, that to the extent to which these controversies require special expertise, we have no such duty. We are far more likely to worsen than to improve our epistemic situation by becoming better informed on these questions. I suggest we do better…Read more
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27What evolves when morality evolves?Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (3): 612-620. 2006.
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151Moore on Twin EarthErkenntnis 75 (1): 137-146. 2011.In a series of articles, Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have argued that Richard Boyd’s defence of moral realism, utilizing a causal theory of reference, fails. Horgan and Timmons construct a twin Earth-style thought experiment which, they claim, generates intuitions inconsistent with the realist account. In their thought experiment, the use of (allegedly) moral terms at a world is causally regulated by some property distinct from that regulating their use here on Earth; nevertheless, Horgan and …Read more
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82The wisdom of the packPhilosophical Explorations 9 (1). 2006.This short article is a reply to Fine's criticisms of Haidt's social intuitionist model of moral judgement. After situating Haidt in the landscape of meta-ethical views, I examine Fine's argument, against Haidt, that the processes which give rise to moral judgements are amenable to rational control: first-order moral judgements, which are automatic, can nevertheless deliberately be brought to reflect higher-order judgements. However, Haidt's claims about the arationality of moral judgements seem…Read more
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59Conspiracy Theories (review)Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 24 (1-2): 47-48. 2004.
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192Consciousness and Moral ResponsibilityOxford University Press. 2014.Neil Levy presents a new theory of freedom and responsibility. He defends a particular account of consciousness--the global workspace view--and argues that consciousness plays an especially important role in action. There are good reasons to think that the naïve assumption, that consciousness is needed for moral responsibility, is in fact true
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University of OxfordRegular Faculty (Part-time)
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Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Social Epistemology |
Philosophy of Psychology |
Applied Ethics |
Philosophy of Action |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Applied Ethics |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |