-
215Still epiphenomenal qualia: Response to MullerPhilosophia 37 (1): 105-107. 2009.Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of qualia without thereby falsifying himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through.
-
2048Touching Voids: On the Varieties of Absence PerceptionReview of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2): 355-366. 2017.Seeing one’s laptop to be missing, hearing silence and smelling fresh air; these are all examples of perceptual experiences of absences. In this paper I discuss an example of absence perception in the tactual sense modality, that of tactually perceiving a tooth to be absent in one’s mouth, following its extraction. Various features of the example challenge two recently-developed theories of absence perception: Farennikova’s memory-perception mismatch theory and Martin and Dockic’s meta-cognitive…Read more
-
276The Space of Seeing-InBritish Journal of Aesthetics 51 (3): 271-278. 2011.Recent work on seeing-in has taken a pluralist turn. There is variety among pictures, so we should expect variety among seeing-in. Dominic Lopes’s taxonomy of seeing-in is arguably the most thorough that is currently available. Lopes identifies five varieties of seeing-in. In this paper I identify a sixth: pseudo-actualism. This paper improves our current best taxonomy of seeing-in.
-
171Photographic Phenomenology as Cognitive PhenomenologyBritish Journal of Aesthetics 55 (1): 71-89. 2015.Photographic pictorial experience is thought to have a peculiar phenomenology to it, one that fails to accompany the pictorial experiences one has before so-called ‘hand-made’ pictures. I present a theory that explains this in terms of a common factor shared by beliefs formed on the basis of photographic pictorial experience and beliefs formed on the basis of ordinary, face-to-face, perceptual experience: the having of a psychologically immediate, non-inferential etiology. This theory claims tha…Read more
-
208Kind Properties and the Metaphysics of Perception: Towards Impure RelationalismPacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4): 487-509. 2015.A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception is between those who hold that perception is a detection relation of sensory awareness and those who hold that it is representational state akin to belief. Another key debate is between those who claim that we can perceive natural or artifactual kind properties, e.g. ‘being a tomato’, ‘being a doorknob’, etc. and those who hold we cannot. The current consensus is that these debates are entirely unrelated. I argue that this consensus is wr…Read more
Areas of Specialization
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Aesthetics |
Areas of Interest
| Epistemology |
| Metaphilosophy |
| Metaphysics |
| Meta-Ethics |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
PhilPapers Editorships
| Photography |