•  202
    On a “Fatal Dilemma” for Moderate Foundationalism
    Journal of Philosophical Research 30 251-259. 2005.
    Contemporary foundationalists prefer Moderate Foundationalism over Strong Foundationalism. In this paper, we assess two arguments against the former which have been recently defended by Timothy McGrew. Three theses are central to the discussion: that only beliefs can be probabilifying evidence, that justification is internal, in McGrew’s sense of the term, and that only beliefs can be nonarbitrary justifying reasons.
  •  702
    Who or What is God, According to John Hick?
    Topoi 36 (4): 571-586. 2017.
    I summarize John Hick’s pluralistic theory of the world’s great religions, largely in his own voice. I then focus on the core posit of his theory, what he calls “the Real,” but which I less tendentiously call “Godhick”. Godhick is supposed to be the ultimate religious reality. As such, it must be both possible and capable of explanatory and religious significance. Unfortunately, Godhick is, by definition, transcategorial, i.e. necessarily, for any creaturely conceivable substantial property F, i…Read more
  •  643
    In Defense of Naïve Universalism
    Faith and Philosophy 20 (3): 345-363. 2003.
    Michael J. Murray defends the traditional doctrine of hell by arguing directly against its chief competitor, universalism. Universalism, says Murray, comes in “naïve” and “sophisticated” forms. Murray poses two arguments against naïve universalism before focusing on sophisticated universalism, which is his real target. He proceeds in this fashion because he thinks that his arguments against sophisticated universalism are more easily motivated against naïve universalism, and once their force is c…Read more
  •  1478
    The Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (2): 43-68. 2010.
    The fact that our asking God to do something can make a difference to what he does underwrites the point of petitionary prayer. Here, however, a puzzle arises: Either doing what we ask is the best God can do or it is not. If it is, then our asking won’t make any difference to whether he does it. If it is not, then our asking won’t make any difference to whether he does it. So, our asking won’t make any difference to whether God does it. Our asking is therefore pointless. In this paper, we try to…Read more
  •  373
    This is a review of Peter Forrest's book.
  •  3590
    Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.
  •  11
    This is a Polish translation of "Was Jesus Mad, Bad, or God?...Or Merely Mistaken?," Faith and Philosophy 21, 2004: 456-479, reprinted in Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology, Volume 1: Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement (Oxford 2009), ed. Michael Rea