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Michael Jacovides

Purdue University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    33
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 More details
  • Purdue University
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
University of California, Los Angeles
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1997
Email (login required)
West Lafayette, Indiana, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
General Philosophy of Science
Philosophy of Religion
  • All publications (33)
  •  368
    Locke's distinctions between primary and secondary qualities
    In Lex Newman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding", Cambridge University Press. 2007.
    in The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s Essay, edited by Lex Newman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
    Primary and Secondary QualitiesLocke: Primary and Secondary Qualities
  •  245
    Do Experiences Represent?
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (1): 87-103. 2010.
    The paper contains four arguments to show that experiences don't represent. The first argument appeals to the fact that an experience can't occur without what the experience is of; the second appeals to the fact we can have an experience without having any awareness of what it is of, the third argument appeals to the fact that long experiences, such as the experience of being kidnapped, don't represent anything; and the fourth appeals to the fact that experiences often leave physical traces. The…Read more
    The paper contains four arguments to show that experiences don't represent. The first argument appeals to the fact that an experience can't occur without what the experience is of; the second appeals to the fact we can have an experience without having any awareness of what it is of, the third argument appeals to the fact that long experiences, such as the experience of being kidnapped, don't represent anything; and the fourth appeals to the fact that experiences often leave physical traces. The author rebuts several arguments for the conclusion that experiences represent. The author also considers some of the pitfalls involved in stipulating that experiences represent in a technical sense of “experience” or “represent”
    The Contents of Perception, MiscRepresentationalism
  •  205
    Locke on the semantics of secondary quality words: A reply to Matthew Stuart
    Philosophical Review 116 (4): 633-645. 2007.
    Philosophical Review, revised April 16, 2007.
    Locke: Philosophy of Language, MiscLocke: Primary and Secondary Qualities
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