Pietro Gori

In this chapter, I reconstruct and interpret Mary Hesse’s work on scientific language from 1952–1961. I begin by looking at her criticisms of views that hold theoretical concepts and statements are made meaningful by reduction or translation into phenomenal concepts and statements. The shortcomings Hesse identifies with these views inform her positive account of scientific language, which pays close attention to the ways scientists talk about and use models. I highlight three aspects of Hesse’s account: (1) her use of Friedrich Waismann’s notion of open texture; (2) the role she thinks models drawn from more familiar experience play in making theories intelligible; and (3) her claim that the relationship between the theoretical and phenomenal statements of our theories involves interpretation rather than translation. I then offer preliminary remarks about Hesse’s use of history in developing this account. Finally, I close with a very brief suggestion about the continuity between Hesse’s early use of open texture and the later parallels she draws between metaphors and models.

Beginning with her 1952 paper “Operational Definition and Analogy in Physical Theories”, Mary Hesse has championed an approach to analogy in scientific investigation that aims to capture the different ways in which analogies are used by working scientists. For various reasons, Hesse’s pioneering contribution, which culminated in her Models and Analogies in Science (1963–66), has often been misunderstood. This paper addresses what is arguably one of the most common misunderstandings of Hesse’s approach, having to do with the distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘material’ analogies in science. In response to concerns about the overly restrictive character of Hesse’s requirements on inductively strong analogical inferences, an interpretation and partial refinement of Hesse’s proposal will be provided that does justice to its significance for the epistemology of science.

How can we reconstruct what long extinct animals, such as dinosaurs, looked like, how fast they moved, and what ecological role they played in their paleoenvironment? These features are not preserved in the fossil record, so paleontologists must instead turn to scientifically informed models and analogies to try to answer these questions. In her celebrated book Models and Analogies in Science, Mary Hesse illustrates the concept of material analogy using the examples of homologies and analogies in biology. These two types of analogy have given rise to two different research programs in the project of reconstructing extinct life: the Phylogenetic Approach and the Functional Morphology Approach. In this chapter I show how each of these approaches has its own strengths and weaknesses, and argue instead for an Integrated Approach that makes use of both of Hesse’s types of analogy. I conclude by highlighting the importance of paying attention to model uncertainty, adequacy-for-purpose, and the whole organism in a paleoreconstruction.

This chapter explores relevant aspects of Mary Hesse’s epistemology, with special attention to her attempt to outline a post-empiricist account of scientific knowledge based on criticisms of the received positivist view that were discussed at the time. Key features of Hesse’s view of language and meaning will be considered, and it will be shown that there is a certain consistency between her conception of the growth of scientific knowledge and Thomas Kuhn’s mature philosophy. An account of Hesse’s and Kuhn’s attempts to stress that interpretive activity occurs at various levels of scientific inquiry will allow us to delve into their shared idea that the hermeneutic approach that has traditionally been considered the most appropriate to the human sciences may be appropriate to the natural sciences as well.

Mary B. Hesse’s modified realism offers an original perspective on the dynamic nature of scientific knowledge in the landscape of twentieth century philosophy of science. Although her work on models and metaphors is quite acknowledged and frequently referenced, her realistic proposal is mostly forgotten or ignored. The aim of this paper is to present some of the main features of this perspective grounded in her epistemological proposal, the Network Model. This model for understanding scientific theories portrays scientific concepts as intricately interconnected, emphasizing the complex relationships within theories. Hesse places a spotlight on the pivotal role of language, contending that linguistic expression shapes scientific understanding and fosters connections between ideas. We will discuss the fundamental theses of this model, as well as some of its consequences for central issues in the philosophy of science, like theory-ladenness or the distinction between theoretical and observational statements. Hesse’s modified realism, embraces the nuanced and dynamic character of scientific development. Departing from traditional approaches, her realistic conception acknowledges the continuous evolution and interplay of ideas in scientific practice. This dynamic perspective aligns with the complexities of real scientific inquiry, offering a more authentic framework for comprehending the development of scientific knowledge.

