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Inscrutable Evil and the Silence of GodDissertation, Syracuse University. 1992.For all we know, theism and evil are compatible. And God need not have created the best possible world He could have. So how does evil render atheistic belief justified? Perhaps, as Hume and Draper argue, the biological role of pain and pleasure make them much less likely on theism than on the hypothesis that they are not the result of the benevolent or malevolent actions of nonhuman persons. But this is very dubious. Perhaps Dostoevski's Ivan Karamozov is right: God would not permit the involun…Read more
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102On Rowe's Argument from Particular HorrorsIn Kelly Clark (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Religion, Broadview. 2005.This article assesses Bill Rowe's 1979 version of the evidential argument from evil.
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174The Evidential Argument from EvilIndiana University Press. 1996.Is evil evidence against the existence of God? Even if God and evil are compatible, it remains hotly contested whether evil renders belief in God unreasonable. The Evidential Argument from Evil presents five classic statements on this issue by eminent philosophers and theologians and places them in dialogue with eleven original essays reflecting new thinking by these and other scholars. The volume focuses on two versions of the argument. The first affirms that there is no reason for God to permi…Read more
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620The epistemology of religious experience (review)International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 1997.This is a review of Keith Yandell's book.
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786How not to render an explanatory version of the evidential argument from evil immune to skeptical theismInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion (3): 1-8. 2015.Among the things that students of the problem of evil think about is whether explanatory versions of the evidential argument from evil are better than others, better than William Rowe’s famous versions of the evidential argument, for example. Some of these students claim that the former are better than the latter in no small part because the former, unlike the latter, avoid the sorts of worries raised by so-called “skeptical theists”. Indeed, Trent Dougherty claims to have constructed an explana…Read more
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830God, Schmod and Gratuitous EvilPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4): 861-874. 1993.It is common these days for theists to argue that we aren’t justified in believing atheism on the basis of evil. They claim that neither facts about particular horrors nor more holistic considerations pertaining to the magnitude, kinds and distribution of evil can ground atheism since we can't tell whether any evil is gratuitous.1 In this paper we explore a novel strategy for shedding light on these issues: we compare the atheist who claims that there is no morally sufficient reason for certain …Read more
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2085The Skeptical ChristianOxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 8 142-167. 2017.This essay is a detailed study of William P. Alston’s view on the nature of Christian faith, which I assess in the context of three problems: the problem of the skeptical Christian, the problem of faith and reason, and the problem of the trajectory. Although Alston intended a view that would solve these problems, it does so only superficially. Fortunately, we can distinguish Alston’s view, on the one hand, from Alston’s illustrations of it, on the other hand. I argue that, although Alston’s view…Read more
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627The Fellowship of Confessing Anglicans (FCA), whose leaders govern well over half of the 80 million Anglicans worldwide, have put forward ‘a contemporary rule,’ called The Jerusalem Declaration, to guide the Anglican realignment movement. The FCA and its affiliates, e.g. the newly-formed Anglican Church in North America, require assent to the Declaration. To date, there has been little serious appraisal of the Declaration and the status accorded to it. I aim to correct that omission. Unlike ap-p…Read more
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135Foundationalism and arbitrarinessPacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1). 2005.Nonskeptical foundationalists say that there are basic beliefs. But, one might object, either there is a reason why basic beliefs are likely to be true or there is not. If there is, then they are not basic; if there is not, then they are arbitrary. I argue that this dilemma is not nearly as decisive as its author, Peter Klein, would have us believe.
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439Divine hiddenness and human reason (review)Mind. 1995.This is a review of John Schellenberg's book.
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8William P. AlstonIn John R. Shook (ed.), Dictionary of Modern American Philosophy, Thoemmes Press. 2005.This is an encyclopedia entry for William P. Alston.
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13On a “Fatal Dilemma” for Moderate FoundationalismJournal of Philosophical Research 30 251-259. 2005.Contemporary foundationalists prefer Moderate Foundationalism over Strong Foundationalism. In this paper, we assess two arguments against the former which have been recently defended by Timothy McGrew. Three theses are central to the discussion: that only beliefs can be probabilifying evidence, that justification is internal, in McGrew’s sense of the term, and that only beliefs can be nonarbitrary justifying reasons.
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25Surplus EvilPhilosophical Quarterly 40 78-86. 1990.This is a defense of Bill Rowe's 1979 version of the evidential argument from evil.
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474Is Theism Compatible with Gratuitous Evil?American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (2). 1999.We argue that Michael Peterson's and William Hasker's attempts to show that God and gratuitous evil are compatible constitute miserable failures. We then sketch Peter van Inwagen's attempt to do the same and conclude that, to date, no one has shown his attempt a failure.
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727Are Beliefs about God Theoretical Beliefs? Reflections on Aquinas and KantReligious Studies 32 (2). 1996.The need to address our question arises from two sources, one in Kant and the other in a certain type of response to so-called Reformed epistemology. The first source consists in a tendency to distinguish theoretical beliefs from practical beliefs (commitments to the world's being a certain way versus commitments to certain pictures to live by), and to treat theistic belief as mere practical belief. We trace this tendency in Kant's corpus, and compare and contrast it with Aquinas's view and a mo…Read more
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453The puzzle of prayers of Thanksgiving and praiseIn Yujin Nagasawa & Erik J. Wielenberg (eds.), New waves in philosophy of religion, Palgrave-macmillan. 2008.in eds. Yujin Nagasawa and Erik Wielenberg, New Waves in Philosophy of Religion (Palgrave MacMillan 2008).
