Martin Davies

### Canada As previously reported here,1 in February 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in Carter v Canada that the country's prohibition on assisted dying violated constitutional rights.2 The Court suspended its ruling for 12 months to give governments time to enact legislation consistent with its decision and, following an appeal to the Court in January 2016, granted an extension to give governments until 6 June 2016 to act.3 In May 2016, a bill was passed in the Canadian House of Commons which would permit medical aid in dying for competent adults with ‘a grievous and irremediable medical condition’ causing ‘intolerable suffering’, and whose ‘natural death’ has become ‘reasonably foreseeable’.4 Medical aid in dying includes administration by a medical or nurse practitioner of a lethal substance, or the prescription or provision of a lethal substance to an individual so that they might self-administer.5 At the time of writing, the bill had not completed its passage through the Senate. A significant amendment by the Senate had, however, removed the requirement for the individuals to be close to death, thus widening the eligibility criteria to include individuals who do not have a terminal illness, and bringing it in line with the wording of the Court's judgement in Carter. 6 Once the bill has been passed by the Senate, it will return to the Commons where Members of Parliament (MPs) will consider the amendments made. No date has yet been set for when the legislative process will be finished and the bill passed into law. As the Supreme Court's deadline was not met, in the absence of legislation physician-assisted dying is governed by the Supreme Court's ruling, supplemented by guidelines from provincial and territorial medical regulatory bodies.7 Assisted dying legislation has been in force in the province of Quebec …

Introduction: Cotard delusion—the delusional belief “I am dead”—is named after the French psychiatrist who first described it: Jules Cotard (1880, 1882). Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1998) proposed that the idea “I am dead” comes to mind when a neuropathological condition has resulted in complete abolition of emotional responsivity to the world. The idea would arise as a putative explanation: if “I am dead” were true, there would be no emotional responsivity to the world. Methods: We scrutinised the literature on people who expressed the delusional belief “I am dead”, looking for data on whether such patients are reported as entirely lacking in emotional responsivity. Results: In numerous cases, patients with Cotard delusion are described as experiencing emotions including anxiety, fear, guilt, distress, euphoria and worry. Conclusions: We conclude that complete absence of emotional responsivity cannot be what prompts the delusional idea that one is dead. We propose that, in at least some cases, the idea “I am dead” comes to mind in response to symptoms of depersonalisation or derealisation, often present in cases of Cotard delusion, and give examples of Cotard patients with abnormalities in various neural areas that could be responsible for the presence of such symptoms.

On 7 April 2022 – coinciding with World Health Day – the British Medical Association launched its new report, Health and human rights in the new world order.1 Written during the global upheaval triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, and published just weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the report responds to a range of emerging and intensifying threats to health-related human rights globally. As the report establishes, human rights in health and healthcare matter because human suffering, and its relief, are fundamental moral issues. As relief of human suffering is the primary purpose of medicine, it follows that doctors and other health professionals are often active in times of human challenge and extremity. During conflict, humanitarian crises, and, as we have so recently seen, global public health emergencies, health professionals are essential to the response. But these crises – and the response to them – can put fundamental human rights and interests under pressure. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has seen sustained indiscriminate shelling of civilian infrastructure. Whether health facilities were directly targeted is moot – the indiscriminate nature of the assault means they will inevitably be hit. Not only is this a violation of the Geneva Conventions, it undermines fundamental human rights, not least of which the right to health. Destroying health infrastructure drives further suffering and delays post-conflict recovery. Public heath emergencies can rightly require draconian measures – social distancing, enforced isolation, location tracking, economic shutdown. Although we saw their necessity during the COVID-19 outbreak, concerns were raised about disproportionate restrictions on basic rights, including rights to privacy and liberty. Human Rights Watch drew attention to the way governments unlawfully exploited COVID-19 to crack down on fundamental rights.2 Although conflicts and public health emergencies are not new, the report also tracks a number of …

Originally published in 1981. This is a book for the final year undergraduate or first year graduate who intends to proceed with serious research in philosophical logic. It will be welcomed by both lecturers and students for its careful consideration of main themes ranging from Gricean accounts of meaning to two dimensional modal logic. The first part of the book is concerned with the nature of the semantic theorist's project, and particularly with the crucial concepts of meaning, truth, and semantic structure. The second and third parts deal with various constructions that are found in natural languages: names, quantifiers, definite descriptions, and modal operators. Throughout, while assuming some familiarity with philosophical logic and elementary formal logic, the text provides a clear exposition. It brings together related ideas, and in some places refines and improves upon existing accounts.

