Martin Davies

Thinking about the Enlightenmentlooks beyond the current parameters of studying the Enlightenment, to the issues that can be understood by reflecting on the period in a broader context. Each of the thirteen original chapters, by an international and interdisciplinary team of contributors, illustrates the problematic legacy of the Enlightenment and the continued ramifications of its thinking since the eighteenth century. Together, they consider whether modernity can see its roots in the intellectual revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The collection is divided into six sections, preceded by a comprehensive introduction to the field and the most recent scholarship on the period. Across the sections, the contributors consider modern day encounters with Enlightenment thinking, including Kant's moral philosophy, the conflict between reason and faith, the significance of the Enlightenment of law and the gender inequality that persisted throughout the eighteenth century. By examining specific encounters with the problematic results of Enlightenment concerns, the contributors are able to illuminate and offer new perspectives on topics such as human nature, race, politics, gender and rationality. Drawing from history, philosophy, literature and anthropology, this book enables students and academics alike to take a fresh look at the Enlightenment and its legacy in the modern world.

In August 2012, the drug manufacturer, Fresenius Kabi, barred the sale of the anaesthetic, propofol, for use in lethal injections. The company announced that it would not accept orders for the drug from US departments of correction, and put in place similar requirements on all its wholesalers and distributors.1Propofol is one of the world's most widely used anaesthetics. Earlier in 2012, US states began to use propofol in executions following shortages of other drugs which had previously been used in lethal injections. In May 2012, the state of Missouri decided to move to a one-drug protocol, using propofol alone for lethal injections, in place of the three-drug protocol that had been used by most states carrying out the death penalty. Missouri took this decision when supplies of thiopental sodium and pentobarbital, drugs used in the three-drug protocol, became unavailable.2Fresenius Kabi said that it had imposed the restrictions in order to ‘prevent Propofol from being used for purposes other than its approved medical indications’ and to ensure that ‘the immediate access to Propofol needed by medical professionals’ was not hindered. The company said that it objected to the use of its products in any manner that was not in full accordance with the medical indications for which they have been approved by health authorities.3 All forms of Fresenius Kabi propofol are manufactured in Europe. A European Union Council regulation prevents products that may reasonably be expected to be used in executions from being exported from the EU. The company said that, should propofol begin to be used in executions in the USA, inadequate access to the drug in the country was a likely consequence. At the time of writing, the US Food and Drug Administration was reporting shortages of the drug in the USA for …

This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Female Genital Mutilation (England, Wales and Northern Ireland) Act 2003.1 i The Act makes it an offence for any person to excise, infibulate or otherwise mutilate the whole or any part of a female's labia majora, labia minora or clitoris, or to aid, abet, counsel or procure the mutilation by another person. The exception is where a surgical or obstetric procedure is clinically indicated. There has long been UK legalisation against female genital mutilation (FGM) but the 2003 Act extended the criminal offence to UK nationals and permanent residents who are overseas, including in countries where the practice is legal. A person found guilty of an offence under the Act can be imprisoned for up to 14 years. Precise figures for the number of girls and women who have undergone, or who are at risk of FGM, in the UK, are hard to establish because of the secrecy surrounding the practice. It is estimated, however, that over 21 000 girls under the age of 15, in England and Wales, are at high risk of FGM.2 Despite this prevalence, recent clinical and policy guidelines3,4 and the legislative framework to prosecute, there have been no prosecutions for FGM in the UK. Worryingly, there is a suggestion that some girls are being brought to the UK for FGM, as the UK is seen as having ‘fewer controls’ and ‘less awareness about FGM’. A recent quote in the BMJ noted ‘People from many countries in Europe go to the UK for this purpose’.5 In response to the lack of prosecutions, in November 2012, the Crown Prosecution Service launched an action plan for improving prosecutions. Action points include: gathering more robust data on allegations of FGM; raising with Ministers what the existing reporting …

In England, Wales and Scotland, the vast majority of abortions take place in the first trimester of pregnancy. In 2009, for example, 91% of abortions were carried out at under 13 weeks gestation for women resident in England and Wales. 1 Early abortion opens up the opportunity for a woman to have a medical abortion rather than a surgical abortion. Medical abortion is considered to be less invasive and less expensive than surgical abortion, and is increasingly becoming the preferred method. 1 The proportion of medical abortions to surgical abortions has doubled in the last five years with 52% of abortions being medical abortions under 9 weeks gestation in 2009. A medical abortion typically involves taking mifepristone to block the hormones that help a pregnancy to continue, and then later on misoprostol, which makes the womb expel the embryo/fetus, usually within 4–6 h. Current legislation requires that both sets of drugs are administered in an NHS hospital or approved place, but women can go home after taking the second dose of drugs to complete the abortion. There has long been disagreement between the Department of Health and the British Pregnancy Advisory Services about what constitutes ‘any treatment for the termination of pregnancy’ under the Abortion Act 1967, specifically whether a woman taking the second set of drugs is considered to be undergoing the ‘treatment’ and is therefore required to be present in premises permitted under the Act. At the end of 2010, BPAS went to the High Court to challenge the Department of Health's view that the legislation requires women to take both sets of drugs in an approved place. BPAS argued that ‘treatment’ stops at the point of prescription and women should be able to go home, …

