•  138
    Externalism and armchair knowledge
    In Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford University Press. pp. 384--414. 2000.
    [I]f you could know a priori that you are in a given mental state, and your being in that state conceptually or logically implies the existence of external objects, then you could know a priori that the external world exists. Since you obviously _can.
  •  16
    Psychological understanding and social skills
    with Tony Stone
    In Betty Repacholi & Virginia Slaughter (eds.), Individual Differences in Theory of Mind: Implications for Typical and Atypical Development, Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press. 2003.
    _In B. Repacholi and V. Slaughter (eds), _Individual Differences in Theory of Mind: Implications for Typical and Atypical__ __Development_. Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science. Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press, 2003._
  •  402
    Cognitive neuropsychology and the philosophy of mind
    with Tony Stone
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4): 589-622. 1993.
  • Professor Strawson was interviewed on video on location at King's College, London during the Spring of 1992. Professor Strawson discusses his thoughts on a variety of topics on which he has written previously, providing some illuminating insights into how his thoughts has progressed. The text published here is en excerpt from this interview, translated with kind permission of Mr Rudolf V. Fara, the producer, in which prof. Strawson discusses his philosophical views with Martin Davies, Wilde Read…Read more
  •  411
    Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account
    with Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon, and Nora Breen
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2): 133-158. 2001.
    Article copyright 2002. We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher's view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experien…Read more
  •  59
    Ethics briefings
    with Eleanor Chrispin, Sophie Brannan, Veronica English, and Rebecca Mussell
    Journal of Medical Ethics 36 (6): 375-377. 2010.
    There has long been debate about the degree to which conventional health professionals should work closely with complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) practitioners, if patients choose treatment from both. Some doctors are trained in conventional and alternative therapies but often, liaison depends on the type of therapy, whether it is regulated by law and whether it supplements conventional methods of diagnosis and treatment or claims to provide an alternative to them. Among the therapies…Read more
  •  373
    Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission and Easy Knowledge
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1): 213-245. 2004.
  •  18
    Philosophisch-medizinische Aufsätze
    with Marcus Herz
    . 1997.
  •  34
    Externalism, self-knowledge and transmission of warrant
    In Maria Frapolli & Esther Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge, University of Chicago Press. 2002.
    Externalism about some mental property, M, is the thesis that whether a person (or other physical being) has M depends, not only on conditions inside the person.
  •  54
    Ethics briefings
    with Sophie Brannan, Eleanor Chrispin, Veronica English, and Rebecca Mussell
    Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (7): 483-484. 2013.
    Ever so often in the UK, there is a flurry of activity around the information requirements of donor-conceived individuals. In April 2013, it was the launch of a report from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics that brought the issue back to public consciousness.1Since 1991, information about treatment with donor gametes or embryos has been collected by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. Since then, over 35 000 donor-conceived individuals have been born through treatment in licensed c…Read more
  •  74
    Simulation theory
    with Tony Stone
    In Tim Crane (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online, Routledge. 2018.
    Mental simulation is the simulation, replication or re-enactment, usually in imagination, of the thinking, decision-making, emotional responses, or other aspects of the mental life of another person. According to simulation theory, mental simulation in imagination plays a key role in our everyday psychological understanding of other people. The same mental resources that are used in our own thinking, decision-making or emotional responses are redeployed in imagination to provide an understanding…Read more
  •  170
    Tactile expectations and the perception of self-touch: An investigation using the rubber hand paradigm
    with Rebekah C. White, Anne M. Aimola Davies, and Terri J. Halleen
    Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2): 505-519. 2010.
    The rubber hand paradigm is used to create the illusion of self-touch, by having the participant administer stimulation to a prosthetic hand while the Examiner, with an identical stimulus , administers stimulation to the participant’s hand. With synchronous stimulation, participants experience the compelling illusion that they are touching their own hand. In the current study, the robustness of this illusion was assessed using incongruent stimuli. The participant used the index finger of the rig…Read more
  •  199
    Consciousness and the varieties of aboutness
    In Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Blackwell. pp. 2. 1994.
    Thinking is special. There is nothing quite like it. Thinking.
