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123Mental causation, compatibilism and counterfactualsCanadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1): 20-42. 2017.According to proponents of the causal exclusion problem, there cannot be a sufficient physical cause and a distinct mental cause of the same piece of behaviour. Increasingly, the causal exclusion problem is circumvented via this compatibilist reasoning: a sufficient physical cause of the behavioural effect necessitates the mental cause of the behavioural effect, so the effect has a sufficient physical cause and a mental cause as well. In this paper, I argue that this compatibilist reply fails to…Read more
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53A Non-reductive Model of Component Forces and Resultant ForceInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (4): 359-380. 2012.While there are reasons to believe that both component forces and a resultant force operate on a body in combined circumstances, the threat of overdetermination largely prevents adoption of this view. Accordingly, a lively debate has arisen over which force actually exists and which force is eliminated in combined circumstances, the components or the resultant. In this article I present a non-reductive model of resultant force which ensures the existence of both the resultant force and the compo…Read more
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125Role Functionalism and EpiphenomenalismPhilosophia 39 (3): 511-525. 2011.The type-type reductive identity of the mental to the physical was once the dominant position in the mental causation debate. In time this consensus was overturned, largely due to its inability to handle the problem of multiple realizability. In its place a nonreductive position emerged which often included an adherence to functionalism. Functionalism construes mental properties as functional states of an organism, which in turn have specific physical realizers. This nonreductive form of functio…Read more
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94Explanatory exclusion and mental explanationPhilosophical Psychology 29 (3): 390-404. 2016.Jaegwon Kim once refrained from excluding distinct mental causes of effects that depend upon the sufficient physical cause of the effect. At that time, Kim also refrained from excluding distinct mental explanations of effects that depend upon complete physical explanations of the effect. More recently, he has excluded distinct mental causes of effects that depend upon the sufficient cause of the effect, since the physical cause is individually sufficient for the effect. But there has been, to th…Read more
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59The Generalization Problem and the Identity SolutionErkenntnis 72 (1): 57-72. 2010.For some time now, Jaegwon Kim has argued that irreducible mental properties face the threat of causal inefficacy. The primary weapon he deploys to sustain this charge is the supervenience/exclusion argument. This argument, in a nutshell, states that any mental property that irreducibly supervenes on a physical property is excluded from causal efficacy because the underlying physical property takes care of all of the causal work itself. Originally intended for mental properties alone, it did not…Read more
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124On Robinson’s Response to the Self-Stultifying ObjectionReview of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4): 627-641. 2012.Qualia Epiphenomenalism is the view that qualitative events lack causal efficacy. A common objection to qualia epiphenomenalism is the so-called Self-Stultifying Objection, which suggests that justified, true belief about qualitative events requires, among other things, the belief to be caused by the qualitative event—the very premise that qualia epiphenomenalism denies. William Robinson provides the most sustained response to the self-stultification objection that is available. In this paper I …Read more
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100Counterfactuals, Autonomy and Downward Causation: Reply to ZhongPhilosophia 41 (3): 831-839. 2013.In recent papers, Lei Zhong argues that the autonomy solution to the causal exclusion problem is unavailable to anyone that endorses the counterfactual model of causation. The linchpin of his argument is that the counterfactual theory entails the downward causation principle, which conflicts with the autonomy solution. In this note I argue that the counterfactual theory does not entail the downward causation principle, so it is possible to advocate for the autonomy solution to the causal exclusi…Read more
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42S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe, and R. D. Ingthorsson, eds., Mental Causation and Ontology. Reviewed by (review)Philosophy in Review 35 (4): 194-197. 2015.
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164Functional Reduction and Mental CausationActa Analytica 25 (4): 435-446. 2010.Over the past few decades, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is an inherently unstable position. In his view, the most serious problem is that non-reductive physicalism leads to type epiphenomenalismâthe causal inefficacy of mental properties. Kim suggests that we can salvage mental causation by endorsing functional reduction. Given the fact that Kimâs goal in formulating functional reduction is to provide a robust account of mental causation it would be surprising if his…Read more