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7584God, evil, and sufferingIn Michael Murray (ed.), Reason for the Hope Within, Eerdmans. pp. 217--237. 1999.This essay is aimed at a theistic audience, mainly those who are new to thinking hard about the problem of evil.
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212Revisionary ontologists are making a comeback. Quasi-nihilists, like Peter van Inwagen and Trenton Merricks, insist that the only composite objects that exist are living things. Unrestriced universalists, like W.V.O. Quine, David Lewis, Mark Heller, and Hud Hudson, insist that any collection of objects composes something, no matter how scattered over time and space they may be. And there are more besides. The result, says Eli Hirsch, is that many commonsense judgments about the existence or iden…Read more
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571Does Faith Entail Belief?Faith and Philosophy 33 (2): 142-162. 2016.Does faith that p entail belief that p? If faith that p is identical with belief that p, it does. But it isn’t. Even so, faith that p might be necessarily partly constituted by belief that p, or at least entail it. Of course, even if faith that p entails belief that p, it does not follow that faith that p is necessarily partly constituted by belief that p. Still, showing that faith that p entails belief that p would be a significant step in that direction. Can we take that step? In this essay, I…Read more
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424On the a priori rejection of evidential arguments from evilSophia 33-47. 1994.Recent work on the evidential argument from evil offers us sundry considerations which are intended to weigh against this form of atheological arguments. By far the most provocative is that on a priori grounds alone, evil can be shown to be evidentially impotent. This astonishing thesis has been given a vigorous defense by Keith Yandell. In this paper, we shall measure the prospects for an a priori dismissal of evidential arguments from evil.
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2025The Evolutionary Argument for AtheismIn John-Christopher Keller (ed.), Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from van Inwagen, Oxford University Press. 2017.This essay assesses Paul Draper's argument from evolution to atheism.
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350Lehrer's case against foundationalismErkenntnis 60 (1): 51-73. 2004.In this essay, I assess Keith Lehrer's case against Foundationalism, which consists of variations on three objections: The Independent Information or Belief Objection, The Risk of Error Objection, and the Hidden Argument Objection. I conclude that each objection fails for reasons that can be endorsed – indeed, I would say for reasons that should be endorsed – by antifoundationalists and foundationalists alike.
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1069Hiddenness of GodIn Donald Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Macmillan. 2006.This is a 5,000 word article on divine hiddeness, with special attention to John Schellenberg's work on the topic
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118How an Unsurpassable Being Can Create a Surpassable WorldFaith and Philosophy 11 (2): 260-268. 1994.Imagine that there exists a good, essentially omniscient and omnipotent being named Jove, and that there exists nothing else. No possible being is more powerful or knowledgable. Out of his goodness, Jove decides to create. Since he is all-powerful, there is nothing but the bounds of possibility to prevent him from getting what he wants. Unfortunately, as he holds before his mind the host of worlds, Jove sees that for each there is a better one. Although he can create any of them, he can't create…Read more
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646Theism, the Hypothesis of Indifference, and the Biological Role of Pain and PleasureFaith and Philosophy 11 (3): 452-466. 1994.Following Hume’s lead, Paul Draper argues that, given the biological role played by both pain and pleasure in goal-directed organic systems, the observed facts about pain and pleasure in the world are antecedently much more likely on the Hypothesis of Indifference than on theism. I examine one by one Draper’s arguments for this claim and show how they miss the mark.
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799Trinity MonotheismPhilosophia Christi 5 (2). 2003.Reprinted in Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity, Oxford, 2009, eds Michael Rea and Thomas McCall. In this essay, I assess a certain version of ’social Trinitarianism’ put forward by J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, ’trinity monotheism’. I first show how their response to a familiar anti-Trinitarian argument arguably implies polytheism. I then show how they invoke three tenets central to their trinity monotheism in order to avoid that implication. After displaying these ten…Read more
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544Review of David O'Connor, God and Inscrutable Evil (review)Philosophical Review. 2001.This is a critical review of David O'Connor's book, God and Inscrutable Evil.
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569Seeing through CORNEAInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 32 (1). 1992.This essays assesses Steve Wykstra's original CORNEA.
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718BonJour’s ‘Basic Antifoundationalist Argument’ and the Doctrine of the GivenSouthern Journal of Philosophy 36 (2): 163-177. 1998.Laurence BonJour observes that critics of foundationalism tend to argue against it by objecting to "relatively idiosyncratic" versions of it, a strategy which has "proven in the main to be superficial and ultimately ineffective" since answers immune to the objections emerge quickly (1985: 17). He aims to rectify this deficiency. Specifically, he argues that the very soul of foundationalism, "the concept of a basic empirical belief," is incoherent (1985: 30). This is a bold strategy from which we…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Religion |
Moral Psychology |