This chapter aims to shed light on the relation between Hesse’s mature work—the culmination of which is arguably her 1974 book The Structure of Scientific Inference and the theoretical perspective that Feyerabend elaborated roughly from 1958 to 1970. The goal is not to present a philological inquiry into the extent to which Hesse’s work can be traced back to Feyerabend. Instead, the aim is to better understand the extent to which the content of Hesse’s general philosophy of science is determined by the issues, topics, and sensibilities that belong to the post-Popperian tradition in epistemology. To achieve this, this chapter will detail Hesse’s engagement with and further development of several concepts and stances that characterized Feyerabend’s philosophy before the publication of Against Method. This analysis will shed light on where Hesse situates herself within the post-Popperian milieu, her series of arguments directed against positivist philosophy of science, and the way in which her position overcomes specific issues and difficulties that undermine Feyerabend’s position. This will provide us with a better appreciation of both thinkers’ approaches to themes such as theory change, explanation, and the theory-ladenness of observational terms. The conclusion will briefly consider whether a more continued interaction of Hesse’s epistemology with Feyerabend’s stance might have benefited her later work.

Mary Hesse’s work on the role of analogical reasoning in science has set the disciplinary standard. Her classic Models and Analogies in Science (1966) spearheaded the emergence of the philosophy of scientific modelling and enjoys lasting prominence in the field. Hesse’s account famously divided analogy into three kinds: positive, negative, and neutral. In this chapter we aim to bring attention to the one element that has been relatively least explored, the negative analogy. We draw on an example from medical practice, namely the use of the Neer Classification system in the medical prognosis and treatment of shoulder fractures. We argue that there are externally and internally functioning negative analogies, and that, importantly, the latter have a ‘positive’ inferential role. We describe three types of externally functioning negative analogies that have already been to some extent discussed in the literature—which we refer to as ‘crucial’, ‘irrelevant’, and ‘requisite’—as well as a new fourth type that we call ‘scope-fixing.’ We then apply Hesse’s distinction between horizontal and vertical relations to the clinical case study and suggest that there are two different ways in which internally functioning negative analogies can serve as premises in analogical inference.

As part of her seminal work on models and analogies in science, Hesse develops a general ‘network theory’ of meaning in which she posits that all language (both natural and scientific) is fundamentally metaphorical. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s theory of family resemblance, she claims that the application of any concept to a novel case is based on the tacit perception of complex similarities between the new case and cases already subsumed under the concept in question, and thus amounts to a metaphorical transfer of that concept to the novel case. In this chapter, it will be argued that Hesse’s resulting theory of scientific inference lapses into anti-realism, as Hesse regards the similarities based on which all descriptive concepts are applied not as objective features of the world, but as dependent on social or anthropological factors. In contrast, it will be shown that Wittgenstein’s original theory of meaning already makes room for a genuine epistemic access to objective resemblances in the world—one which is established through direct, practically embodied acquaintances of the cognitive agent with such resemblances. Wittgenstein’s overall theory thus proves to be more realist than Hesse appreciates in her own interpretation and application of it, and thus helps to redeem the realist program of Hesse’s approach.

Mary Hesse advocates a methodological stance pertaining to theory development based on James Clerk Maxwell’s ‘method of physical analogies’. It is an approach avoiding pitfalls such as unsupported hypotheses or losing sight of the object of research. Hesse’s claim about a unity of the Newtonian method of ‘deduction from phenomena’ with analogical reasoning is explored. In this spirit, it is argued that Hesse’s classification of analogies provides a dynamic tracking of the theory-building process. Three instances where Hesse’s classification of analogies plays a crucial role in contemporary debates in philosophy of science are briefly touched upon.

In this chapter, I argue that the theoretical framework that Mary Hesse outlines in her seminal work Forces and Fields (Hesse, Forces and Fields: The Concept of Action at a Distance in the History of Physics, Greenwood Press, 1961) may help us to address the challenge to scientific realism posed by the Pessimistic Meta-Induction (PMI) argument. To do so, I will draw upon Hesse’s idea of satisfactory models to account for scientific theories. I aim to provide a new framework within which both the epistemic stance of scientific realism, whose defense is mostly based on the ‘No Miracle Argument’, and the PMI argument can be reformulated without referring to such terms as ‘success’ and ‘truth’. This is crucial to me since both terms are central to the PMI argument and hence getting rid of them may undermine its effectiveness.

This paper consists of two parts which are linked by Mary Hesse’s notion of negative analogy. In the first part I will characterise the context into which this notion was introduced, i.e. the discourse on models and analogies which Hesse reacts to and her own work from some papers in the 1950ies to her book on Models and Analogies (Hesse, 1966). One important distinction she draws in this book is between positive, neutral and negative analogies. In the second part of the paper, I will start with an observation by Hesse on negative analogies and will argue this has far reaching consequences for the metaphysics of science. It allows us to see how we can have empirical access to natural modalities.

