Jon Robson

Veronica Mars's hometown harbors a whole range of social ills. Neptune provides a very poor environment for nurturing trusting relationships. A typical resident of Neptune may quite reasonably be reluctant ever to trust fully his or her neighbors, co‐workers, and even closest friends. Veronica Mars is a far from being a typical resident of Neptune. Veronica is atypical in ways that should make her even less trusting than others in Neptune. It seems that there are some people whom Veronica genuinely trusts—at least some of the time: her father Keith, Wallace Fennel and Logan Echolls.. This chapter analyzes whether Veronica genuinely trusts anyone. It first explains what 'trust' really means. Veronica's relationship with Keith, her daddy, is the best place to look for a genuinely trusting relationship in Veronica's life. The trust between them isn't perfect. Sadly, the distrust between father and daughter goes much deeper than that.

In a recent article Mark Ian Thomas Robson argues that there is a clear contradiction between the view that possible worlds are a part of God's nature and the theologically pivotal, but philosophically neglected, claim that God is perfectly beautiful. In this article I show that Robson's argument depends on several key assumptions that he fails to justify and as such that there is reason to doubt the soundness of his argument. I also demonstrate that if Robson's argument were sound then this would be a problem for all classical theists and not just those who hold the possible worlds view

What is the relationship between acquaintance and aesthetic judgement? Wollheim’s acquaintance principle (AP) is one answer. Amir Konigsberg—the most recent critic of AP—has produced a number of examples which he claims will require us to restrict AP even further than has previously been suggested. I argue that Konigsberg is mistaken and that his examples do not necessitate any further restrictions on AP. This failure, however, is not the result of some specific flaw in Konigsberg’s argument; rather it is an artefact of a deeper problem at the heart of the current debate over AP (and its successors). I conclude by arguing that this problem—the absence of any satisfactory reformulation of AP itself—has far-reaching consequences for our theorizing in aesthetics

The problem of evil is typically presented as a problem – sometimes the problem – facing theistic realists. This article takes no stance on what effect (if any) the existence of evil has on the rationality of theistic belief. Instead, it explores the possibility of using the problem of evil to generate worries for some of those who reject theistic realism. Although this article focuses on the consequences for a particular kind of religious fictionalist, the lessons adduced are intended to have more general application.