George Hilding Rudebusch

In 'Plato on Sense and Reference' (Mind,1985, pp. 526-37), I argued that Plato 'understood and rejected' a general strategy for explaining false belief, and that Frege's explanation of false belief was an instance of that general strategy. Michael Beaney ('Mistakes and Mismatches: A Reply to Rudebusch', Mind, 1987, pp. 95-8) replied that there is a feature of Frege's explanation that enables it to escape the argument. In this rejoinder I argue that Beaney's escape is not Fregean and that it fails.

In this study, George Rudebusch addresses whether Socrates was a hedonist--whether he believed pleasure to be the good. In attempting to locate Socrates' position on hedonism, Rudebusch examines the passages in Plato's early dialogues that are the most disputed on the topic. He maintains that Socrates identifies pleasant activity with virtuous activity, describing Socrates' hedonism as one of activity, not sensation. This analysis allows for Socrates to find both virtue and pleasure to be the good, thus solving the textual puzzle and showing the power of Socratic argument in leading human beings toward the good.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Knowing Persons: A Study in PlatoGeorge RudebuschLloyd P. Gerson. Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. x + 308. Cloth, $45.00.For Plato, persons are souls, able to exist apart from bodies. It is natural to read Plato, especially in the Phaedo, as holding a Prison Model of embodiment: an embodied person is different from a disembodied person roughly as a prisoner in a cell is different from a prisoner freed from his cell. The book (KP) argues that such a model is inferior as an interpretation of Plato to the Image Model: "an embodied person is different from a disembodied person roughly as images of the intelligible differ from their paradigms" (276). Chapter One argues that the Socratic arguments making virtue supreme in human life fail, lacking premises about the soul's afterlife. Chapter Two argues that the four arguments in the Phaedo for the immortality of the soul are not independent but linked, although even linked they are invalid. Chapter Three argues that the Republic's partition of the soul into three agencies is consistent with the Phaedrus and can account for akrasia onlyif we accept Plato's metaphysics of immortal souls. Chapters Four and Five give a unified account of Plato's theory of knowledge and belief in the Republic and Theaetetus. Chapter Six argues that there are no substantial revisions to Plato's account of personhood in the later dialogues Timaeus,Philebus, and Laws.The chapters of KP defend the Image Model interpretation by showing how the Image Model is consistent with the themes of personhood, tripartition, and knowledge throughout the middle and later dialogues and how this model remedies the defects of the earlier dialogues. There are other insights, interpretations, and arguments in each chapter, of which the most important is that Plato's ethics and epistemology are not easily detached from his metaphysics of soul.I doubt that KP shows the superiority of the Image Model to the Prison Model as an interpretation of Plato. KP gives only a brief argument against the Prison Model: "For Plato a 'body' is different from a 'corpse'," and "whereas the body is the subject of, say, a state of depletion, the embodied soul or person is the subject of hunger;" therefore while "it is not completely misleading" to say that "a person is a soul and a human being is a composite of soul and body," "the matter is actually more complex than this" (2). But neither premise of this argument requires us to abandon the Prison Model for an Image Model. As a prison is a compound of prisoner and cell, a human being is a compound of soul and body. The distinction between (animated) body and corpse (i.e. inanimate body) will correspond to the distinction between occupied and unoccupied prison cell. And just as the body is subject [End Page 108] to chill (i.e. temperature-depletion relative to sustaining life) but soul to feeling the chill, so too a prisoner's cell is subject to chill but the prisoner to feeling the chill.Moreover, the Prison Model is superior to the Image Model at providing for "personal identity across embodied and disembodied states" (3): it is obviously the same prisoner, before and after freedom from the cell. But according to KP the embodied person is an image of the disembodied person. At death the embodied person becomes disembodied. According to KP's account, this change must be a replacement of image with original, and therefore the image does not survive death. The consequence for me, an embodied person, is that I do not survive death or enjoy immortality. Moreover, this consequence ruins KP's thesis that Plato's metaphysics of disembodied souls is necessary to defend his ethical prescription to care for one's soul before one's body. If in fact I am only an image of a future disembodied object, its fate is of no obvious concern to me.Finally, KP's account of akrasia seems impossible:• A soul is partitioned in that one and the same soul is divided into "a better and a worse part" (268-9), i.e...

Paul Hoffman (in “Kripke on Private Language”, Philosophical Studies 47, 1985, 23-28) argues that Kripke’s Wittgenstein fails in his solution to his own sceptical paradox. I argue that Hoffman fails to see the importance for Kripke’s Wittgenstein of the distinction between agreement in fact and judged agreement. Hoffman is right that no solution to the sceptical paradox can be based on agreement in fact, but the solution of Kripke’s Wittgenstein depends upon judged agreement. An interpretation is given: by ‘judged agreement’ Kripke’s Wittgenstein does not mean understanding oneself to judge agreement but having a feeling of agreement. On this interpretation Hoffman’s argument fails

The argument used by Socrates to refute the thesis that piety is what all the gods love is one of the most well known in the history of philosophy. Yet some fundamental points of interpretation have gone unnoticed. I will show that (i) the strategy of Socrates' argument refutes not only Euthyphro's theory of piety and such neighboring doctrines as cultural relativism and subjectivism, but nominalism in general; moreover, that (ii) the argument needs to assume much less than is generally thought, and finally that (iii) while Socrates' argument, properly understood in its full force, appears to be inconsistent with the goal of his own inquiry, his own 'Platonic' position escapes the inconsistency.

Paul Hoffman argues that Kripke’s Wittgenstein fails in his solution to his own sceptical paradox. I argue that Hoffman fails to see the importance for Kripke’s Wittgenstein of the distinction between agreement in fact and judged agreement. Hoffman is right that no solution to the sceptical paradox can be based on agreement in fact, but the solution of Kripke’s Wittgenstein depends upon judged agreement. An interpretation is given: by ‘judged agreement’ Kripke’s Wittgenstein does not mean understanding oneself to judge agreement but having a feeling of agreement. On this interpretation Hoffman’s argument fails.

After defining dramatic prefiguration, I show how (1) the initial meeting between Polemarchus's party and the smaller group of Socrates and Glaucon prefigures the Republic's theme of how to install the philosophical element in its proper place as ruler in the soul; (2) the relay race of torches carried on horseback prefigures the theory of the soul as tripartite, containing reason, spirit, and appetite; and (3) the opening image of Socrates descending to the Piraeus prefigures the descent of the reasoning element back from the forms to give birth to works of wisdom

Intellectualism about human virtue is the thesis that virtue is knowledge. Virtue intellectualists may be eliminative or reductive. If eliminative, they will eliminate our conventional vocabulary of virtue words-'virtue', 'piety', 'courage', etc.-and speak only of knowledge or wisdom. If reductive, they will continue to use the conventional virtue words but understand each of them as denoting nothing but a kind of knowledge (as opposed to, say, a capacity of some other part of the soul than the intellect, such as the will or the appetites). Virtue intellectualists may be pluralists or monists. If pluralist, they identify the virtues with distinct kinds of knowledge. If monist, they identify all the virtues with one and the same kind of knowledge. In a number of dialogues-including the Euthyphro, Apology, Charmides, Euthydemus, Laches, Lysis, Protagoras, and Republic I-Socrates gives arguments that support Reductive Monist Intellectualism (RMI) about human virtue. I disarm an influential objection to RMI as the correct interpretation of Socrates.