We put forward a two-factor account of anosognosia for hemiplegia—more generally, anosognosia for motor impairments—considered as a delusion. Anosognosia is a patient’s lack of knowledge of their illness or impairment, and patients who lack knowledge of their motor impairments believe that they can still move limbs that are, in reality, paralysed. This belief fits the DSM-5 definition of delusion.In our two-factor account of anosognosia as a continued-belief delusion, the first factor—an impairment of the motor control system—results in an anomaly of experience. When patients try, but fail, to move their left arm, there is an anomalous absence of immediate bodily experience of movement failure—perhaps accompanied by an illusory experience of successful movement. However, even without immediate experience of movement failure, other evidence of the motor impairments would be available—including evidence from everyday mishaps consequent on the motor impairments. The second factor in our two-factor account results in patients being unable to use this evidence to evaluate and reject the delusional belief and achieve knowledge of their motor impairments. Cognitive impairments of memory, error detection, executive function or working memory are candidate second factors that could result in this failure of belief evaluation.

Philosophy has much to offer psychiatry, not least regarding ethical issues, but also issues regarding the mind, identity, values, and volition. This has become only more important as we have witnessed the growth and power of the pharmaceutical industry, accompanied by developments in the neurosciences. However, too few practising psychiatrists are familiar with the literature in this area. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry offers the most comprehensive reference resource for this area ever published. It assembles challenging and insightful contributions from key philosophers and others to the interactive fields of philosophy and psychiatry. Each contributions is original, stimulating, thorough, and clearly and engagingly written - with no potentially significant philosophical stone left unturned. Broad in scope, the book includes coverage of several areas of philosophy, including philosophy of mind, science, and ethics. For philosophers and psychiatrists, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry is a landmark publication in the field - one that will be of value to both students and researchers in this rapidly growing area.

INTRODUCTION: In accounts of the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor in this theory has been referred to only in the most general terms, as a failure in the processes of hypothesis evaluation, with no attempt to characterise those processes in any detail. Coltheart and Davies attempted such a characterisation, proposing a detailed eight-step model of how unexpected observations lead to new beliefs based on the concept of abductive inference as introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce. METHODS: In this paper, we apply that model to the explanation of various forms of delusional belief. RESULTS: We provide evidence that in cases of delusion there is a specific failure of the seventh step in our model: the step at which predictions from hypotheses are considered in the light of relevant evidence. CONCLUSIONS: In the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor consists of a failure to reject hypotheses in the face of disconfirmatory evidence.

INTRODUCTION: Capgras delusion is sometimes defined as believing that close relatives have been replaced by strangers. But such replacement beliefs also occur in response to encountering an acquaintance, or the voice of a familiar person, or a pet, or some personal possession. All five scenarios involve believing something familiar has been replaced by something unfamiliar. METHODS: We evaluate the proposal that these five kinds of delusional belief should count as subtypes of the same delusion. RESULTS: Personally familiar stimuli activate the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) much more strongly than unfamiliar stimuli. In Capgras delusion, this difference is absent, prompting the delusional idea that a familiar person is actually a stranger. We suggest this absence of an effect of familiarity on SNS response will occur in all five scenarios and will prompt the idea that the familiar has been replaced by the unfamiliar. CONCLUSIONS: We propose that: (a) all five scenarios be referred to as subtypes of Capgras delusion; (b) in all five, ideas about replacement are prompted by weakness of SNS responses to familiar stimuli; (c) this is insufficient to generate delusion. For a delusional idea to become a belief, a second factor (impaired hypothesis evaluation) must also be present.

In parts of the world, discussion regarding COVID-19 has shifted towards endemicity, and questions of living with, rather than directly battling, the virus. As a result, ethical questions are being refocussed. The imperative is beginning to shift towards what we can learn from the pandemic, and how we can better prepare for future global outbreaks. Among the questions that need to be addressed is what Covid-29 has taught us about how research can be conducted ethically during major global public health emergencies. It is widely accepted that research has an essential role to play in improving the effectiveness of health interventions in major public health crises.1 Even before COVID-19, a special series published in The Lancet highlighted the critical role of research in humanitarian crises, and lamented the paucity of good data on the effectiveness of health interventions in these particularly demanding contexts.2 The impact of expedited vaccine research on the mortality, morbidity and global disruption of the COVID-19 pandemic would be difficult to exaggerate. But it is clear that one important driver of vaccine hesitancy was public concern about the speed with which research into the vaccines was undertaken and hence the reliability of the data concerning their safety.3 Although for understandable reasons, the focus of attention on ethical research during the COVID-19 pandemic has been on vaccines and anti-virals, research in public health emergencies involves a wide range of activities designed to generate evidence, including social science research – which can be particularly critical in understanding barriers to vaccine uptake for example – along with epidemiological studies and health systems research. One widely acknowledged area of ethical tension concerning research in public health emergencies is between the need for rapid ethical review, and the strong moral requirement …

