Jeffrey Reid

_Great Philosophers_ tells the story of Western philosophy through the thought of its main protagonists, the great philosophers. The narrative begins with the Presocratic philosophers Heraclitus and Parmenides and ends in recent times, as each philosopher wrestles with the problems and solutions of his or her predecessors. Along the way, Jeffrey Reid provides an engaging introduction to many of the principal ideas of luminaries such as Plato, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Sartre. _Great Philosophers_ not only provides an ideal introduction to philosophical thought, but also an original understanding of the discipline of philosophy itself. The book aims not only to recount an important tradition, but also to reveal something about how it has affected who we are.

The paper is a conference presentation on the theme of meta-philosophy, which took place in the Philosophy Department of the University of Ottawa, March 2026. The paper discovers the river trope in several figures in the history of Western philosophy (Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, Schelling and Hegel) at applies their different fluvial conceptions to the history of philosophy itself. How is the philosophical river ever-changing, yet the same? How are its binary banks involved in its flow? Where is its source? How does it swell? What role does forgetting play (Lethe)?

Sophocles’s tragedy, Antigone, is evoked twice in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, once near the beginning of chapter six (Spirit), in the Ethical Order (Sittlichkeit) section, and again, in chapter seven, on Religion, in the section on the Spiritual Work of Art. Each occurrence presents a significantly distinct perspective on the play, which represents, for Hegel, the paradigmatic expression of Greek tragedy. Reflecting on the specificity of each occurrence not only sheds light on Hegel’s views on tragedy but reveals a fundamental and generally ignored binary division within Hegelian philosophy itself, and its systematic reconciliation. The transition from the Phenomenology’s Spirit chapter to Religion presents a crucial shift; from the narrative recounted from the perspective of human reason, we move to that of absolute revelation. In Religion, we thus have the outline of the same story that has been presented in the earlier chapters of the Phenomenology but now told through the experiences of a different protagonist, the Absolute itself. Without this second, “religious” point of view, the story that Hegel recounts would end in the endless strivings of human morality, in the ambiguous considerations of confession and forgiveness that close chapter six. The twin narratives of reason and revelation can then be brought together in the short, dense final chapter, Absolute Knowing. Hegel’s two presentations of the Antigone tragedy in Spirit and Religion are informed by this fundamental distinction between human and absolute agencies, as well as their complicity. By reflecting upon the two appearances of Antigone, in the Phenomenology, we apprehend both the difference and the complicity between the two narratives: the strivings of human reason and the agency of absolute revelation. Thus, we gain a holistic insight into the system that Hegel calls Science.

_Great Philosophers_ tells the story of Western philosophy through the thought of its main protagonists, the great philosophers. The narrative begins with the Presocratic philosophers Heraclitus and Parmenides and ends in recent times, as each philosopher wrestles with the problems and solutions of his or her predecessors. Along the way, Jeffrey Reid provides an engaging introduction to many of the principal ideas of luminaries such as Plato, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Sartre. _Great Philosophers_ not only provides an ideal introduction to philosophical thought, but also an original understanding of the discipline of philosophy itself. The book aims not only to recount an important tradition, but also to reveal something about how it has affected who we are.

This paper first specifies Romantic psychology in counter-distinction to Enlightenment-informed faculty-psychology, whose scientific paradigm is fundamentally materialistic and mechanistic. Romantic psychology is then presented through Friedrich Schlegel’s theory and practice of the literary fragment. In the fragment, we discover selfhood that is self-positing, powered by electrochemical wit (Witz) and animated by stimulating otherness. Romantic psychology determines the self as an ironic system, complete and yet organically open. The paper shows that the fragmentary self is phenomenological in nature. Romantic psychology’s contemporary legacy can be found in psychoanalysis and psychoanalytical hermeneutics.

Scholar and philosopher Jeffrey Reid’s latest monograph, Reason and Revelation in Hegel, offers a new understanding of Hegel’s metaphysical thought, centring on the Absolute’s self-revelatory agency – its unfolding through nature, human thought, and history. Structured in four sections, the book explores absolute agency and the relationship between eternal truth and historical temporality. How does absolute presence take place in art, religion, and philosophy? Finally, questions of systematicity and meaning are engaged with reference to the Big Bang universe, our experience of music, and the question of what Hegel’s Science leaves behind. Reason and Revelation in Hegel stands out in the landscape of Hegelian studies, where dominant trends often downplay metaphysical dimensions in favor of analytic, materialist, and secular interpretations. Rather than reducing Hegel’s religious ideas to cultural phenomena or aspirational human consciousness, Reid argues that the Absolute is not a distant metaphysical object but an active, performative force within rational human striving itself. In this view, the failures of historical actuality become openings for philosophical truth – shaped by, and inseparable from, eternal revelation.

I begin by defending Heinrich Gustav Hotho’s foundational edition of the Lectures on Aesthetics (LA) contra Gethmann-Siebert and others who argue for a non-systematic view of Hegel’s aesthetics generally and music specifically. I defend Hegel against the common conceit that his comprehension of music was somehow deficient and introduce the Hegelian idea of absolute agency as performative in art and music. Reference to Kant’s transcendental aesthetics then allows us to grasp how, in Hegel, meaningful tones arise from the vibratory oscillation between selfhood’s presiding unity and its temporal self-positing. I then trace back further elements of musical architecture, such as rhythm, harmony and melody to the temporal oscillation arising from within selfhood. The fundamental ambiguity within temporal oscillation is the source of meaningfulness in music, the feeling that its experience is meaningful without telling us exactly what that meaning is. Meaningfulness forms the absolute Ur-Ton of beautiful music, which arises as determinate tones within selfhood and resonates into the soul of the listener. The temporal vanishing of musical tones within a compositional framework is a pre-linguistic expression of meaning, performative of the ambiguous oscillation between the human and the divine.

Hegel reads the poet Novalis as an expression of terminal irony, a pathological case of Gemüt, where the conscious mind is alienated from reality and turns its negativity inwards on the contents of its own natural soul. The condition of self-feeling, presented in Hegel’s “Anthropology”, is a self-consumption that manifests itself somatically in the physical disease (consumption) from which Novalis dies. The poet’s literary production represents a pathological fixation that impedes the dynamic organicity of Hegelian Science. As such, Novalis’s mental illness and death constitute an expression of romantic irony and an ongoing threat to Hegel’s philosophy.

Kate Crawford presents AI as “both reflecting and producing social relations and understandings of the world”; or again, as “a form of exercising power, and a way of seeing… as a manifestation of highly organized capital backed by vast systems of extraction and logistics, with supply chains that wrap around the entire planet”. I interpret these material insights through a Marxist understanding of ideology, with reference to Marx/Engels, Guy Debord and Louis Althusser. In the German Ideology, Marx and Engels present ideology as the alienated and alienating discourse of exchange, dissimulating the material forces of production and its science. Guy Debord presents the spectacle as the further representation of capital. The spectacle is a total Weltanschauung, pure appearance, where “whatever appears is good and where what is good, appears.” Above all, the spectacle is ideology, representing “the impoverishment, enslavement and negation of real life”. Louis Althusser presents ideology as essential for the reproduction of labor-power and capital. His notion of “interpellation” explains the subjective uptake of ideology, how we respond, “yes!” to its call. The algorithms of AI are enactments of surplus value generating capital as data. The AI data-world is the spectacle, “the autonomous movement of non-life” (Debord) where the proletariat/consumer is the producer of their own ideological subjection. Is resistance possible? What form might it take? And if AI is understood as ideology, i.e. as a language that obscures the true conditions of real life, then what are those true conditions? What is “real life”?

Reading the Phenomenology onto-grammatically means interpreting its constitutive forms of consciousness as grammatical iterations of the speculative proposition, where the subject-object relations can be read as dialogical encounters between subject and predicate, where the predicate “talks back”, creating a discursive space of hermeneutical ambiguity and openness, at play in the copula. The article begins with a brief presentation of Hegel’s general theory of language, as it pertains to the distinction between the linguistic sign (Zeichen) and the word (Wort), drawn from his later writings, before applying these grammatical terms to the ontological reading of the speculative sentence, as presented in the Preface to the Phenomenology and discussed by Jere Surber. Then, the article puts its dialogical insights into practice, examining how the onto-grammatical reading of the speculative sentence plays out in the Phenomenology’s famous "lordship and bondage" (aka "master/slave") dialectic.

In the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel describes at length and in detail the particular workings of animal digestion and excretion, referring to the empirical research of his day (Berzelius, Spallanzani, Traviranus). By becoming engaged in the scientific disputes and insights of the time—regarding, for example, the mechanical versus chemical nature of digestion, immediate digestive assimilation and the chemical composition of feces—Hegel arrives at the novel idea that what the animal excretes as superfluous is its own particular entanglement with inorganic otherness. The animal’s subsequent feeling of triumph and satisfaction constitutes the affirmation of individual purposiveness, a form of immediate ideality that Hegel presents as animal subjectivity.

An updated version of this paper forms a chapter in my 2025 book: Reason and Revelation in Hegel: Metaphysical Dimensions of the Absolute (University of Toronto Press). Through reference to Karl Löwith's reading of time in Hegel as fundamentally inspired by the temporality of Aristotle, the paper shows how the absolute "now" is thoroughly informed by historical time. Hegel's preferred tense is that of the Perfekt, the present perfect, where the present "now" is always also what it has been. Hegel thus reconciles Greek and Christian forms of temporality, the distinction that Löwith reads as unreconciled and tragic in Hegel's "young" followers: Feuerbach, Stirner, Bauer, Marx and Nietzsche. Nonetheless, the Left Hegelian heritage is right in comprehending Hegelian time as fundamentally past-oriented. Their own stunted philosophical endeavors are aimed at the future.

An updated version of this paper forms a chapter in my 2025 book: Reason and Revelation in Hegel: Metaphysical Dimensions of the Absolute (University of Toronto Press). The organic trope is a popular way of accepting the systematicity of Hegelian science. It allows for diversity and difference within the living whole, where each organ contributes to the life of the holistic "one", which, in turn, ensures the vitality of each organ. For example, in the Philosophy of Right, the organic state maintains itself in relation to the various institutions and corporations that constitute its organs. However, one element of the organic trope remains largely ignored: excretion. Briefly, if we take Hegel's system as organic, then what does it excrete? What constitutes its excrement? This book chapter examines Hegel's philosophical, syllogistic interpretation of animal digestion and excretion in the Philosophy of Nature and then attempts to apply it to the organic system of science, as an individual, purposive life form whose subjectivity arises through the excretion of what is deemed superfluous.

This is a version of a book chapter included in my 2025 book, Reason and Revelation in Hegel: Metaphysical Dimensions of the Absolute (University of Toronto Press). The chapter deals with metaphysical issues in Big Bang cosmology (the Big Crunch, the Big Chill, the anthropic principle, singularities...) from a Hegelian point of view. If human consciousness is an undeniable feature of the universe, then can we not say that the universe possesses or has possessed consciousness and therefore is or has been conscious? Similarly, Hegel's Absolute knows itself through the self-knowing agency of human thought. And so should we not attribute to the universe the same divine existence that Hegel's Encyclopedia evokes, in its last paragraph where he refers to Aristotle's self-contemplating, self-enjoying god?

This paper examines the Hegelian moment of the for-another in its negative relation to the other moment of particularity: the for-itself. I identify the dissolving, fluidifying action of the for-another by examining figures within the Philosophy of Nature, particularly comets and moons, but also Hegel’s physics of light and sound. The dissolution of the lunar for-itself at the hands of the cometary for-another illustrates how the dynamic relation between the two moments of particularity participates in the presentation of essence, within the Hegelian syllogism, i.e. as mediating between the universal and the singular. The dynamic action of cometary negativity occurs throughout the Philosophy of Nature and therefore should be pivotal to how the work is read.

Romantic psychology is first specified in counter-distinction to Enlightenment-informed faculty-psychology, whose scientific paradigm is fundamentally materialistic and mechanistic. Romantic psychology is then presented through Fr. Schlegel’s theory and practice of the literary fragment. In the fragment, we discover selfhood that is self-positing, powered by electro-chemical forces and enlivened by the stimulating Other. Romantic psychology determines the self as an ironic system, complete and yet organically open to other selves. It is phenomenological in nature and its contemporary legacy can be found in psychoanalysis and psychoanalytical hermeneutics.

Reading The Phenomenology of Spirit through a linguistic lens, Jeffrey Reid provides an original commentary on Hegel's most famous work. Beginning with a close analysis of the preface, where Hegel himself addresses the book's difficulty and explains his tortured language in terms of what he calls the “speculative proposition”, Reid demonstrates how every form of consciousness discussed in The Phenomenology involves and reveals itself as a form of language. Elucidating Hegel's speculative proposition, which consists of the reversal of the roles of the subject and predicate in such a way that the copula of the proposition becomes the lively arena of dialogical ambiguity and hermeneutical openness, this book offers new onto-grammatical readings of every chapter of The Phenomenology. Not only does this bring a new understanding to Hegel's foundational text, but the linguistic approach further allows Reid to unpack its complexity by relating it to contemporary contexts that share the same language structures that we discover in Hegel. Amongst many others, this includes Hegel's account of sense-certainty and the critique of the immediacy of consumer culture today. There's a YouTube interview on the book, under Professor Jeffrey Reid.

The article re-visits the different scholarly approaches to Hegel's end-of-art scenario, and then proposes a new reading whereby ending and finitude are presented as essential features of beautiful art. The first and most determinant of art's endings is the death of the Christly art object, not representations of Christ, but the actual death of (the son of) God himself as the last classical artwork. The death of God represents the last word in Greco-Roman art, the accomplishment of the beautiful individuality and its failure to present the Absolute in a singular, naturally infected, lively, human (made) form. The ending of art brings about a new form of the sacred: the representational language of revelatory religion. The ongoing production of modern artistic forms is a feature of actuality ("Wirklichkeit") and as such is condemned to an infinite approximation of what has been. Such actuality nonetheless "ends" in the ironic discourse of contemporary artistic expression, which Hegel qualifies as a "Vereitelung". The final realization of the beautiful art form, as a human-informed singularity embodying absolute content, may well be the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, whose performative iteration takes place in the form of "worship" practiced in the modern, state university.

How is Hegel's scientific (systematic) language meant to be objective? Through an examination of Hegel's theory of language, as outlined in the Encyclopedia, we understand how thought inhabits signs to form words, gaining in objectivity. The words of the positive sciences of the understanding are then taken up (reflected upon) syllogistically, where the discourse of Science is informed by the relative objectivity of its linguistic contents. The Philosophy of Nature, for example, does not reflect directly on nature but rather gains its truth and objectivity through reflection on the discourses of the natural sciences.

The paper examines the historiographic element in Hegel's philosophy of history, i.e. how the philosophy is constituted as a narrative whose objective truth is guaranteed through the incorporation of original accounts, which are reflected upon in secondary sources. It is these accounts that the philosophy of history further reflects upon and incorporates as the objective linguistic content of Science. Briefly, philosophy of history is a discourse that reflects upon other discourses and not on historical "events" themselves.

Mettre en rapport des textes de Hegel sur l’amour érotique avec quelques passages du penseur romantique Friedrich Schlegel permet de mettre en relief la méfiance hégélienne à l’égard du désir sexuel. Selon l’échelle hiérarchique de désirs chez Hegel, le désir érotique fait preuve d’un déséquilibre entre le sujet désirant et l’objet désiré, ce qui est typique d’un rapport purement naturel et non spirituel. C’est dire que la connaissance charnelle, avec son objet dénué de Soi propre, représente pour Hegel une forme inférieure de savoir. L’inégalité sujet-objet propre à l’amour érotique n’est dépassée que par la participation à la substance éthique, ce qui exige la reconnaissance réciproque de consciences de soi égales. Dans ce contexte, il s’agit du mariage. Juxtaposing some of Hegel’s texts on erotic love with certain passages from the romantic thinker Friedrich Schlegel throws light on Hegel’s problematic relationship with sexual desire. According to his hierarchy of types of desire, erotic desire betrays an imbalance between the desiring subject and the object of desire, typical of a purely natural, non-spiritual relation. This means that carnal knowledge, with its self-less object, represents an inferior form of knowing. The inequality between subject and object, inherent in erotic love, is only surpassed through participation in the ethical substance, requiring the reciprocal recognition of equal self-consciousnesses. In the present context, this means marriage.