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136Seeing causings and hearing gesturesPhilosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 405-428. 2009.Can humans see causal interactions? Evidence on the visual perception of causal interactions, from Michotte to contemporary work, is best interpreted as showing that we can see some causal interactions in the same sense as that in which we can hear speech. Causal perception, like speech perception, is a form of categorical perception.
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59Perceiving expressions of emotion: What evidence could bear on questions about perceptual experience of mental states?Consciousness and Cognition 36 438-451. 2015.
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88Infants' representations of causationBehavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3): 126-127. 2011.It is consistent with the evidence in The Origin of Concepts to conjecture that infants' causal representations, like their numerical representations, are not continuous with adults', so that bootstrapping is needed in both cases
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125Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification * By SANFORD C. GOLDBERG (review)Analysis 69 (3): 582-585. 2009.Reflection on testimony provides novel arguments for anti-individualism. What is anti-individualism? Sanford Goldberg's book defends three main claims under this heading: first, facts about the contents of beliefs do not supervene on individualistic facts about the believers ; second, an individual's epistemic entitlement to accept a piece of testimony depends on facts about her peers ; third, processes by which some humans acquire knowledge from testimony includes activities performed for them …Read more
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377Cue competition effects and young children's causal and counterfactual inferencesDevelopmental Psychology 45 (6): 1563-1575. 2009.The authors examined cue competition effects in young children using the blicket detector paradigm, in which objects are placed either singly or in pairs on a novel machine and children must judge which objects have the causal power to make the machine work. Cue competition effects were found in a 5- to 6-year-old group but not in a 4-year-old group. Equivalent levels of forward and backward blocking were found in the former group. Children's counterfactual judgments were subsequently examined b…Read more
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Planning for Collective AgencyIn Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems, Springer Verlag. 1st ed. 2015.
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196Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states?Psychological Review 116 (4): 953-970. 2009.The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans’ capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Non-human animals also fail critical tests of belief reasoning but can show very complex social behaviour (e.…Read more
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187Review: Ruth M. J. Byrne: The Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality (review)Mind 117 (468): 1065-1069. 2008.
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33Are these different requirements, in the sense that someone could satisfy one without satisfying the other? No one could meet the Truth Requirement without meeting the Variation Requirement, because understanding that a belief is false involves realising one should not believe it and appreciating the possibility of having other beliefs in its place. But could someone meet the Variation Requirement without meeting the Truth Requirement? In other words, is it possible to be aware of beliefs which …Read more
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72Tool Use and Causal Cognition (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2011.What cognitive abilities underpin the use of tools, and how are tools and their properties represented or understood by tool-users? Does the study of tool use provide us with a unique or distinctive source of information about the causal cognition of tool-users? Tool use is a topic of major interest to all those interested in animal cognition, because it implies that the animal has knowledge of the relationship between objects and their effects. There are countless examples of animals developin…Read more
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18The Developing Mind: A Philosophical IntroductionRoutledge. 2017.The development of children’s minds raises fundamental psychological and scientific questions, from how we are able to know about and describe basic aspects of the world such as words, numbers and colours to how we come to grasp causes, actions and intentions. This is the first book to properly introduce and examine philosophical questions concerning children’s cognitive development and considers the implications of scientific breakthroughs for the philosophy of developmental psychology. Each ch…Read more
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45Is goal ascription possible in minimal mindreading?Psychological Review 123 (2): 228-233. 2016.In this response to the commentary by Michael and Christensen, we first explain how minimal mindreading is compatible with the development of increasingly sophisticated mindreading behaviours that involve both executive functions and general knowledge, and then sketch one approach to a minimal account of goal ascription.
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350Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive ActionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1): 119-145. 2012.Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordina…Read more
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13011. What Does Knowledge Explain? Commentary on Jennifer Nagel,'Knowledge as a Mental State'Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4 309. 2013.
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53Shared Emotions, Joint Attention and Joint Action, Centre for Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Denmark, 26 October 2010
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |