Marilyn Frye

Images of species, sets, and containers, combined with an obsolete positivist theory of meaning and a curiously illogical interpretation of a structuralist understanding of meaning, together have driven feminists and their critics to find unavoidable essentialism and binary totalism in feminist theorists' use of the category WOMEN. This paper explores an enriched imagination for how categories can be structured internally and in relations to other categories, and proposes that we need to think categories simultaneously through multiple and mixed metaphors, including the metaphors of a spun thread and family resemblance, and the image of correlational densities in multidimensional quality spaces.

In this paper I present a sorting and accounting of a variety of things which fall or might fall under the rubric "saying something." The object is clarification--the illumination of an area which can be a source of much confusion in discussion and analysis of speech acts. The point of departure is Austin's initial analysis of saying, in which he tries to set out the "acts" or "doings" which are supposed to be in some sense the elements of the total act of saying. From this, I develop an analysis of saying which may be seen either as an improved version of Austin's or as an alternative analysis, depending on one's assessment of the significance of its departure from Austin's initial intent or insight. I am inclined to see it as an alternative, though hardly a radical one.

I very much welcome Professor Wilder’s debunking of Rossi’s theses and arguments and I wholeheartedly share his rejection of that sort of biological determinism and his recognition of the unnaturalness of all human behavior. That last is, I think, an essential first step toward our assuming responsibility for how things are. However, I am not as comfortable as he seems to be with the liberal anyone-can-parent line of thought. What gives me pause about that may be some of the same experience and observations that make the Rossi sort of view so plausible to so many people. That is, regardless of my clear knowledge that an ability to acquire facility in the home kitchen or with infant care is not biologically determined, and also my knowledge that ability to become competent in the maintenance of the common automobile is not biologically determined either, I see many such propensities and abilities as being hardly less difficult to acquire or to lose as a gendered adult than if they had been biologically determined. In other words, the tracking into gender-correlated competencies creates a “second-nature”—each individual seems to take to some activities and practices naturally. It feels natural, one is “a natural” as a mother or as a businessman; it seems natural to all those around, as well. And, learned and human-created though it may be, it is not therefore easy to undo.