I distinguish between two kinds of sensorimotor expectations: agent‐ and object‐active ones. Alva Noë's answer to the problem of how perception acquires volumetric content illicitly privileges agent‐active expectations over object‐active expectations, though the two are explanatorily on a par. Considerations which Noë draws upon concerning how organisms may ‘off‐load’ internal processes onto the environment do not support his view that volumetric content depends on our embodiment; rather, they s…
Read moreI distinguish between two kinds of sensorimotor expectations: agent‐ and object‐active ones. Alva Noë's answer to the problem of how perception acquires volumetric content illicitly privileges agent‐active expectations over object‐active expectations, though the two are explanatorily on a par. Considerations which Noë draws upon concerning how organisms may ‘off‐load’ internal processes onto the environment do not support his view that volumetric content depends on our embodiment; rather, they support a view of experience which is restrictive of the body's role in perception. My objections undercut central arguments which Noë gives for his brand of enactivism.