In a recent judgment1 the Court of Protection was highly critical of health professionals for continuing to provide clinically-assisted nutrition and hydration in the face of disagreement about the patient’s best interests, without seeking to resolve the issue. This hearing had been set up specifically to consider whether GU’s dignity had been properly protected, and if not why not, given concerns raised by the Official Solicitor about what she considered to be “a complete abrogation of responsibility to consider properly or at all, and to determine whether it was in GU’s best interests and therefore lawful to continue to give him an invasive medical treatment, CANH.” In April 2014, at 63 years old and living in Thailand, GU sustained severe injuries after suffering from an electrocution accident. He sustained a cardiorespiratory arrest with a significant delay before cardiopulmonary resuscitation was started and was unconscious and unresponsive. In September 2014 he was transferred to the UK. In August 2018, GU’s brother made a request for a best interests decision concerning the continuation of CANH. The family met to discuss this and all except GU’s son, agreed that continuing CANH was not in GU’s best interests. In view of the fact that there was not unanimity among the family, a decision was made that CANH should continue. Commenting on this decision, Mr Justice Hayden said ‘the apparent assumption that in the face of family disagreement ‘ therefore will continue to be cared for by nursing staff ” is a troubling non sequitur’ and stressed that ‘family dissent to a medical consensus should never stand in the way of an incapacitated patients’ best interests being properly identified’. He also made clear that the responsibility for ensuring that a best interests assessment is undertaken rests with the …

### Challenge to the abortion act 1967 dismissed In September, the High Court dismissed a judicial review of the Abortion Act 1967 that sought a judgement of incompatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights.1 The case focused on a clause in the Act which permits abortion in England, Scotland and Wales after 24 weeks if there is a substantial risk that, if the child were born, it would suffer from ‘such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped’. The case was brought by three parties: Heidi Crowter, a 24 year old woman living independently with Downs Syndrome and a campaigner for disability rights; a 2 year old boy with DS; and his mother who, when pregnant with him, felt pressure to terminate the pregnancy. The claimants sought a declaration that the clause was incompatible with the right to life; freedom from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment; right to private and family life; and protection from discrimination. Further to this it was also argued that the Act does not permit abortion on the basis that an unborn child has been diagnosed with a non-fatal fetal disability such as DS and that such abortions should not be funded by the state. In dismissing the claim, the judges focused on the ‘margin of appreciation’ that the European law allows domestic states on this issue and the fact that a foetus has never been deemed to have personhood status under the ECHR. The judges noted the ability to provide for a disabled child would vary significantly and that some conditions would only be found late in a pregnancy, after 24 weeks. Stating that the case by its nature did not permit the Court to hear from other perspectives, including women who may be affected by any change to the law and further criminalisation of abortion, the judges emphasised …

As the COVID-19 vaccine roll out continues apace, in the higher-income countries at least, concerns remain about the level of vaccine coverage in some health and social care settings. Although most countries have seen a relatively high uptake of vaccination against COVID-19 among staff, there continue to be some pockets of hesitancy. The risk of outbreaks in settings with potentially very vulnerable patients has led some governments across Europe to consider, or to introduce, measures compelling healthcare staff to be vaccinated. The justifiability of mandating the vaccination of healthcare professionals is a longstanding question but it has come to the fore in recent months following a resurgence of cases of COVID-19 and the prevalence of the more transmissible Delta variant. In deciding whether the introduction of a mandate is appropriate, states have to balance a range of ethical and practical considerations. A voluntary approach, backed up with education, respects healthcare workers’ autonomy to make private healthcare decisions, which is valued highly in liberal democracies. However, healthcare professionals also have an obligation to ensure that they do not present a risk of harm to their patients. Similarly, healthcare providers have a responsibility to take appropriate steps to minimise the risk of infection. Alongside balancing these rights and responsibilities, governments must also consider the potential consequences and risks of enforcing vaccine uptake. For example, there are concerns that a coercive approach could deepen mistrust and resentment among people who are genuinely fearful or hesitant. Moreover, a large number of refusals and the subsequent imposition of sanctions, such as suspension or redeployment, could affect the ability of providers to staff necessary services. In the UK, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland have all ruled out the introduction of compulsory vaccination. However, in July, the English Parliament voted through …