Every theory of metaphor faces the challenge of explaining the complex relationship between literal and metaphorical meaning. In this chapter, we analyze Hesse’s approach to metaphor, arguing that her original perspective sheds light on the contemporary debate on the literal-metaphorical distinction, going beyond how it is interpreted within the domains of semantics and pragmatics. To this end, we discuss the theoretical move that allowed Hesse to reject the primacy of literal meaning and the semantic-pragmatic distinction in her explanation of the interpretation of metaphorical meanings. Reference is made to ancient, medieval, and contemporary debates to underline the three theoretical steps upon which Hesse’s original view is based: (1) an approach to metaphor as an analogical process capable of reshaping previous uses of words and previous perceptions of reality; (2) a description of the analogical process as a classification that identifies similarities that constitute higher categories; and (3) the equation between word meaning and word classificatory uses, which explains how the discovery of new similarities and differences can modify the meaning of a word and create new relations between words.

To what extent should we think of Mary Hesse as having been a scientific realist? Her early works were clearly intended to make space for a form of realism based on a fuller recognition of the role of models and analogies in science than existing empiricist views allowed. Her commitment to realism is explicit in her publications from the mid-1960s until at least the mid-1970s. But there were also some kinds of realism that she always distanced herself from. I investigate what all these versions of realism were, and why she endorsed some but opposed others. In the 1970s, Hesse’s growing conviction that there is no cumulation or convergence of theory across the history of science, together with the idea of the underdetermination of theory by data, led her to endorse what she thought of as a form of ‘pragmatism’ or ‘instrumentalism’. Had she turned against her earlier form of scientific realism, or perhaps all forms of scientific realism, and if so, why? Or did she think her pragmatism was compatible with her initial, model-based realism? I draw attention to a residually realist aspect of her views, one that should make us think of her as having suggested what others would later come to think of as structural realism. But I also argue that her approach to language might well jeopardise the idea that she was ever a realist.

The article addresses the issue of perspectivism in Nietzsche, defending the idea that it is not limited to the epistemic dimension but, on the contrary, its scope involves the axiological level of human evaluative practice. The first part explores the value and function of perspectivism in Nietzsche's philosophical project, highlighting aspects that connect this concept with the moral and civilizational questions that concerned him. The second part is focused on the role played by Nietzsche's perspectivism in the history of philosophy, with special attention to its connections with recent post-positivist developments in the philosophy of knowledge and the philosophy of science.

This chapter explores relevant aspects of Mary Hesse’s epistemology, with special attention to her attempt to outline a post-empiricist account of scientific knowledge based on criticisms of the received positivist view that were discussed at the time. Key features of Hesse’s view of language and meaning will be considered, and it will be shown that there is a certain consistency between her conception of the growth of scientific knowledge and Thomas Kuhn’s mature philosophy. An account of Hesse’s and Kuhn’s attempts to stress that interpretive activity occurs at various levels of scientific inquiry will allow us to delve into their shared idea that the hermeneutic approach that has traditionally been considered the most appropriate to the human sciences may be appropriate to the natural sciences as well.

This volume explores the work of Mary B. Hesse (1924–2016), a pivotal figure in twentieth-century philosophy of science. At a time when the foundations of an integrated approach to the history and philosophy of science were being established, Hesse, as a female philosopher, offered a distinctive and influential contribution grounded in a post-empiricist understanding of the natural sciences. Central to her thought was a focus on the metaphorical and analogical value of scientific language, in contrast to views assessing its literal significance. Hesse also departed from traditional hypothetico-deductive accounts of scientific methodology and theory structure, advancing instead perspectives rooted in both historical and contemporary scientific practices. To mark the centenary of her birth, this book brings together an international group of scholars to re-examine and engage with Hesse’s intellectual legacy. The chapters address the central themes of her work and situate them within her broader philosophical context. Each contribution adopts a cross-disciplinary perspective, highlighting the continued relevance of Hesse’s ideas to current debates in the philosophy of science. This volume will be of particular interest to scholars in the history and philosophy of science, as well as those engaged in gender studies and the study of women in philosophy.

La tempestividad de Nietzsche es patente en el renovado entusiasmo con el que filósofos de tradición continental y analítica se han acercado recientemente a su obra. Entre otros temas, la atención se ha dirigido hacia dos aspectos importantes del pensamiento nietzscheano: el análisis, la crítica y la genealogía de la cultura, así como la posición de Nietzsche respecto de la subjetividad. En este estudio introductorio, los autores realizarán un breve análisis de ambos aspectos. Como se mostrará, estos aspectos juegan un papel de primera importancia en el pensamiento nietzscheano, y la relación entre ellos es más fuerte de lo que se podría pensar inicialmente.