  • Poggio Bracciolini
    In Jill Kraye (ed.), Cambridge translations of Renaissance philosophical texts, Cambridge University Press. pp. 135. 1997.
  • The Fogelin Panel
    with W. V. Quine, Robert J. Fogelin, Paul Horwich, and Rudolf Fara
    Philosophy International. 1994.
  •  205
    Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate (edited book)
    with Tony Stone
    Blackwell. 1995.
    Many philosophers and psychologists argue that normal adult human beings possess a primitive or 'folk' psychological theory. Recently, however, this theory has come under challenge from the simulation alternative. This alternative view says that human bings are able to predict and explain each others' actions by using the resources of their own minds to simuate the psychological etiology of the actions of others. The thirteen essays in this volume present the foundations of theory of mind debate…Read more
  •  22
    He then argues that (1), (2) and (3) constitute an inconsistent triad as follows (1991, p. 15): Suppose (1) that Oscar knows a priori that he is thinking that water is wet. Then by (2), Oscar can simply deduce E, using premisses that are knowable a priori, including the premiss that he is thinking that water is wet. Since Oscar can deduce E from premisses that are knowable a priori, Oscar can know E itself a priori. But this contradicts (3), the assumption that E cannot be known a priori. Hence …Read more
  •  45
    Ethics briefings
    with Sophie Brannan, Eleanor Chrispin, Samuel Mason, and Rebecca Mussell
    Journal of Medical Ethics 36 (9): 574-576. 2010.
    Proponents of fetal rights argue that, from the moment of conception, a fetus has significant human rights. There are degrees of opinion, however, about the scope of those rights, with some arguing that, in certain circumstances, such as where the conception is the result of rape, the mother's rights predominate. Others argue that the fetus' rights are absolute and should override the woman's right to life and health so that pregnancies cannot be terminated, even to save women's lives. Various c…Read more
  •  305
    In his paper ‘Scmantic Theory and Tacit Knowlcdgc’, Gareth Evans uscs a familiar kind of cxamplc in ordcr to render vivid his account of tacit knowledge. We arc to consider a finite language, with just one hundrcd scntcnccs. Each scntcncc is made up of a subjcct (a name) and a prcdicatc. The names are ‘a’, ‘b’,..., T. The prcdicatcs arc ‘F’, ‘G’,..., ‘O’. Thc scntcnccs have meanings which dcpcnd in a systematic way upon their construction. Thus, all scntcnccs containing ‘a’ mean something about …Read more
  •  119
    Externalism and experience
    In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Mit Press. pp. 244-250. 1997.
    In this paper, I shall defend externalism for the contents of perceptual experience. A perceptual experience has representational properties; it presents the world as being a certain way. A visual experience, for example, might present the world to a subject as containing a surface with a certain shape, lying at a certain distance, in a certain direction; perhaps a square with sides about 30 cm, lying about one metre in front of the subject, in a direction about 20 degrees to the left of straigh…Read more
  •  105
    Relevance and mutual knowledge
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4): 716-717. 1987.
  •  365
    Folk psychology and mental simulation
    with Tony Stone
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 53-82. 1998.
    This paper is about the contemporary debate concerning folk psychology – the debate between the proponents of the theory theory of folk psychology and the friends of the simulation alternative.<sup>1</sup> At the outset, we need to ask: What should we mean by this term ‘folk psychology’?
  •  58
    Aunty's own argument for the language of thought
    In Jes Ezquerro (ed.), Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 235--271. 1992.
  •  167
  •  133
    Inference and explanation in cognitive neuropsychology
    with Max Coltheart
    Cortex 39 (1): 188-191. 2003.
    The question posed by Dunn and Kirsner (D&K) is an instance of a more general one: What can we infer from data? One answer, if we are talking about logically valid deductive inference, is that we cannot infer theories from data. A theory is supposed to explain the data and so cannot be a mere summary of the data to be explained. The truth of an explanatory theory goes beyond the data and so is never logically guaranteed by the data. This is not just a point about cognitive neuropsychology, or ev…Read more
  •  38
    Martin Davies draws parallels between Herz's personal life and Prussian politics and culture to make sense of the end of the eighteenth century when Enlightenment tradition and Romantic thought coincided.