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57Self-deception without thought experimentsIn T. Bayne & J. Fernández (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation, Psychology Press. 2008.Theories of self-deception divide into those that hold that the state is characterized by some kind of synchronic tension or conflict between propositional attitudes and those that deny this. Proponents of the latter like Al Mele claim that their theories are more parsimonious, because they do not require us to postulate any psychological mechanisms beyond those which have been independently verified. But if we can show that there are real cases of motivated believing which are characterized by …Read more
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30Defending the Consciousness Thesis: A response to Robichaud, Sripada and CarusoJournal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8): 61-76. 2015.16 page
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17John S. Callender, Free Will and Responsibility: A Guide for Practitioners. Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 30 (5): 318-319. 2010.
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28Respecting rights … to deathJournal of Medical Ethics 32 (10): 608-611. 2006.Ravelingien et al1 argue that, given the restrictions that must be imposed on recipients of xenotransplanted organs, we should conduct clinical trials of xenotransplantation only on patients in a persistent vegetative state. I argue that there is no ethical barrier to using terminally ill patients instead. Such patients can choose to waive their rights to the liberties that xenotransplantation would probably restrict; it is surely rational to prefer to waive your rights rather than to die, and p…Read more
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3Christine Sistare, Larry May, and Leslie Francis, eds., Groups and Group Rights Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 21 (4): 297-299. 2001.
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84Zimmerman’s The Immorality of Punishment: A Critical Essay (review)Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (1): 103-112. 2015.In “The Immorality of Punishment”, Michael Zimmerman attempts to show that punishment is morally unjustified and therefore wrong. In this response, I focus on two main questions. First, I examine whether Zimmerman’s empirical claims—concerning our inability to identify wrongdoers who satisfy conditions on blameworthiness and who might be reformed through punishment, and the comparative efficacy of punitive and non-punitive responses to crime—stand up to scrutiny. Second, I argue that his crucial…Read more
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5320 Intuitions and experimental philosophy: comfortable bedfellowsIn Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, Routledge. pp. 381. 2013.
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95Restrictivism is a Covert compatibilismIn Nick Trakakis & Daniel Cohen (eds.), Essays on free will and moral responsibility, Cambridge Scholars Press. 2008._Libertarian restrictivists hold that agents are rarely directly free. However, they seek to reconcile their views_ _with common intuitions by arguing that moral responsibility, or indirect freedom (depending on the version of_ _restrictivism) is much more common than direct freedom. I argue that restrictivists must give up either the_ _claim that agents are rarely free, or the claim that indirect freedom or responsibility is much more common_ _than direct freedom. Focusing on Kane’s version of …Read more
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25Bruce N. Waller , Against Moral Responsibility . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 32 (3): 234-236. 2012.
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162What, and where, luck is: A response to Jennifer LackeyAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3). 2009.In 'What Luck Is Not', Lackey presents counterexamples to the two most prominent accounts of luck: the absence of control account and the modal account. I offer an account of luck that conjoins absence of control to a modal condition. I then show that Lackey's counterexamples mislocate the luck: the agents in her cases are lucky, but the luck precedes the event upon which Lackey focuses, and that event is itself only fortunate, not lucky. Finally I offer an account of fortune. Fortune is luck-in…Read more
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144The Prospects for Evolutionary Ethics TodayEurAmerica 40 (3): 529-571. 2010.One reason for the widespread resistance to evolutionary accounts of the origins of humanity is the fear that they undermine morality: if morality is based on nothing more than evolved dispositions, it would be shown to be illusory, many people suspect. This view is shared by some philosophers who take their work on the evolutionary origins of morality to undermine moral realism. If they are right, we are faced with an unpalatable choice: to reject morality on scientific grounds, or to reject ou…Read more
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228Enhancing AuthenticityJournal of Applied Philosophy 28 (3): 308-318. 2011.Some philosophers have criticized the use of psychopharmaceuticals on the grounds that even if these drugs enhance the person using them, they threaten their authenticity. Others have replied by pointing out that the conception of authenticity upon which this argument rests is contestable; on a rival conception, psychopharmaceuticals might be used to enhance our authenticity. Since, however, it is difficult to decide between these competing conceptions of authenticity, the debate seems to end in…Read more
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Law or Order: Reconsidering the Aims of PolicingAustralian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 2 (2). 2000.
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125Does phenomenology overflow access?Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (7): 29-38. 2008.Ned Block has influentially distinguished two kinds of consciousness, access and phenomenal consciousness. He argues that these two kinds of consciousness can dissociate, and therefore we cannot rely upon subjective report in constructing a science of consciousness. I argue that none of Block's evidence better supports his claim than the rival view, that access and phenomenal consciousness are perfectly correlated. Since Block's view is counterintuitive, and has wildly implausible implications, …Read more
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40Justin Garson, The Biological Mind: A Philosophical Introduction. Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 35 (5): 259-260. 2015.
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50Review of Experimental Philosophy (review)Metapsychology 12 (33). 2008.This anthology mixes together previously published and new work in experimental philosophy, by many of its leading figures (among whom the editors feature prominently). Experimental philosophy is a burgeoning movement that urges philosophers to leave their armchairs and test their philosophical claims empirically. It builds upon but goes further than the movement that Jesse Prinz, in his contribution, calls empirical philosophy; philosophy that turns to existing scientific literature to find evi…Read more
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19Cognitive Enhancement and Intuitive Dualism Testing a Possible LinkIn Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning, Psychology Press. pp. 171. 2012.
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45William Hirstein , Mindmelding: Consciousness, Neuroscience, and the Mind's Privacy . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 34 (1-2): 75-77. 2014.
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129History as struggle: Foucault's genealogy of genealogyHistory of the Human Sciences 11 (4): 159-170. 1998.
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71Peter Ulric Tse , The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 33 (4): 331-333. 2013.
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A Gresham's Law For Reporting About GeneticsAustralian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 4 (2). 2002.
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5Untimely Meditations: Periodising Recent French ThoughtSymposium 2 (1): 61-75. 1998.Most accounts of recent French intellectual history are organized around a fundamental rupture, which divides thought and thinkers into two eras: ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’. But the attempts to identify the features which characterise these eras seem, at best, inconclusive. In this paper, I examine this rupture, by way of a comparison of two thinkers representative of the divide. Sartre seems as uncontroversially modern as any twentieth-century can be, while Foucault’s work is often taken to be d…Read more
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156Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st CenturyCambridge University Press. 2007.Neuroscience has dramatically increased understanding of how mental states and processes are realized by the brain, thus opening doors for treating the multitude of ways in which minds become dysfunctional. This book explores questions such as when is it permissible to alter a person's memories, influence personality traits or read minds? What can neuroscience tell us about free will, self-control, self-deception and the foundations of morality? The view of neuroethics offered here argues that m…Read more
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236Libertarianism in all its varieties is widely taken to be vulnerable to a serious problem of present luck, inasmuch as it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to action. Genuine indeterminism entails luck, and lack of control over the ensuing action. Compatibilism, by contrast, is generally taken to be free of the problem of present luck, inasmuch as it does not require indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a probl…Read more
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University of OxfordRegular Faculty (Part-time)
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Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Social Epistemology |
Philosophy of Psychology |
Applied Ethics |
Philosophy of Action |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Applied Ethics |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |