Catherine Wilson

The naturalistic approach to metaethics is sometimes identified with a supervenience theory relating moral properties to underlying descriptive properties, thereby securing the possibility of objective knowledge in morality as in chemistry. I reject this approach along with the purely anthropological approach which leads to an objectionable form of relativism. There is no single method for arriving at moral objectivity any more than there is a single method that has taken us from alchemy to modern chemistry. Rather, there is an ensemble of instruments, techniques, experiments and observations that contribute to eliminating moral error, delivering what we are entitled to call greater objectivity.

This paper discusses the significance for the philosophy of perception and aesthetics of certain productions of the ‘offline brain’. These are experienced in hypnagogic and other trance states, and in disease- or drug-induced hallucination. They bear a similarity to other visual patterns in nature, and reappear in human artistry, especially of the craft type. The reasons behind these resonances are explored, along with the question why we are disposed to find geometrical complexity and ‘supercolouration’ beautiful. The paper concludes with a plea on behalf of neuroaesthetics, but with a caution or two.

This introductory article explains the coverage of this book, which is about the history of philosophy in Europe during the early modern period. This book explores the most important developments in the philosophy of the period as these are expounded both in texts that have since become very familiar and in other philosophical texts that are undeservedly less well-known. It attempts to make evident the fluid boundaries in the early modern period between deductions from experimental science and philosophical theory and considers the impact on philosophy of historical and political events.

Reversing centuries of methodological caution and skepticism, philosophers have begun to explore the possibility that experience in some form is widely distributed in the universe. It has been proposed that consciousness may pertain to machines, rocks, elementary particles, and perhaps the universe itself. This paper shows why philosophers have good reason to suppose that experiences are widely distributed in living nature, including worms and insects, but why panpsychism extending to non-living nature is an implausible doctrine.

In this paper I discuss the largely obsolete notion of ‘metaphysical foundations for science’ and the problems of representation, truth, and embodiment in Descartes identified by Adrian Moore. I explain why rather than enaging in a project of pure inquiry Descartes needed to fit the pursuit and findings of the physical and life sciences into a theological framework. His much misunderstood scientifc image of the human being as a psychosomatic unity is defended as coherent and influential, as is his rejection of the correspondence theory of veridical perception.

This is an essay review of Ted Honderich's recently published autobiography. Treating the work as both a study of philosophical and political culture in the second half of the twentieth century and as an exercise in self-evaluation, the reviewer discusses the problems of truth and explanation in narrative and the issues of professional and sexual morality raised by the narrative. Honderich's account is assessed as credible, illuminating, and well-written, even as questions are raised concerning the consistency of his political beliefs.