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446The Rejection of Objective ConsequentialismUtilitas 9 (2): 241-248. 1997.Objective consequentialism is often criticized because it is impossible to know which of our actions will have the best consequences. Why exactly does this undermine objective consequentialism? I offer a new link between the claim that our knowledge of the future is limited and the rejection of objective consequentialism: that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and we cannot produce the best consequences available to us. I support this apparently paradoxical contention by way of an analogy. I cannot beat Kar…Read more
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42Is it less wrong to harm the vulnerable than the secure?Journal of Philosophy 89 (12): 643-647. 1992.
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130Damned If You Do; Damned If You Don’t!Philosophia 36 (1): 1-15. 2008.This paper discusses the Principle of Normative Invariance: ‘An action’s moral status does not depend on whether or not it is performed.’ I show the importance of this principle for arguments regarding actualism and other variations on the person-affecting restriction, discuss and rebut arguments in favor of the principle, and then discuss five counterexamples to it. I conclude that the principle as it stands is false; and that if it is modified to avoid the counterexamples, it is gutted of any …Read more
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37A Consequentialist Case for Rejecting the RightJournal of Philosophical Research 18 109-125. 1993.Satisficing and maximizing versions of consequentialism have both assumed that rightness is an alI-or-nothing property. We argue thal this is inimical to the spirit of consequentialism, and that, from the point of view of the consequentialist, actions should be evaluated purely in terms that admit of degree. We first consider the suggestion that rightness and wrongness are a matter of degree. If so, this raises the question of whether the claim that something is wrong says any more than that it …Read more
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1478The Puzzle of Petitionary PrayerEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (2): 43-68. 2010.The fact that our asking God to do something can make a difference to what he does underwrites the point of petitionary prayer. Here, however, a puzzle arises: Either doing what we ask is the best God can do or it is not. If it is, then our asking won’t make any difference to whether he does it. If it is not, then our asking won’t make any difference to whether he does it. So, our asking won’t make any difference to whether God does it. Our asking is therefore pointless. In this paper, we try to…Read more
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777God, Knowledge, and Mystery (review)Faith and Philosophy 16 (1): 126-134. 1999.This is a review of Peter van Inwagen's collection of essays. It corrects a typesetter’s deletion of 75% of the review originally published in _Faith and Philosophy_15, 1998: 397-399.
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82The Real Problem of No Best WorldFaith and Philosophy 13 (3): 422-425. 1996.This is a reply to William Rowe, "The Problem of No Best World," Faith and Philosophy (1994).
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19Is It Less Wrong to Harm the Vulnerable than the Secure?Journal of Philosophy 89 (12): 643. 1992.
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Religion |
Normative Ethics |