Court of appeal ruling on assisted dyingIn July 2013, the Court of Appeal ruled on an assisted dying case brought by Paul Lamb, a 58-year-old man who has been quadriplegic and without function in any of his limbs, apart from a little movement in his right hand, since a car accident in 1990.1 Mr Lamb was permitted by the Court to take over the legal case of Tony Nicklinson, who died in August 2012, less than a week after his request for judicial review was rejected by the High Court.2 Like Mr Nicklinson, the severity of Mr Lamb's injuries means that he is unable to take his own life, other than by starvation. He would like his life to be ended, preferably by lethal injection administered at home, and does not want to travel to Switzerland for an assisted suicide.Mr Lamb's case was heard, along with that of Mr Nicklinson's wife and that of another man, ‘Martin’, in the Court of Appeal in May.The Court identified three issues from the parties’ submissions: The common law should provide a defence to murder where that takes the form of euthanasia in circumstances where another party is giving effect to the settled wish of a competent person. The legal prohibitions on those providing assistance constitute a disproportionate interference with Article 8 rights to a private and family life. The Director of Public Prosecution's policy statement on factors which he will take into account when considering whether or not to exercise his discretion in favour of prosecuting does not satisfy the …

Ever so often in the UK, there is a flurry of activity around the information requirements of donor-conceived individuals. In April 2013, it was the launch of a report from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics that brought the issue back to public consciousness.1Since 1991, information about treatment with donor gametes or embryos has been collected by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. Since then, over 35 000 donor-conceived individuals have been born through treatment in licensed clinics. Medical information and information about donors’ appearance are collected by clinics, and donors are encouraged to put together a ‘pen portrait’ giving information about themselves for any resulting children. One focus of the new report is on improving the quality and quantity of information available about donors.Traditionally, gamete and embryo donations were practised on an anonymous basis, so that those born as a result of such donation may receive only non-identifying information about the donor when they reach the age of 18. This changed in 2005 when donor anonymity was removed so that anyone donating after that time could be identified to individuals born as a result of the treatment. Those who have donated in the past are also able to reregister as identifiable donors. Much concern was expressed at the time that this would exacerbate the shortage of donors although the Nuffield Council on Bioethics reports that, 8 years on, those clinics that actively recruit donors appear to be successful in finding sufficient donors. The report recommends that the option of anonymous donation should not be reintroduced.A big issue of debate in the UK has been, and continues to be, whether parents should tell their …

Inattentional blindness studies have shown that an unexpected object may go unnoticed if it does not share the property specified in the task instructions. Our aim was to demonstrate that observers develop an attentional set for a property not specified in the task instructions if it allows easier performance of the primary task. Three experiments were conducted using a dynamic selective-looking paradigm. Stimuli comprised four black squares and four white diamonds, so that shape and colour varied together. Task instructions specified shape but observers developed an attentional set for colour, because we made the black–white discrimination easier than the square–diamond discrimination. None of the observers instructed to count bounces by squares reported an unexpected white square, whereas two-thirds of observers instructed to count bounces by diamonds did report the white square. When attentional set departs from task instructions, you may fail to see what you were told to look for.

The rubber hand paradigm is used to create the illusion of self-touch, by having the participant administer stimulation to a prosthetic hand while the Examiner, with an identical stimulus, administers stimulation to the participant’s hand. With synchronous stimulation, participants experience the compelling illusion that they are touching their own hand. In the current study, the robustness of this illusion was assessed using incongruent stimuli. The participant used the index finger of the right hand to administer stimulation to a prosthetic hand while the Examiner used a paintbrush to administer stimulation to the participant’s left hand. The results indicate that this violation of tactile expectations does not diminish the illusion of self-touch. Participants experienced the illusion despite the use of incongruent stimuli, both when vision was precluded and when visual feedback provided clear evidence of the tactile mismatch.

A simple experimental paradigm creates the powerful illusion that one is touching one’s own hand even when the two hands are separated by 15 cm. The participant uses her right hand to administer stimulation to a prosthetic hand while the Examiner provides identical stimulation to the participant’s receptive left hand. Change in felt position of the receptive hand toward the prosthetic hand has previously led to the interpretation that the participant experiences self-touch at the location of the prosthetic hand, and experiences a sense of ownership of the prosthetic hand. Our results argue against this interpretation. We assessed change in felt position of the participant’s receptive hand but we also assessed change in felt position of the participant’s administering hand. Change in felt position of the administering hand was significantly greater than change in felt position of the receptive hand. Implications for theories of ownership are discussed.