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George Hilding Rudebusch

Northern Arizona University
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  •  Publications
    93
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  • Northern Arizona University
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1982
CV
Homepage
Flagstaff, Arizona, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Socrates
Plato: Metaphysics
Plato: Epistemology
Plato: Philosophy of Language
Plato: Ethics
Plato: Why Dialogues?
Plato: Socratic Irony
Plato: Elenchos
Plato: Collection and Division
Aristotle: Pleasure
Aristotle: Happiness
6 more
Areas of Interest
Aristotle: Happiness
  • All publications (93)
  •  151
    "Ethics, practical reasoning, and political philosophy in antiquity and in Christian, jewish, and islamic philosophy": A joint conference of the society for the study of islamic philosophy and science (SSIPS); the society for ancient greek philosophy (SaGP); and the international society for neoplatonic studies (ISNS): A report
    Philosophy East and West 37 (4): 429-433. 1987.
    Arabic and Islamic PhilosophyAncient Greek and Roman Philosophy, MiscellaneousClassicsHistory of Pol…Read more
    Arabic and Islamic PhilosophyAncient Greek and Roman Philosophy, MiscellaneousClassicsHistory of Political Philosophy
  •  115
    Review of Ancient Concepts of Philosophy, by William Jordan (review)
    Ancient Philosophy 13 (2): 467-470. 1993.
    Classical Greek PhilosophyHellenistic and Later Ancient Philosophy, MiscPre-Socratic Philosophy, Mis…Read more
    Classical Greek PhilosophyHellenistic and Later Ancient Philosophy, MiscPre-Socratic Philosophy, Misc
  •  958
    Socrates, Wisdom and Pedagogy
    Philosophical Inquiry 31 (1-2): 153-173. 2009.
    Intellectualism about human virtue is the thesis that virtue is knowledge. Virtue intellectualists may be eliminative or reductive. If eliminative, they will eliminate our conventional vocabulary of virtue words-'virtue', 'piety', 'courage', etc.-and speak only of knowledge or wisdom. If reductive, they will continue to use the conventional virtue words but understand each of them as denoting nothing but a kind of knowledge (as opposed to, say, a capacity of some other part of the soul than the …Read more
    Intellectualism about human virtue is the thesis that virtue is knowledge. Virtue intellectualists may be eliminative or reductive. If eliminative, they will eliminate our conventional vocabulary of virtue words-'virtue', 'piety', 'courage', etc.-and speak only of knowledge or wisdom. If reductive, they will continue to use the conventional virtue words but understand each of them as denoting nothing but a kind of knowledge (as opposed to, say, a capacity of some other part of the soul than the intellect, such as the will or the appetites). Virtue intellectualists may be pluralists or monists. If pluralist, they identify the virtues with distinct kinds of knowledge. If monist, they identify all the virtues with one and the same kind of knowledge. In a number of dialogues-including the Euthyphro, Apology, Charmides, Euthydemus, Laches, Lysis, Protagoras, and Republic I-Socrates gives arguments that support Reductive Monist Intellectualism (RMI) about human virtue. I disarm an influential objection to RMI as the correct interpretation of Socrates.
    SocratesVirtues and Vices
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