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69Malament and Zabell on Gibbs phase averagingPhilosophy of Science 56 (2): 325-340. 1989.In their paper "Why Gibbs Phase Averages Work--The Role of Ergodic Theory" (1980), David Malament and Sandy Zabell attempt to explain why phase averaging over the microcanonical ensemble gives correct predictions for the values of thermodynamic observables, for an ergodic system at equilibrium. Their idea is to bypass the traditional use of limit theorems, by relying on a uniqueness result about the microcanonical measure--namely, that it is uniquely stationary translation-continuous. I argue th…Read more
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103Holes and determinism: Another lookPhilosophy of Science 62 (3): 425-437. 1995.I argue that Earman and Norton's familiar "hole argument" raises questions as to whether GTR is a deterministic theory only given a certain assumption about determinism: namely, that to ask whether a theory is deterministic is to ask about the physical situations described by the theory. I think this is a mistake: whether a theory is deterministic is a question about what sentences can be proved within the theory. I show what these sentences look like: for interesting theories, a harmless bit of…Read more
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43Tooley on causation and probabilitiesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2). 2000.This Article does not have an abstract
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16Review: George Boolos, Richard Jeffrey, Computability and Logic (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 42 (4): 585-586. 1977.
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4Przelecki and Wojcicki "Twenty Five Years of Logical Methodology in Poland" (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (3): 447. 1980.
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29Understanding Understanding (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 13 (4): 586-588. 1973.
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13Review: Yoemon Sampei, On the Principle of Effective Choice and its Applications (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (2): 243-244. 1975.
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50Postscript to 'a problem about frequencies in direct inference'Philosophical Studies 48 (1). 1985.
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15This paper investigates the possibility of extending the likelihood treatment of support to situations in which the evidence and the hypotheses supported by the evidence are all outcomes of a chance process. An example is when we ask how much support the observed sequence of heads and tails gives to the hypothesis that the next toss will be a head. I begin by discussing Sober’s approach to a problem of this type: that of estimating how much support the observation that I have a mind gives to the…Read more
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24Review: Kevin T. Kelly, Oliver Schulte, The Computable Testability of Theories Making Uncomputable Predictions (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 61 (3): 1049-1049. 1996.
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65Price on the Wheeler-feynman theoryBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1): 288-294. 1994.
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111Wheeler–Feynman Again: A Reply to PriceBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3): 381-383. 1995.
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134Foundations of statistical mechanics—two approachesPhilosophy of Science 70 (1): 126-144. 2003.This paper is a discussion of David Albert's approach to the foundations of classical statistical menchanics. I point out a respect in which his account makes a stronger claim about the statistical mechanical probabilities than is usually made, and I suggest what might be motivation for this. I outline a less radical approach, which I attribute to Boltzmann, and I give some reasons for thinking that this approach is all we need, and also the most we are likely to get. The issue between the two a…Read more
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146Constructive empiricismSynthese 101 (2). 1994.Constructive Empiricism, the view introduced in The Scientific Image, is a view of science, an answer to the question “what is science?” Arthur Fine’s and Paul Teller’s contributions to this symposium challenge especially two key ideas required to formu- late that view, namely the observable/unobservable and accept- ance/belief distinctions. I wish to thank them not only for their insightful critique but also for the support they include. For they illuminate and counter some misunderstandings of…Read more
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17Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of PsychologyPhilosophical Review 89 (3): 482. 1980.
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Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Physical Science |