Interpreters of Descartes have understood the mind-body union to consist just in the naturally instituted associations through which these two are joined. This reading cannot accommodate Descartes' claim that the soul is united to the whole body, and forms a unit with it. I provide an account of the union of mind and body which respects both aspects of Descartes' account of a human being by considering a part of his work which has long been neglected: The Passions of the Soul. I argue that soul …
Read moreInterpreters of Descartes have understood the mind-body union to consist just in the naturally instituted associations through which these two are joined. This reading cannot accommodate Descartes' claim that the soul is united to the whole body, and forms a unit with it. I provide an account of the union of mind and body which respects both aspects of Descartes' account of a human being by considering a part of his work which has long been neglected: The Passions of the Soul. I argue that soul and body form a union in virtue of sharing the human good. ;This account of the Cartesian human being arises by recognizing that the mental-physical associations which the standard account claims constitute the union are not fixed and beyond our control. Attention to Descartes' account of the regulation of the passions reveals that he conceives of the mind-body union as dynamic; he thinks that we can come to change those mental-physical associations. ;This picture requires we re-evaluate Descartes' claim that bodily and mental states are joined by a natural institution. I argue that Descartes takes his notion of love to provide a model for the soul-body union. In doing so, he suggests that the institution of mental-physical associations is achieved willingly through an appropriation by the soul of the body's good. Thus, he suggests that mental-physical associations involve an activity of the mind, and are not simply a matter of divine fiat. This 'love' model of the union also helps explain Descartes' claim that the pineal gland is the seat of the soul. ;To complete my interpretation of the soul-body union, I consider Descartes' account of the regulation of the passions. Central to the regulation of the passions is Cartesian generosity. I explicate this concept of generosity and show that it contains Descartes' account of the human good. This good constitutes the Cartesian human being. ;I conclude by arguing that my interpretation of the soul-body union is consistent with a form of dualism which might well be Descartes' if we understand Cartesian substance properly