In June 2021, the BMA published its report on moral distress and moral injury in UK doctors.1 The report includes definitions of the terms ‘moral distress’ and ‘moral injury’ as well as a summary of how the concepts have developed over time. There is also an analysis of the BMA’s pan-profession survey of moral distress and moral injury of doctors in the UK, the first of its kind. The impact of COVID-19 and recommendations for tackling moral distress also feature. Many may be unfamiliar with the concepts of ‘moral distress’ and ‘moral injury’. These terms are relatively new, and debate is ongoing in academic circles on the best way to understand them.2 Some use the terms interchangeably. The BMA defines moral distress as the psychological unease generated where professionals identify an ethically correct action to take but are constrained in their ability to take that action. Even without an understanding of the morally correct action, moral distress can arise from the sense of a moral transgression. More simply, it is the feeling of unease stemming from situations where institutionally required behaviour does not align with moral principles. This can be as a result of a lack of power or agency, or structural limitations, such as insufficient staff, resources, training or time. The individual suffering from moral distress need not be the one who has acted or failed to act; moral distress can be caused by witnessing moral transgressions by others. Moral injury can arise where sustained moral distress leads to impaired function or longer-term psychological harm. Moral injury can produce profound guilt and shame, and in some cases also a sense of betrayal, anger and profound ‘moral disorientation’. It has also been linked to severe mental health issues. There is increasing recognition across the UK of the problem …

During the first UK wave of the pandemic, there were two areas of immediate ethical concern for the medical profession. The first was the possibility that life-saving resources could be overwhelmed. Early reports from hospitals in the Italian city of Bergamo suggested that ventilatory support might need rationing and emergency ‘battlefield’ triage was a real possibility.1 In the UK, several professional bodies, including the British Medical Association and the Royal College of Physicians rapidly developed guidance for doctors should triage become a reality.2 The second issue was the acute shortage of personal protective equipment. Where doctors were unable to protect their patients – and themselves – from the risk of COVID-19, ethical challenges emerged. Ordinarily, doctors and patients do not present risks of significant harm to each other. To shift to a position where every patient – and every health professional – could potentially be a threat presented serious clinical and ethical challenges. To treat with inadequate PPE, so options for mitigating harms are radically reduced, deepens the challenges. Among the questions the BMA wrestled with was the extent of doctors’ duties to treat infected or potentially infected patients in the absence of effective PPE. The BMA was clear that despite obligations to treat, medicine is not a self-sacrificing profession: there were limits to the risk doctors could be required to expose themselves to.3 These issues no longer seem so pressing. In the UK at least, there is adequate PPE and with the second steep wave behind us, and significant numbers vaccinated, it is less likely that triage will be required in the UK. But as those concerns have receded so other ethical questions have arisen. Among them is a cluster of issues associated with what might be called COVID-19’s indirect harms. Understandably, in response to …

In December, the National Data Guardian 1 for health and care in England, Dame Fiona Caldicott, published the outcomes of a public consultation about the Caldicott Principles and the role of Caldicott Guardians.1 The Caldicott Principles are good practice guidelines which have been used by health and social care organisations in the UK since 1997 to ensure that people’s data are kept safe and used in an ethical way.2 The role of the Caldicott Guardian is well-established in the UK. Caldicott Guardians are senior people which support the upholding of the Caldicott Principles within organisations. In response to views expressed during the consultation the NDG has added an eighth Caldicott Principle to the existing seven and will use her statutory powers to issue guidance about the appointment of Caldicott Guardians for health and adult social care organisations. The new eighth Caldicott Principle is: ‘Inform patients and service users about how their confidential information is used’. It provides that: > A range of steps should be taken to ensure no surprises for patients and service users, so they can have clear expectations about how and why their confidential information is used, and what choices they have about this. These steps will vary depending on the use: as a minimum, this should include providing accessible, relevant and appropriate information - in some cases, greater engagement will be required. The NDG explains that the introduction of the new principle was prompted by consideration of the role that the legal concept of ‘reasonable expectations’ should play in shaping the circumstances under which health and care data may be legitimately shared. The NDG does not envisage that this principle will establish reasonable expectations as a legal basis in its own right …