Il contenuto dei paragrafi conclusivi della "Genealogia della morale" può essere considerato il nucleo di una rete di concetti che costituisce l’intelaiatura della tarda filosofia di Nietzsche. In questo saggio si mostrerà in particolare come la problematizzazione della verità annunciata in GM III, 24 e 27 rappresenti per Nietzsche un passaggio fondamentale per portare a maturazione le istanze critiche del proprio pensiero e permettere la realizzazione della «filosofia dell’avvenire» di cui "Al di là del bene e del male" doveva costituire il preludio.

This chapter explores Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s views on language and knowledge, establishing a philosophical dialogue between two different positions, which are based on a similar anti-essentialist and instrumentalist concern. The chapter will first focus on Nietzsche’s conception of language as the expression of valuational perspectives developing through the natural and cultural history of mankind. It will then consider Wittgenstein’s account of language as the inherited background of our practical engagement with the world. Finally, by bringing Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s views together, the last section reflects on the crucial strategic move they make in their respective battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.

The chapter explores comparatively the attention to the practical dimension that—each in his own way—Michel Foucault, Friedrich Nietzsche, and the classic pragmatist thinker William James pay when confronted with the challenge of providing a non-skeptical response to the relativist stance on truth that arose in the post-Kantian age. Particular focus will be given to the extent to which these three authors conceived of the practical framework as the only one that allows us to meaningfully address and determine truth.

This volume provides a geographically and historically diverse overview of philosophical traditions that establish a deep connection between truth and practice, or even see truth itself as a kind of practice. Under the label "practices of truth" are subsumed disparate approaches that can be fruitfully brought together to explore the intersections between truth and practice in philosophy as well as to address a range of intriguing questions about truth that fall outside the domain of pure theory. The chapters in this volume provide a variety of perspectives on key practices of truth in philosophy and in the history of philosophy, enriching our understanding of the different ways in which truth and practice may be connected, including the role of certain practices in enabling philosophical insight into truth; the ways in which truth may actually be embedded in some practices; and the impact of truth on practice. Practices of Truth in Philosophy will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in the history of philosophy, comparative philosophy, ethics, epistemology, and the metaphysics of truth.

La Genealogia della morale si presenta al lettore come un compatto ma articolato crocevia di temi e di problematiche del pensiero di Friedrich Nietzsche. L'opera è certo caratterizzata da una particolare unità tematica, ma è al tempo stesso ricca di spunti che offrono accessi a questioni di non secondaria importanza e che, nel loro complesso, definiscono la trama di un pensiero che manifesta la propria ricchezza e originalità al lettore più accorto. Di tale ricchezza si è cercato di rendere conto nel presente volume, che raccoglie una serie di incursioni nel testo di Nietzsche a firma di studiosi italiani e stranieri, alcune delle quali sono state originariamente discusse nel corso di un seminario di ricerca svoltosi nell’ambito della Scuola di Dottorato in Filosofia dell’Università di Padova. Questi contributi affrontano, ciascuno a suo modo, la Genealogia della morale, illuminandone alcuni passaggi cruciali e intervenendo nella discussione di aspetti che si dimostrano significativi non solamente per approfondire ulteriormente la qualità e la rilevanza filosofiche dell'opera di Nietzsche, ma anche per valutarne il ruolo nella storia del pensiero occidentale contemporaneo.

Ernst Mach (1838-1916) è stato una figura di riferimento per la cultura scientifica e filosofica tardo-ottocentesca e dei primi decenni del Novecento. Le sue ricerche in fisica e psicologia, così come il lavoro epistemologico che emerge dalle pagine di opere quali La meccanica nel suo sviluppo storico-critico e Conoscenza ed errore, hanno influito notevolmente su molti autori a lui contemporanei. In questi testi, Mach delinea una concezione antimetafisica del pensiero scientifico e una concezione biologico-evolutiva della conoscenza umana che si ritrovano elaborate in vario modo nella teoria della relatività di A. Einstein, nell’epistemologia evoluzionistica di K. Popper e D. Campbell, nel pragmatismo di W. James e, più in generale, nelle idee che animarono il primo Circolo di Vienna. I saggi raccolti nel presente volume si propongono di commemorarne la figura e l’opera, guardando a Mach come figura di confine tra prospettive di indagine che la storia della filosofia dell’ultimo secolo ha spesso visto contrapposte.