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119Scylla and Charybdis of the epistemic relativist: Why the epistemic relativist still cannot use the sceptic’s strategyStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1): 145-149. 2013.In a reply to Howard Sankey I have maintained that the epistemic relativist cannot use the strategy of the sceptic since the relativist is at pains not to draw the sceptical solution. Sankey has objected to my argument by distinguishing between weak and strong justification: according to Sankey, the relativist using the sceptic’s strategy aims to provide an argument against the latter form of justification but still maintains that we can have the former.In this counter-response I argue that if t…Read more
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453Von Wahrheit über Bedeutung zum Anti-Begriffsrelativismus? Davidsons Argumentation gegen den BegriffsrelativismusFacta Philosophica 10 (1): 39-66. 2008.Since Davidson's proposal to use a Tarskian theory of truth in order to develop a theory of meaning has been criticised extensively, it is decisive to ask whether Davidson needs such a theory as an assumption and premise in other parts of his work. Especially, many authors have claimed that Davidson's argument in his paper 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' depends on his approach in the theory of meaning. It is argued that this interpretation is wrong and Davidson's attack on conceptual …Read more
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6232The Problem of Relativism in the Sociology of (Scientific) Knowledge (edited book)ontos. 2011.This volume comprises original articles by leading authors – from philosophy as well as sociology – in the debate around relativism in the sociology of (scientific) knowledge. Its aim has been to bring together several threads from the relevant disciplines and to cover the discussion from historical and systematic points of view. Among the contributors are Maria Baghramian, Barry Barnes, Martin Endreß, Hubert Knoblauch, Richard Schantz and Harvey Siegel.
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176Epistemic Relativism. A Constructive CritiquePalgrave-Macmillan. 2014.Are our beliefs justified only relatively to a specific culture or society? Is it possible to give reasons for the superiority of our scientific, epistemic methods? Markus Seidel sets out to answer these questions in his critique of epistemic relativism. Focusing on the work of the most prominent, explicitly relativist position in the sociology of scientific knowledge – so-called 'Edinburgh relativism' or the 'Strong Programme' –, he scrutinizes the key arguments for epistemic relativism from a …Read more
University of Siegen
Alumnus, 2014
Münster, Northrhine-Westphalia, Germany
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Social Science |
General Philosophy of Science |
Philosophy of Science, Misc |
Thomas Kuhn |
PhilPapers Editorships
Epistemic Relativism |
Epistemic Relativism, Misc |
Sociology of Knowledge |
Sociology of Science |