Eugene Schlossberger

It is often said that one cannot be held responsible for something one cannot help. Indeed, Ted Honderich, Paul Edwards, and C. A. Campbell have suggested that it is obtuse, barbaric, or a solecism to think otherwise 1. Thus, if (contra Sartre and others) one cannot help feeling one's emotions, one is not responsible for one's emotions. In this paper I will argue otherwise; one is responsible for one's emotions, even if one cannot help feeling them. 2 In particular, I will define a rather special sense of the word 'responsible', one that is closely tied to our ordinary notion of moral worth. We are, in that special sense of the word, 'responsible' for our emotions. I will then argue that my limited sense of 'responsibility' is sufficient to warrant morale valuation of individuals, and can be used as the basis for a theory of punishment.

Insufficient attention has been paid to the ethics of distributing costs of insurance risk. Seven approaches are articulated: the egalitarian model, the needs/ability model, the loss history model, the statistical model, the causality model, the moral fault model (avoidability interpretation and worldview interpretation), and eclectic models. The ethical dimensions of each model are explored. Although some reasons are given for preferring the eclectic model, the main purpose of the paper is to provide an ethical framework for further discussion of an oft-neglected issue.