George Hilding Rudebusch

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Knowing Persons: A Study in PlatoGeorge RudebuschLloyd P. Gerson. Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. x + 308. Cloth, $45.00.For Plato, persons are souls, able to exist apart from bodies. It is natural to read Plato, especially in the Phaedo, as holding a Prison Model of embodiment: an embodied person is different from a disembodied person roughly as a prisoner in a cell is different from a prisoner freed from his cell. The book (KP) argues that such a model is inferior as an interpretation of Plato to the Image Model: "an embodied person is different from a disembodied person roughly as images of the intelligible differ from their paradigms" (276). Chapter One argues that the Socratic arguments making virtue supreme in human life fail, lacking premises about the soul's afterlife. Chapter Two argues that the four arguments in the Phaedo for the immortality of the soul are not independent but linked, although even linked they are invalid. Chapter Three argues that the Republic's partition of the soul into three agencies is consistent with the Phaedrus and can account for akrasia onlyif we accept Plato's metaphysics of immortal souls. Chapters Four and Five give a unified account of Plato's theory of knowledge and belief in the Republic and Theaetetus. Chapter Six argues that there are no substantial revisions to Plato's account of personhood in the later dialogues Timaeus,Philebus, and Laws.The chapters of KP defend the Image Model interpretation by showing how the Image Model is consistent with the themes of personhood, tripartition, and knowledge throughout the middle and later dialogues and how this model remedies the defects of the earlier dialogues. There are other insights, interpretations, and arguments in each chapter, of which the most important is that Plato's ethics and epistemology are not easily detached from his metaphysics of soul.I doubt that KP shows the superiority of the Image Model to the Prison Model as an interpretation of Plato. KP gives only a brief argument against the Prison Model: "For Plato a 'body' is different from a 'corpse'," and "whereas the body is the subject of, say, a state of depletion, the embodied soul or person is the subject of hunger;" therefore while "it is not completely misleading" to say that "a person is a soul and a human being is a composite of soul and body," "the matter is actually more complex than this" (2). But neither premise of this argument requires us to abandon the Prison Model for an Image Model. As a prison is a compound of prisoner and cell, a human being is a compound of soul and body. The distinction between (animated) body and corpse (i.e. inanimate body) will correspond to the distinction between occupied and unoccupied prison cell. And just as the body is subject [End Page 108] to chill (i.e. temperature-depletion relative to sustaining life) but soul to feeling the chill, so too a prisoner's cell is subject to chill but the prisoner to feeling the chill.Moreover, the Prison Model is superior to the Image Model at providing for "personal identity across embodied and disembodied states" (3): it is obviously the same prisoner, before and after freedom from the cell. But according to KP the embodied person is an image of the disembodied person. At death the embodied person becomes disembodied. According to KP's account, this change must be a replacement of image with original, and therefore the image does not survive death. The consequence for me, an embodied person, is that I do not survive death or enjoy immortality. Moreover, this consequence ruins KP's thesis that Plato's metaphysics of disembodied souls is necessary to defend his ethical prescription to care for one's soul before one's body. If in fact I am only an image of a future disembodied object, its fate is of no obvious concern to me.Finally, KP's account of akrasia seems impossible:• A soul is partitioned in that one and the same soul is divided into "a better and a worse part" (268-9), i.e...