Nicla Vassallo

According to the theory of meaning as justification, semantics is closely entangled with epistemology: knowing the meaning of an utterance amounts to knowing the justification one may offer for it. In this perspective, the theory of meaning is connected with the epistemic theory of justification, namely the theory that undergoes the more explicit attempts of naturalization. Is it possible to extend those attempts to the notion of meaning? There are many ways of naturalizing the notion of meaning, independently of its links with the notion of justification. Our goal in this paper is to explore the possibility of naturalizing meaning using those very links. To this aim, we will evaluate in brief three main directions: a) the interaction between justification and discovery; b) Quine's naturalized epistemology; c) the naturalization of logic.

Epistemological contextualism and semantic contextualism are two distinct but closely entangled projects in contemporary philosophy. According to epistemological contextualism, our knowledge attributions are context-sensitive. That is, the truth-conditions of knowledge ascribing sentences – sentences of the form of (1) S knows that p - vary depending on the context in which they are uttered. Contextualism admits the legitimacy of several epistemic standards that vary with the context of use of (1); it might be right to claim – for the same cognitive subject S and the same proposition p – that (1) is true in one context, and false in another. The epistemological contextualist thesis is grounded in a semantic claim about the context-sensitivity of the predicate “know”: the semantic thesisis that a sentence of the form (1) does not express a complete proposition. Different utterances of (1) can, in different contexts, express different propositions: we must add in information about the context in order to determine the proposition expressed by (1). Many scholars have tried to spell out the semantic contextualist thesis on which epistemological contextualism is grounded. Our general aim in this paper is to evaluate the plausibility of a project that takes the opposite starting point, that is establishing the semantic contextualist thesis on the epistemological one. According to semantic contextualism, virtually no sentences of a naturallanguage express complete propositions – meaning underdetermines truth conditions. In our paper, instead of assuming the traditional view of meaning in terms of truth conditions, we suggest that a theory of meaning as justification may shed new light on the contextualist approach. We thus show how the notion of justification can be contextualized, arguing that our attempt provides an interesting and quite straightforward way of contextualizing meaning.

Historically, George Boole’s philosophy of logic has been regarded as the very opposite of Gottlob Frege’s, insofar as Frege is characterized as a strong logical anti-psychologist. Although there are significant differences between Frege’s and Boole’s views on logic, there are also significant similarities, which provide support for our representation of Frege’s philosophy of logic as weakly psychologistic. Both Boole and Frege aspire to capture the essence of a pure and ideally perfect language that may faithfully express correct reasoning, but Boole’s trust in the power of natural language is stronger than Frege’s. Although we cannot adequately defend this claim, we submit that a thorough examination of the differences between Frege’s and Boole’s views on symbolic and natural languages may lead to a more interesting comparison of their stances on logic and thinking than the often repeated contrast in their attitudes toward psychologism.

This book analyses an inconsistency within epistemic contextualism known as the factivity problem. It also provides key insights into epistemic contextualism, an important innovation in contemporary epistemology, enabling readers to gain a better understanding of the various solutions to the factivity problem. As the authors demonstrate, each explanation is based on a different interpretation of the problem. Divided into seven chapters, the book offers comprehensive coverage of this topic, which will be of major interest to philosophers engaged in epistemology and the philosophy of language. After an introductory chapter, Chapter 2 presents the most common understanding of epistemic contextualism and its semantic basis. It also clarifies the epistemological implications of the theory’s semantic assumptions. This chapter also explains the main argument of the factivity problem. The next four chapters discuss the respective solutions proposed by Wolfgang Freitag, Alexander Dinges, Anthony Brueckner and Christopher Buford, Michael Ashfield, Martin Montminy and Wes Skolits, and Peter Baumann. Stefano Leardi and Nicla Vassallo highlight the similarities and commonalities, identifying three main approaches to the factivity problem. Chapter 7 provides a brief overview of the solutions proposed to solve the factivity problem and presents an outline of the conclusions reached in the book.

The aim of this paper is to show that science, understood as pure research, ought not to be affected by non-epistemic values and thus to defend the traditional ideal of value-free science. First, we will trace the distinction between science and technology, arguing that science should be identified with pure research and that any non-epistemic concern should be di­rected toward technology and technological research. Second, we will examine different kinds of values and the roles they can play in scientific research to argue that science understood as pure research is mostly and in any case ought to be value-free. Third, we will consider and dismiss some widespread arguments that aim to defend, especially at a normative level, the inevitable value-ladenness of science. Finally, we will briefly return to the connections among science, technology, and values.

In this paper, we examine some issues debated in mainstream epistemology for which the social features of knowledge are relevant, such as the epistemic relevance of social contexts, the nature of practical knowledge, and the epistemic role of testimony. In the first part of the paper, we show how feminist epistemologies have usefully stressed the social character of knowledge in many central areas of debate within mainstream epistemology. We call these the virtues of feminist epistemology: the denial of the neutrality and autonomy of the epistemic subject, the focus on practical knowledge, and the ensuing attention to the social dimensions of the epistemic process. Our conclusion on the social dimensions of knowledge is the thesis that the epistemic subject can know only in connection with others. In the second part of the paper, we address the issue of the plausibility of feminist epistemologies by discussing three main criticisms which have been raised against them. We conclude that, even if these criticisms are valid, the legacy of feminist epistemologies remains because the social features of knowledge are plausibly significant not only within but also without the perspectives of feminist epistemologies.

The dual purpose of this paper is to examine whether the epistemology of testimony is useful in clarifying reflections on the Holocaust, and on the hand to employ the Holocaust as a test case for the epistemology of testimony in itself. In contrast to any form of epistemological individualism, I examine the epistemological problems and conditions that face both an historian (an indirect witness) and an ocular witness (a direct one). In this discussion, I will not be able to give precise answers to various questions, in particular concerning the relationship between these types of witnesses. I will conclude that although testimony requires truth of the proposition testified, lying seems better that telling the truth in cases where it is instrumental in saving many human life from the brutality of the Nazis. This conclusion is modest: while the epistemology of testimony can perhaps be of help in reflecting upon the Holocaust, it surely brings up more problems than what it can solve. Notwithstanding, I do not believe that the fault is with the epistemology of testimony, but rather that because of its extreme cruelty, inhumanity, and horror, it is too complex to say when a serious testimony about Holocaust is fully justified.