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68Does Plato think false speech is speech?Noûs 24 (4): 599-609. 1990.I look at (I) the problem of false speech which Plato faces, (II) the solution he gives in the Sophist, and (III) how that very solution is undermined by the argument of the Theaetetus. I conclude that we ought to see the account of the Theaetetus as overruling the account of the Sophist. On this alternative, Plato holds that false speech and thought really is impossible.
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1Aristotelian predication, Augustine and the trinityThe Thomist 53 (4). 1989.AUGUSTINE WISHED TO DEFEND AND MAKE AS INTELLIGIBLE AS POSSIBLE THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. I SHOW HOW AUGUSTINE WORKS WITH AN ARISTOTELIAN MODEL OF PREDICATION, DERIVES AN INCOMPLETENESS RESULT WITHIN THE STANDARD FORMS OF PREDICATION, AND ACCEPTS, WITH SOME QUALIFICATION, A NONSTANDARD FORM OF PREDICATION USED BY ARISTOTLE FOR PREDICATING PRIMARY SUBSTANCE OF MATTER
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20Sophist 237–239Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (4): 521-531. 1991.The text of Sophist 237-9 is aporetic and shares with many other dialogues this structure: A question is asked and an answer, given in a single sentence, is reached and accepted by the interlocutor. The the interlocutor is examined further and his assent undermined. I argue that the Stranger does not share Theaetetus' perplexity and holds the rejected answer. I explain the Stranger's behavior by appealing to his pedagogy.
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206Plato on knowing a traditionPhilosophy East and West 38 (3): 324-333. 1988.The success of relativism as a solution to skeptical problems depends upon the relativist's object of knowledge being invulnerable to the same skeptical doubts which we might have about the undiscovered world. Naturally, therefore, a traditional Platonic response is to argue that the relativist's selected object of knowledge cannot be known apart from knowledge of the undiscovered world. This indeed is the Platonic thesis of this article, as it applies to tradition. I begin by giving a philosoph…Read more
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18Hoffman on Kripke’s WittgensteinPhilosophy Research Archives 12 177-182. 1986.Paul Hoffman argues that Kripke’s Wittgenstein fails in his solution to his own sceptical paradox. I argue that Hoffman fails to see the importance for Kripke’s Wittgenstein of the distinction between agreement in fact and judged agreement. Hoffman is right that no solution to the sceptical paradox can be based on agreement in fact, but the solution of Kripke’s Wittgenstein depends upon judged agreement. An interpretation is given: by ‘judged agreement’ Kripke’s Wittgenstein does not mean unders…Read more
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607Christopher Rowe's Plato and the art of philosophical writingPhilosophical Books 50 (1): 55-62. 2009.The review argues that Plato makes a valid distinction between inferior hypothetical and superior unhypothetical methods. Given the distinction, the book confuses the hypothetical for unhypothetical dialectic.
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31Reconsidering Ren as Virtue and BenevolenceJournal of Chinese Philosophy 40 (3-4): 456-472. 2013.One reason why Confucius is preeminent among Chinese philosophers is his teaching about ren 仁. Interpreters have said many different things about ren, yet two basic assumptions are pervasive: that ren is a virtue and that ren is benevolence. I argue that it is more respectful to the text of the Analects to discard both assumptions. Instead of virtue, ren is a priority in one's motives. Instead of benevolence, ren is humane courtesy
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41"Ethics, practical reasoning, and political philosophy in antiquity and in Christian, jewish, and islamic philosophy": A joint conference of the society for the study of islamic philosophy and science (SSIPS); the society for ancient greek philosophy (SaGP); and the international society for neoplatonic studies (ISNS): A reportPhilosophy East and West 37 (4): 429-433. 1987.
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41Beaney on mistakesMind 96 (384): 545-547. 1987.In 'Plato on Sense and Reference' (Mind,1985, pp. 526-37), I argued that Plato 'understood and rejected' a general strategy for explaining false belief, and that Frege's explanation of false belief was an instance of that general strategy. Michael Beaney ('Mistakes and Mismatches: A Reply to Rudebusch', Mind, 1987, pp. 95-8) replied that there is a feature of Frege's explanation that enables it to escape the argument. In this rejoinder I argue that Beaney's escape is not Fregean and that it fail…Read more
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95Socrates, pleasure, and valueOxford University Press. 1999.In this study, George Rudebusch addresses whether Socrates was a hedonist--whether he believed pleasure to be the good. In attempting to locate Socrates' position on hedonism, Rudebusch examines the passages in Plato's early dialogues that are the most disputed on the topic. He maintains that Socrates identifies pleasant activity with virtuous activity, describing Socrates' hedonism as one of activity, not sensation. This analysis allows for Socrates to find both virtue and pleasure to be the go…Read more
