Ronnie Littlejohn

The Liezi is the forgotten classic of Daoism. Along with the Laozi (Daodejing) and the Zhuangzi, it's been considered a Daoist masterwork since the mid-eighth century, yet unlike those well-read works, the Liezi is little known and receives scant scholarly attention. Nevertheless, the Liezi is an important text that sheds valuable light on the early history of Daoism, particularly the formative period of sectarian Daoism. We do not know exactly what shape the original text took, but what remains is replete with fantastic characters, whimsical tales, paradoxical aphorisms, and philosophically sophisticated reflection on the nature of the world and humanity's place within it. Ultimately, the Liezi sees the world as one of change and indeterminacy. Arguing for the Liezi's historical, philosophical, and literary significance, the contributors to this volume offer a fresh look at this text, using contemporary approaches and providing novel insights. The volume is unique in its attention to both philosophical and religious perspectives.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, and: Classic Asian Philosophy: A Guide to the Essential TextsRonnie LittlejohnReadings in Classical Chinese Philosophy. Edited by Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan Van Norden. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2003. Pp. xviii + 362. Paper $24.95.Classic Asian Philosophy: A Guide to the Essential Texts. By Joel J. Kupperman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. x + 159. Hardcover $50.00. Paper $21.00.Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, an anthology edited by Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan Van Norden, contains introductions to and translations of seven important Chinese philosophical works from the sixth to the end of the third centuries B.C.E. The figures included are Kongzi (the Analects), Mozi, Mengzi, Laozi (the Daodejing), Zhuangzi, Xunzi, and Han Feizi. Each selection is about fifty pages in length, including the introductory remarks, which are typically very concise. The translation is followed by a short and briefly annotated bibliography that is divided into two parts: other translations and secondary works. The volume was originally published in 2001 by Seven Bridges Press, but it is now reprinted by Hackett Publishing.A usual worry one has when using an anthology of translations in which works are not rendered in their entirety is that principal passages might be omitted. It cannot always be the case that one's favorite passages will make it into a condensation of a work, but one does expect to find the major component passages available to the reader. With regard to this collection, I must say that while there can be no guarantee that these translators have included everything that everyone will think is important, nonetheless, as I will try to show in what follows, the selections are very well chosen and ably translated.The first selection is taken from the Analects. Edward Slingerland is the translator. Subsequent to his work in this readings collection, Slingerland has recently published an entire translation of the Analects including a robust collection of the commentarial tradition on that work. What few differences I have been able to notice between this version and the publication of the entire translation seem to be inconsequential. In this readings collection, all twenty chapters of the Analects are represented. [End Page 687] Chapter 4, widely regarded as the centerpiece of sayings reliably traceable to Kongzi himself, is translated in its entirety.Slingerland uses several conventions for dealing with the concepts regarded as fundamental to a Confucian lexicon. For example, he leaves ren untranslated. And a few scholars will be troubled by his decision to translate junzi as "gentleman." As an aid to the reader, he often uses pinyin and gives the Chinese character for other strategic terms, but he does not allow the translation to be cluttered with too many characters. He seems to stay always consistent with the overall intention of the editors of the collection to use characters only as an aid to the beginning student and nonspecialist. What one needs to introduce key Confucian concepts and Kongzi's way of dealing with his students is available here.Philip J. Ivanhoe's translation of Mozi follows next. What struck me in the beginning was Ivanhoe's fine introductory essay on Master Mo, and I think it will be of benefit to students and nonspecialists alike. This is especially true if one is considering this anthology for a first course in Chinese philosophy or comparative philosophy. Some scholars will think that Ivanhoe's translation of jian ai as "impartial care" instead of "universal love" is not adequately explained in the introductory remarks and even somewhat problematic. But this could provide a point of conversation in the study of the text.Ivanhoe bases his translation on his own selections from the various versions available of the central chapters of the Mozi but the result is relatively uncontroversial. He includes the important eighth and eleventh chapters, concerned with worthy ministers, and chapter 16 on jian ai. The inclusion of Mozi's remarks on funerals, ghosts, and spirits demonstrates Ivanhoe's claim that Mozi is the first philosopher of China to exhibit a sustained interest in argumentation and debate. These sections should be read carefully, not only for what they tell...

