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45Transglobal ReliabilismCroatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2): 171-195. 2006.We here propose an account of what it is for an agent to be objectively justified in holding some belief. We present in outline this approach, which we call transglobal reliabilism, and we discuss how it is motivated by various thought experiments. While transglobal reliabilism is an externalist epistemology, we think that it accommodates traditional internalist concerns and objections in a uniquely natural and respectful way.
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29Simulation Theory Versus Theory Theory: A Difference Without A Difference in ExplanationsSouthern Journal of Philosophy 34 (S1): 65-93. 1996.
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44Review of Martin Kusch, Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (1). 2003.
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80Norms, normative principles, and explanation: On not getting is from oughtPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (3): 329-364. 2002.It seems that hope springs eternal for the cherished idea that norms (or normativeprinciples) explain actions or regularities in actions. But it also seems thatthere are many ways of going wrong when taking norms and normative principlesas explanatory. The author argues that neither norms nor normative principlesinsofar as they are the sort of things with normative forceis explanatoryof what is done. He considers the matter using both erotetic and ontic models ofexplanation. He further conside…Read more
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67Entitlement in Gutting's Epistemology of Philosophy: Comments on What Philosophers KnowSouthern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1): 121-132. 2013.In What Philosophers Know, Gary Gutting provides an epistemology of philosophical reflection. This paper focuses on the roles that various intuitive inputs are said to play in philosophical thought. Gutting argues that philosophers are defeasibly entitled to believe some of these, prior to the outcome of the philosophical reflection, and that they then rightly serve as significant (again defeasible) anchors on reflection. This paper develops a view of epistemic entitlement and applies it to argu…Read more
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23What does it take to be a true believer?In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture, Oxford University Press. pp. 211. 2004.Eliminative materialism, as William Lycan (this volume) tells us, is materialism plus the claim that no creature has ever had a belief, desire, intention, hope, wish, or other “folk-psychological” state. Some contemporary philosophers claim that eliminative materialism is very likely true. They sketch certain potential scenarios, for the way theory might develop in cognitive science and neuroscience, that they claim are fairly likely; and they maintain that if such.
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59Account for macro-level causationSynthese 101 (2): 129-156. 1994.By a macro-level feature, I understand any feature that supervenes on, and is thus realized in, lower-level features. Recent discussions by Kim have suggested that such features cannot be causally relevant insofar as they are not classically reducible to lower-level features. This seems to render macro-level features causally irrelevant. I defend the causal relevance of some such features. Such features have been thought causally relevant in many examples that have underpinned philosophical work…Read more
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75The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual AnalysisOxford University Press. 2011.Henderson and Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology. They defend the roles of the a priori and conceptual analysis, but with an essential empirical dimension. 'Transglobal reliability' is the key to epistemic justification. The question of which cognitive processes are reliable depends on contingent facts about human capacities.
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7Simulation and epistemic competenceIn H. Kobler & K. Steuber (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences, Westview. 2000.Epistemology has recently come to more and more take the articulate form of an investigation into how we do, and perhaps might better, manage the cognitive chores of producing, modifying, and generally maintaining belief-sets with a view to having a true and systematic understanding of the world. While this approach has continuities with earlier philosophy, it admittedly makes a departure from the tradition of epistemology as first philosophy
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25Philosophy of Science AssociationIn Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & J. D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science, Mit Press. pp. 58--4. 1991.
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109Iceberg EpistemologyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3): 497-535. 2000.Accounts of what it is for an agent to be justified in holding a belief commonly carry commitments concerning what cognitive processes can and should be like. A concern for the plausibility of such commitments leads to a multi-faceted epistemology in which elements of traditionally conflicting epistemologies are vindicated within a single epistemological account. The accessible and articulable states that have been the exclusive focus of much epistemology must constitute only a proper subset of …Read more
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128Explanation and rationality naturalizedPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (1): 30-58. 2010.Familiar accounts have it that one explains thoughts or actions by showing them to be rational. It is common to find that the standards of rationality presupposed in these accounts are drawn from what would be thought to be aprioristic sources. I advance an argument to show this must be mistaken. But, recent work in epistemology and on rationality takes a less aprioristic approach to such standards. Does the new (psychological or cognitive scientific) realism in accounts of rationality itself si…Read more
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University of Nebraska, LincolnDepartment of PhilosophyRobert R. Chambers Distinguished Professorship of Philosophy and the Moral Sciences
Lincoln, Nebraska, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Social Science |
Philosophy of Physical Science |