In 'Plato on Sense and Reference' (Mind,1985, pp. 526-37), I argued that Plato 'understood and rejected' a general strategy for explaining false belief, and that Frege's explanation of false belief was an instance of that general strategy. Michael Beaney ('Mistakes and Mismatches: A Reply to Rudebusch', Mind, 1987, pp. 95-8) replied that there is a feature of Frege's explanation that enables it to escape the argument. In this rejoinder I argue that Beaney's escape is not Fregean and that it fail…
Read moreIn 'Plato on Sense and Reference' (Mind,1985, pp. 526-37), I argued that Plato 'understood and rejected' a general strategy for explaining false belief, and that Frege's explanation of false belief was an instance of that general strategy. Michael Beaney ('Mistakes and Mismatches: A Reply to Rudebusch', Mind, 1987, pp. 95-8) replied that there is a feature of Frege's explanation that enables it to escape the argument. In this rejoinder I argue that Beaney's escape is not Fregean and that it fails.