On 8 October 2020, the British Medical Association published the results of its survey of BMA members on physician-assisted dying. With 28 986 respondents, this was one of the largest surveys of medical opinion on this topic ever carried out. This represents 19.35% of those who received an invitation to participate and the respondents were broadly representative of the BMA’s overall membership. The BMA was clear throughout this process that the results of the survey would not determine its policy. Its current policy of opposition to all forms of physician-assisted dying would remain unless and until the Representative Body, which makes BMA policy, decided otherwise. The survey results would, however, inform a future debate on policy, currently scheduled to take place in June 2021. When asked what the BMA’s position should be on whether there should be a change in the law to allow doctors to prescribe drugs for an eligible patient to self-administer to end their own life, 40% said the BMA should be supportive, 33% opposed, 21% thought the BMA should be neutral and 6% were undecided. In relation to their own personal views, 50% were supportive, 39% opposed and 11% undecided. When asked whether they would be willing to participate in some way in the process, if it were to be legalised, 36% said yes, 45% said no and 19% were undecided. The same three questions were asked about a change in the law to allow doctors to administer drugs to end the life of an eligible patient. In response, 40% thought the BMA should oppose such a change, 30% thought the BMA should be supportive and 23% thought the BMA should be neutral; 7% of members responding were undecided on this question. In …

People acquire new beliefs in various ways. One of the most important of these is that new beliefs are acquired as a response to experiencing events that one did not expect. This involves a form of inference distinct from both deductive and inductive inference: abductive inference. The concept of abduction is due to the American pragmatist philosopher C. S. Peirce. Davies and Coltheart elucidated what Peirce meant by abduction, and identified two problems in his otherwise promising account requiring solution if that account were to become fully workable. Here we propose solutions to these problems and offer an explicit cognitive model of how people derive new beliefs from observations of unexpected events, based on Peirce's work and Sokolov's ideas about prediction error triggering new beliefs. We consider that this model casts light not only upon normal processes of belief formation but also upon the formation of delusional beliefs.

At the time of writing the COVID-19 pandemic was entering its ninth month, with nearly 800 000 recorded fatalities and 22 million infections in 188 countries and territories.1 In previous ethics briefings2 we raised concerns about the possibility that demand for life-sustaining treatment would overwhelm supply, with a consequent requirement for health professionals to make challenging triage decisions. Fortunately, to date, these have largely not been realised, although there is a possibility that countries in which containment measures have been less-successful, such as South Africa, may still be required to triage.3 Despite the successful ‘flattening of the curve’ in many countries, there is a wide consensus that we remain firmly within the pandemic. Enormous practical challenges remain. It is unclear whether the pandemic will ultimately take the form of two or more successive waves, or whether the patchwork of global responses will lead to a sustained slow ‘burn’ with sporadic flare-ups.4 Areas of uncertainty include whether infection confers some immunity, how long any such immunity might last, whether effective vaccines can be developed and if seasonal temperature fluctuations alter the spread of the virus. The pandemic will also be fundamentally shaped by the decisions that governments make and the extent to which their diktats are complied with by citizens. With the – possibly temporary – retreat of urgent clinical ethics issues, such as triage, opportunities have arisen to reflect on some of the ethical questions that underlie and structure the demanding policy decisions that governments are wrestling with. One of the early questions was how to balance the complex constellation of costs and benefits associated with lockdown. Countries that …

In November 2011, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) published its updated clinical guidelines on ‘The care of women requesting induced abortion’.1 Key changes from the previous 2004 guidelines include, among other things, that services should identify vulnerable women, for example, women being subjected to domestic abuse, and refer them on to appropriate support services; that women should be offered screening for sexually transmitted infections and there should be a system for partner notification and referral to a sexual health service; and that all appropriate methods of contraception should be discussed with women at the initial assessment and a plan agreed for contraception after the abortion. Recent debate around abortion in the UK has focused on the emotional and mental health impact of abortion. The new guidelines recommend that women should be informed about the range of emotional responses they may experience during and following an abortion, but the guidelines are clear that women with a past history of mental health problems are at increased risk of further problems after an unintended pregnancy, whether they abort or continue with a pregnancy. Other women are no more or less likely to experience adverse psychological sequelae. The RCOG's updated guidelines were swiftly followed by the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges' publication ‘Induced abortion and mental health: a systematic review of the mental health impact of induced abortion’.2 The purpose of the review was to examine the evidence of the impact of abortion upon women's mental health. The Academy's conclusions echoed the RCOG's guidelines. On the basis of the best evidence available, the review's steering group concluded that having an unwanted pregnancy is associated with an increased risk of mental health problems. The rates of mental health problems for women with an unwanted pregnancy are the same, however, whether …