Fan Ruiping is engaged in a wide-ranging project to reconstruct Confucianism for the contemporary period. It includes his sustained attack on John Rawls’ theory of distributive justice, various Chinese policies and practices on the delivery of health and elder care, and global business ethics. This paper describes his revised Confucian understanding of environmental morality under the metaphor of nature as garden and man as gardener. I argue the current state of this effort is in need of a more robust appropriation of Chinese sources and a greater attention to comparative analogues using the garden metaphor. I conclude with some suggestions that might advance this specific aspect of his project

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Rationality and Religious Experience: The Continuing Relevance of the World's Spiritual TraditionsRonnie LittlejohnRationality and Religious Experience: The Continuing Relevance of the World's Spiritual Traditions. By Henry Rosemont, Jr.Chicago: Open Court, 2001. Pp. vii + 106.In April 2000, Henry Rosemont delivered the first Hsuan Hua Memorial Lecture at the Pacific School of Religion, Berkeley. The following year, this lecture—originally titled "Whither the World's Religions?"—was published by Open Court in this small book, Rationality and Religious Experience: The Continuing Relevance of the World's Spiritual Traditions. The volume is divided into four sections: (1) the lecture itself, which has the new title "Rationality and Religious Experience"; (2) a commentary by Huston Smith; (3) response and discussion, in which Rosemont replies to Smith and takes questions from the audience; and (4) an epilogue, in which Rosemont makes revisions and expansions on the lecture based on the comments and discussion.In section 1, Rosemont makes a bold claim: "By urging everyone to approach their own text tradition afresh, and alongside others, I am assuming what many of you might find implausible, namely, that in many basic respects all sacred texts are saying the same things, and contain the same truths we can all come to believe without in any way surrendering our rationality" (p. 11). Having said this, he nonetheless does not mean that we can accept the statements of religious texts as stating factual truths, much less that they are putting forward identical descriptions of the world.Rosemont faces the epistemological difficulties of religion directly, saying that we cannot accept the statements of religious texts as factual accounts of the world. He reminds us that it is not merely the Abrahamic traditions that pose an epistemological problem for us: "It no less flies in the face of modern science to believe that the preserver god Vishnu once incarnated himself as Krishna, not merely to give counsel to the spiritual warrior Arjuna, but also, among many other exploits, to make love to 20,000 milkmaids in a single day" (p. 5). Even so, he holds that there is much truth in the sacred texts and narratives of the world's religions (pp. 31-32). As will become apparent in my later remarks, it is not altogether clear to me what sort of truth Rosemont is talking about, but it seems to be more a matter of a certain ego-reduction and a sort of mystical feeling than anything else.Rosemont recognizes not only the epistemological objections to religion, but also the moral ones. He understands the violence and suffering that has been directly and indirectly associated with religion in human history. Yet, in this connection, he says:[E]fforts to exorcise religion from the human realm because of the mischief that has been committed in its name is to throw out the baby with the bath water, and equally to suggest a third response, that there is no hope for the cross-cultural dialogues necessary for [End Page 404] the creation and maintenance of a more peaceful and just twenty-first century until and unless everyone can come to understand how an intelligent and thoroughly decent human being might come to be, or remain, a subscriber to one or another of the world's faiths.(p. 10)It is the phenomenon of spiritual experience and not the doctrine or ontology of any tradition that Rosemont finds of philosophical interest. He thinks that instead of focusing on some purported factual knowledge about the world that we are to believe directly, we should instead concentrate on the instructions that the traditions offer about how to live purposively in the world and derive nonmaterial nurturance from it. "The basis of such nurturance is religious experience" (p. 17).Rosemont begins his remarks on religious experience with a critique of Kierkegaard the purpose of which is to show that lived experience is of one piece. Rosemont attributes to Kierkegaard the position that there are distinguishable and autonomously separable spheres of existence such as the aesthetic, ethical, and spiritual. Speaking of Kierkegaard's three stages, he says that "Almost all of the world's religious traditions, especially the Asian, affirm...